We all felt deeply moved watching Liri Albag, Naama Levy, Karina Ariev, and Daniela Gilboa return to Israel’s borders and into the embrace of their families, joining Romi Gonen, Emily Damari, and Doron Steinbrecher, who were released last week.

Despite Hamas’ attempts to stage their release as a propaganda spectacle — and the Palestinian celebrations about the release of heinous murderers from Israeli prisons — Emily Damari’s brave gestures remind us of the profound differences between the narratives embraced by each side.

In 2014, following the kidnapping and murder of Israeli soldiers Gil-Ad Michael Shaer, Eyal Yifrach, and Naftali Fraenkel, a new visual symbol emerged in the Palestinian street: three raised fingers.

This gesture, initially a reaction to the kidnapping, quickly evolved into a powerful propaganda emblem, gaining significant traction on social media. A Facebook page titled “3 شلاليط ثم اقتحامات ثم انتفاضة ثالثة” (“Three ‘Shalits,’ then an invasion, then a third Intifada”) framed the kidnapping as part of a broader historical narrative of resistance. Drawing parallels to the abduction of Gilad Shalit, the gesture aimed to amplify a sense of Palestinian “victory.”

However, like many narratives in the digital age, this one had a short lifespan. The Facebook page ceased activity after a few months, and the symbol faded from public discourse. The dynamic nature of social media reduced this emblem to a fleeting memory — momentary propaganda rooted in violence and death.

Reclaiming the Symbol: The Israeli Side

A decade later, the world has changed. During the events of October 7, 2023, and the “Iron Swords” war, Palestinian narratives resurfaced rapidly across social media. Yet, alongside them, a completely new narrative emerged from the Israeli side.

The abduction of Emily Damari, a young woman taken from her home in Kfar Aza by Hamas terrorists, became an extraordinary symbol. During her abduction, Emily suffered injuries to her hand, leading to the amputation of two of her fingers. Yet her resilience and courage never wavered. Upon her release, Emily prominently displayed her hand, missing two fingers, as a symbol of the indomitable Israeli spirit.

Her bravery was also evident in her request to the terrorists to release 65-year-old Keith Sigal before her — an extraordinary act of humanity in the face of captivity’s horrors.

A stark contrast emerges between the Palestinian use of three fingers and the Israeli use of the same symbol.

While the Palestinian gesture celebrated violent “victory” through kidnapping and murder, the Israeli narrative draws strength from the pursuit of life, survival, and hope. Emily Damari’s hand has become a gesture of life triumphing over death, courage overcoming violence, and hope transcending despair. In many ways, it embodies the entire story of Zionism.

This powerful gesture serves as a reminder of the fundamental difference between us and our enemies. We celebrate life and courage, while they revel in death and hatred. Even in these challenging days, we continue to choose hope and life. This choice is the source of our strength and our enduring resolve.

“There is hope for your future, declares the Lord, and your children will return to their own land” (Jeremiah 31:17).

Itamar Tzur is an Israeli scholar and Middle East expert who holds a Bachelor’s degree with honors in Jewish History and a Master’s degree with honors in Middle Eastern Studies. As a senior member of the “Forum Kedem for Middle Eastern Studies and Public Diplomacy”. Tzur leverages his academic expertise to enhance understanding of regional dynamics and historical contexts within the Middle East.

The post The Three-Finger Symbol: A Narrative of Death vs. A Narrative of Life first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

During the coming year, the United States, in occasional concert with Israel, must confront expanding terrorist threats. Topping pertinent concerns in Washington and Jerusalem will be an assortment of jihadi groups, some spawned by the al-Assad regime collapse in Syria and some by coinciding reconfigurations of Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Houthi criminals. Also predictable are (1) strengthened and dispersed Fatah units beyond Judea/Samaria (West Bank); and (2) variously lethal synergies between criminal terrorist organizations that include al-Qaeda and ISIS remnants.

Under the protective tutelage of an American president, “We the People” are entitled to expect basic safety in world politics. At a minimum, we should all be able to assume that wider and consistently capable circles of public authority remain poised to thwart terror attacks.

In terms of United States law, the authoritative roots of core security assurances go back to 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Though likely unfamiliar to America’s current president and his senior defense advisors, Hobbes’ Leviathan was integral to the political thought of Thomas Jefferson. The erudite author of the Declaration was widely read by all categories of educated persons.

Regarding US counterterrorist preparation, America’s national security establishment must get ready for all contingencies, most plainly jihadi terrorists who seek “martyrdom.” This includes fashioning conceptual foundations for future Osama Bin-Laden “elimination-type” operations.

During the Obama years, one conspicuously major targeted killing of a jihadi terrorist was the September 2011 US drone-assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. That case was notably “special” in one generally overlooked or underestimated aspect: Jihadi al-Alwaki was born in New Mexico, and was therefore a US citizen. At the same time, despite the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment protections regarding “due process,” it represented a tactical option that could sometime need to be repeated.

Here, a presumptively effective tactic would simultaneously undermine American law and justice.

What should be decided in Washington? Each and every trade-off option would be injurious. Even if we take with utmost seriousness Cicero’s reasonable injunction (“The safety of the people shall be the highest law”), it’s not clear which operational choices would best serve such indispensable “safety?”

What precise legal guidelines should Americans follow in these settings?

To respond properly, Trump and his designated counselors will need to inquire: “Is it sufficiently legal to target and kill jihadi terrorists if precise linkages between prospective targets and discernible attack intentions can be documented?”

To meaningfully answer this critical question, it will first be necessary for Trump’s national security officials to ask whether a proposed terrorist killing plan would be gainfully preemptive or just narrowly retributive. If the latter, a judgment wherein national self-defense was not in any way the underlying operational rationale, authoritative determinations of legality could become more problematic. It would not be sensible to launch risky defensive actions against terrorist adversaries solely because these actions could meet jurisprudential standards.

 It gets even more complicated.

Assassination is explicitly prohibited by US law. (See Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1988), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.  Sec. 401 (1988)). Generally, it is also a crime under international law, which, though not widely understood, is part of American domestic law.

Still, at least in certain more-or-less residual circumstances, the targeted killing of jihadi terrorist leaders could be correctly excluded from ordinarily prohibited behaviors. Accordingly, such peremptorily protective actions could still be defended as permissible expressions of national law-enforcement.

A similar defense could sometimes be applied to the considered killing of terrorist “rank-and-file,” especially where such selective lethality had become part of an already-ongoing pattern of US counter-terrorism. Earlier, for example, the United States widened the scope of its permissible terrorist targeting in parts of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. This widened arc of permissibility — one which now modifies more stringent rules of engagement concerning human target identification — represented a byproduct of continuously developing drone technologies.

In the best of all possible worlds, there would be no need for any decentralized or “vigilante” expressions of international justice. Obviously, we don’t yet live in such an ideal world. Instead, enduring uneasily in an historically anarchic world order- – a context that international law professors prefer to call “Westphalian.”

At some still-indeterminable point, terrorist escalations could lead to instances of chemical, biological or nuclear attack. These unprecedented attacks (ones that are sui generis in law) might be undertaken by assorted sub-state adversaries or by certain “hybrid” combinations of state and sub-state foes. Ironically, in the policies of US ally Israel, dominant concerns have centered on Iran-Hezbollah and Iran/Hamas combinations. Here, an evident irony stems from the fact that one Iranian surrogate (Hezbollah) is Shiite while the other (Hamas) is Sunni.

In our persistently anarchic and prospectively chaotic world legal system, assorted jihadi leaders are already responsible for the mass killing of noncombatant men, women, and children of many different nationalities. It follows that wherever such leaders are not suitably “terminated” by the United States or Israel in the tumultuous Middle East, egregious terror crimes will almost certainly continue and be left unpunished.

Any impunity would be inconsistent with the universal legal obligation to punish international crimes, a jus cogens or peremptory obligation reaffirmed at the original Nuremberg Tribunal and in the subsequent Nuremberg Principles.

Inevitably, complex considerations of law and tactics will intersect and inter-penetrate. In this connection, the glaring indiscriminacy of most jihadist operations is rarely if ever the result of adversarial inadvertence. Typically, it is the intentional outcome of violent terrorist inclinations, unambiguously murderous ideals that lay embedded in the jihadist terrorist leader’s operative views of insurgency.

For jihadists, there can never be meaningful distinctions between civilians and non-civilians, between innocents and non-innocents. For these active or latent terrorist murderers, all that really matters are unassailably immutable distinctions between Muslims, “apostates” and “unbelievers.”

As for the apostates and unbelievers, it’s quite simple. Their lives, believe the jihadists, have no value. Prima facie, they have no immunizing sanctity. In law, both international and national, every government has the right and obligation to protect its citizens against external harms.

Usually, assassination is a certifiable crime under international law. Yet, in our essentially decentralized system of world law, extraordinary self-help by individual states is often necessary, and more-then-occasionally the only real alternative to passively sufferance of terror crimes. In the absence of particular targeted killings, terrorists would continue to create havoc against defenseless civilians almost anywhere of their choosing and with unjust impunity.

A basic difficulty is that jihadi terror criminals are usually immune to the more orthodox legal expectations of extradition and prosecution (aut dedere, aut judicare). This is not to suggest that the targeted killing of terrorists will always “work” — there is literally nothing to support the logic of any such suggestion — but only that disallowing such killing ex ante might not be operationally gainful or legally just.

If carried out with aptly due regard for pertinent “rules,” targeting terrorist leaders could remain consistent with the ancient legal principle of Nullum crimen sine poena, “No crime without a punishment.” Earlier, this original principle of justice had been cited as a dominant rationale for both the Tokyo and Nuremberg war crime tribunals. Subsequently, it was incorporated into customary international law, an authoritative source of law identified inter alia at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

 By both the codified and customary standards of contemporary international law, all terrorists are hostes humani generis, or “common enemies of humankind.” Still, choosing precisely which terrorists ought to be targeted remains a largely ideological rather than jurisprudential matter.

Overall, in his consideration of assassination or targeted-killing as counter-terrorism, President Trump should consider the clarifying position of 18th century Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel in his most famous work, The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law (1758): “The safest plan is to prevent evil where that is possible. A Nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force and every other just means of resistance against the aggressor.”

Even earlier, the right of self-defense by forestalling an attack had been asserted by the foundational Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius, in Book II of The Law of War and Peace (1625). Recognizing the need for what later jurisprudence would reference as threatening international behavior that is “imminent in point of time,” Grotius indicated that self-defense must be permitted not only after an attack has already been suffered, but also in advance, where “the deed may be anticipated.”

Further on, in the same chapter, Grotius summarized: “It be lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill.” Interestingly, Vattel, Pufendorf and Grotius were all taken into primary account by Thomas Jefferson in the American Declaration of Independence.

International law is not a suicide pact. “Where the ordinary remedy fails, recourse must be had to an extraordinary one.”

Donald Trump is obligated to comply with the rules and procedures of humanitarian international law, yet he must also bear in mind that jihadist enemies will remain unaffected by these or any other jurisprudential expectations. Assassination and broader forms of preemption may sometimes be not only allowable under binding international law, but indispensable.

Conversely, there are occasions when strategies of assassination could be determinedly legal but be operationally ineffectual. Recalling the close connections between international law and US law — connections that extend to direct and literal forms of “incorporation” – -an American president can never choose to dismiss the law of war on grounds that it is “merely international.”Always, President Trump should consider decipherable connections between targeted killings, counter-terrorism, and United States Constitutional Law.

Under US law, we are bound to inquire, should an American president ever be authorized to order the extra-judicial killing of a United States citizen — even one deemed an “enemy combatant” — without meaningful reference to “due process of law?” On its face, any affirmative response to this query would be difficult to defend under the US Constitution.

Operational approval would need to be based upon a reasonably presumed high urgency of terror threat. Any such allegedly “authorized” targeted killing of US citizens would express potentially irremediable tension between indissoluble citizen rights and peremptory requirements of public safety. Going forward with obligatory counter terrorist preparations, the US president will need to keep this firmly in mind.

US policy on assassination or targeted killing will have to reflect a very delicate balance. Most important, in any such calculation, will be the protection of civilian populations from jihadist terror-inflicted harms. In those circumstances where harms would involve unconventional weapons of any sort — chemical, biological or nuclear — the legal propriety of targeting jihadists could be patently obvious (per Cicero, above) and “beyond reasonable doubt.”

In sum, for both the United States and Israel, legal assessments of targeted killing ought never be undertaken apart from correlative operational expectations. This means that before any “extraordinary remedies” should be applied, these measures would be not only legally correct, but tactically cost-effective. In the end, as we may finally be reminded by Cicero in The Laws, “The safety of the people shall be the highest law.”

Louis René Beres, Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, is the author of many books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war, including Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1980) and Security or Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy (D.C. Heath/Lexington, 1986). His twelfth book, Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel’s Nuclear Strategy, was published by Rowman and Littlefield in 2016. A version of this article was originally published by Jewish Business News.

The post What the Law Actually Says About Targeting Jihadist Terrorists first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

As Israel celebrates the release of seven of the hostages kidnapped on October 7, 2023 and anticipates the release of more over 42 days, every Israeli dreads the consequences of the dangerous price extorted on the Jewish State by Hamas.

For just 33 hostages alone, Israel has agreed to release over 1,900 terrorists, including many murderers, such as Wael Qassem, who is serving 35 life sentences.

General Security Service Director Ronen Bar told Israel’s security cabinet last week that 82% of the 1,024 terrorists released in exchange for Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit in 2011 “returned to terrorism.”

The leaders of Hamas who planned and led the October 7 massacre were released terrorist prisoners. Thousands of Israelis have been murdered as a direct result of previous terrorist-hostage exchanges.

To display the nature of the danger, Palestinian Media Watch has prepared a list of the names of 80 of the terrorist murderers to be released with descriptions of some of their crimes.

Note that among those being released are terror commanders, who planned and organized murders by suicide bombing, shooting, and stabbing; bomb builders; and terrorists who murdered with their own hands by stabbing and shooting.

As in the past, the majority of those being released now will return to their former positions and be the leaders and foundation of Palestinian terrorism for years to come.

Wael Qassem – Serving 35 life sentences. Led a cell responsible for three suicide bombing attacks in 2002 — Café Moment, the Hebrew University cafeteria, and the Sheffield Club, murdering 35 in total.

Ammar Al-Ziben – Serving 32 life sentences. Hamas. Planned several suicide bombings, including the double suicide bombing at the Mahane Yehuda outdoor market in 1997, murdering 16.

Majdi Za’atri – Serving 23 life sentences. Hamas. Planned and assisted a suicide bombing in 2003 — drove a suicide bomber to a bus stop in Jerusalem where the bomber boarded the #2 bus and blew himself up, murdering 23, including children and babies.

Ahmad Salah – Serving 21 life sentences. Involved in two Jerusalem suicide bus bombings in 2004, murdering 19 people and injuring over 100.

Sami Jaradat – Serving 21 life sentences. Head of Islamic Jihad in the Jenin district. Planned several attacks, including the 2003 suicide bombing at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa, where 21 people were murdered and over 50 were injured.

Fahmi Mashahreh – Serving 20 life sentences. Aided and instructed suicide bomber Muhammad Al-Ghoul, who murdered 19 and wounded 74 on a Jerusalem bus in 2002.

Shadi Ibrahim Ammouri – Serving 17 life sentences. Islamic Jihad. Prepared the bomb for the 2002 Megiddo Junction bombing in which 17 were murdered and 43 were wounded on the #830 bus from Tel Aviv to Tiberias.

Salim Hijja – Serving 16 life sentences. Assisted a suicide bomber in blowing up a bus in Haifa in 2001, murdering 15 and injuring 40.

Mansour Shreim – Serving 14 life sentences. Participated in the murder of an Israeli soldier near Kibbutz Metzer in 2001. Sent terrorists to carry out attacks, including an attack at a Bat Mitzvah celebration in Hadera in 2002, where 6 were murdered and over 30 were injured, and an attack in the town of Itamar in 2002, where 3 teenagers were murdered.

Muhammad Naifeh ‘Abu Rabia’ – Serving 13 life sentences. Tanzim. Involved in the murder of 5 Israelis at Kibbutz Metzer in 2002, 3 Israelis in Hermesh in 2002, and 5 others in various shooting attacks in 2001.

Ahmed Barghouti – Serving 13 life sentences. Commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in the Ramallah region. Dispatched terrorists to lethal attacks in 2002. Sent terrorists to shooting attacks in which 12 people were murdered.

Ahmed Abu Khader – Serving 11 life sentences. Palestinian terrorist and former member of the PA Security Forces, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and Tanzim. Trained terrorists for suicide missions, carried out shooting attacks, and transported terrorists who committed lethal attacks.

Mar’i Abu Sa’ida – Serving 11 life sentences. Hamas. Member of cell responsible for several terror attacks, including a suicide bombing at the Tzrifin bus stop (9 murdered, 14 wounded, 2003), a suicide bombing at Café Hillel in Jerusalem (7 murdered, over 50 wounded, 2003) and a bombing at a bus stop in Tel Aviv (1 murdered, 24 wounded, 2004).

Izz Al-Din Khaled Hamamrah – Serving 9 life sentences. Tanzim. Recruited suicide bomber Muhammad Za’oul, who blew up the #14 bus in Jerusalem in 2004, murdering 8 and injuring dozens. Also perpetrated shooting attacks in the Bethlehem area.

Osama Al-Ashqar – Serving 8 life sentences. Tanzim. Organized two attacks resulting in the deaths of 8 Israelis in 2002 besides carrying out dozens of shooting attacks in the Tulkarem area.

Samer Al-Atrash – Serving 8 life sentences. Assisted a suicide bomber in blowing up a bus in the French Hill neighborhood of Jerusalem in 2003, murdering 7.

Ahmad Obeid – Serving 7 life sentences. Hamas member from East Jerusalem. Together with Nael Obeid, he planned the Café Hillel suicide bombing in Jerusalem in 2003, where 7 people were murdered, and he brought the terrorist to the attack site.

Taleb Ali Taleb Amr – Serving 7 life sentences. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Provided the explosives to a suicide bomber who murdered 6 and wounded more than 80 at Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda outdoor market in 2002.

Muayyad Hammad – Serving 7 life sentences. Ambushed Israeli soldiers near Ramallah, killing 3.

Amjad Takatka – Serving 6 life sentences. Played a role in a suicide bombing at Jerusalem’s outdoor market where 6 were murdered and more than 80 were wounded in 2002.

Ashraf Zgheir – Serving 6 life sentences. Drove a suicide bomber to Tel Aviv’s Allenby Street in 2002, where 6 people were killed and 84 were wounded, in addition to playing roles in other attempted bombings.

Bakr Al-Najjar – Serving 6 life sentences. Tanzim. Was involved in two deadly shooting attacks in 2002.

Hatem Al-Jayousi – Serving 6 life sentences. Provided the car used to perpetrate the 2002 Hadera Bat Mitzvah attack, in which 6 Israelis were murdered and dozens of others were wounded.

Ibrahim Sarahneh – Serving 6 life sentences. Israeli Arab who drove suicide bombers in 2002 to carry out three different attacks in Israel in which five were murdered.

Iyad Masalmeh – Serving 4 life sentences. Hamas. Sent and directed Ahmed Masalmeh and Ali Asafra in 2002 to infiltrate Karmei Tzur near Hebron, where they shot and murdered Eyal Sorek, his pregnant wife Yael, and Shalom Mordechai, and wounded five others.

Yusuf Al-Skafi – Serving 4 life sentences. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Recruited suicide bombers.

Othman Younes – Serving 4 life sentences. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Sent Habash Hanani to murder 3 Israeli students and injure 2 others in the town of Itamar in 2002. Was also involved in other shooting and bombing attacks.

Ali Suleiman Al-Sa’adi – Serving 4 life sentences. Islamic Jihad. Organized an attack at Afula’s central bus station in 2001 that killed Michal Mor and Noam Gozovsky and wounded 50 others. Organized several suicide bombings, including the attack at the Wall Street Café in Kiryat Motzkin in 2001.

Nasser Al-Shawish – Serving 4 life sentences. Responsible for 3 suicide bombings.

Husam Abd Al-Qader Halabi – Serving 3 life sentences. Member of Yasser Arafat’s Presidential Guard. Planned and provided the arms for the attack in which Avi and Avital Wolanski were shot and murdered and their three-year-old son was wounded in 2002.

Nasser Al-Shawish – Serving 4 life sentences. Responsible for 3 suicide bombings.

Bilal Ghanem – Serving 3 life sentences. Shot and stabbed passengers on a bus in Jerusalem’s Armon Hanatziv neighborhood, murdering Israelis Chaim Haviv (78), Alon Govberg (51), and Richard Lakin (76), and wounding 3 Israelis.

Yasser Abu Bakr – Serving 3 life sentences. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Directed an attack in Netanya in 2002 where Israel Yihye and 9-month-old Avia Malka were murdered. Also responsible for the killing of Border Policeman Constantine Danilov.

Mahmoud Abu Wahdan – Serving 3 life sentences. PFLP. Planned suicide bombings during the PA terror campaign (the second Intifada, 2000-2005).

Muhammad Khamis Brash – Serving 3 life sentences. Shot and killed Elad Wallenstein, Amit Zaneh, and Sarah Lisha in 2000.

Akram Othman Hamed and Rafat Othman Hamed – Both serving 3 life sentences. Members of the PA Security Forces members and of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Shot Israeli civilians and soldiers, murdering Assaf Hershkovitz and Idit Mizrachi in 2001. Also murdered a Palestinian they suspected of aiding Israel during the PA terror campaign (the second Intifada, 2000-2005).

Murad Nazmi Al-Ajlouni – Serving 3 life sentences. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Together with Mazen Al-Qadi, he used his status as an Israeli Arab to freely drive Ibrahim Hassouneh to carry out an attack in which 3 Israelis were murdered and 15 were wounded.

Mazen Al-Qadi – Serving 3 life sentences. Drove Ibrahim Hassouneh to Tel Aviv in 2002 to carry out an attack on two restaurants—Seafood Market and Mifgash Hasteak—murdering 3 and wounding 15.

Ali Sa’ada and Wael Al-Arja – Each serving 2 life sentences. Murdered Asher Palmer and his baby son, Yonatan, near the Israeli town of Kiryat Arba in 2011.

Ammar Abu Ghallous and Sajed Abu Ghallous – Both are serving 2 life sentences. Fatah. In 2003, Sajed shot and murdered Israeli civilian David Mordechai and paralyzed his son Menachem, while Ammar stood guard. In 2004, Ammar drove Sajed to an attack in which Sajed shot and murdered Israeli Arab Christian George Khoury, mistaking him for a Jew as he was jogging in Jerusalem.

Yusuf Ata Dhiab Hamdan – Serving 2 life sentences. Drove the suicide bomber who murdered Avner Mordechai in his convenience store near Beit Shean in 2003. Drove 2 other suicide bombers who blew themselves up resulting in the murder of Yehezkel Yekutiel and Erez Hershkowitz as well as the injury of 11 others.

Kifah Hattab – Serving 2 life sentences. PA Security Forces member and head of a Tanzim cell that murdered Rabbi Aharon Ovadian in Baqa Al-Gharbiya in northern Israel in 2001. Hattab was also involved in the murder of a Palestinian suspected of aiding Israel.

Sa’id Musa Shtayyeh – Serving 2 life sentences. Fatah. Provided the arms to the terrorists who murdered Mordechai and Shlomo Odesser in 2002.

Hassan Rateb Aweis – Serving 2 life sentences. Murdered 2 people in a shooting attack at the Afula central bus station in 2001.

Zaid Bassisi – Serving a life sentence. Islamic Jihad. Planned a car bombing outside a Netanya school in which 8 were wounded in 2001.

Zaid Younes – Serving a life sentence. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Drove a suicide bomber to Tel Aviv resulting in the injury of 25 people in 2002 and assisted a terrorist murderer to escape prison.

Hafez Sharai’ah – Serving a life sentence. Member of the PA intelligence service and the Tanzim. Was one of the murderers of Israeli police superintendent Moshe Dayan in the Judean Desert in 2002. Also was one of 39 wanted terrorists who took over the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in April 2002, using dozens of hostages and the religious site as shields.

Ayman Ibrahim Al-Awawdeh – Serving a life sentence. Member of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PA military intelligence. Murdered 1 and committed shooting attacks against Israelis during the PA terror campaign (the second Intifada, 2000-2005).

As’ad Zo’rob – Serving a life sentence. Shot and murdered his Israeli employer, Nissan Dolinger, while traveling together with Dolinger in his car in 2002.

Jad Maalah – Serving a life sentence. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Carried out attacks during the PA terror campaign (the second Intifada, 2000-2005).

Jawad Jawarish – Serving a life sentence for the murder of Devorah Friedman in 2002.

Hani Khamaiseh – Serving a life sentence for the murder of Stanislav Sandomirsky in 2001.

Wael Al-Jaghoub – Serving a life sentence. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader who carried out terror attacks.

Khalil Sarahneh – Serving a life sentence. Israeli Arab who drove a suicide bomber to Jerusalem in 2002 resulting in the killing of Israeli police officer Tomer Mordechai.

Yusuf Kmeil and Muhammad Abu Al-Rub – Each serving a life sentence. Stabbed and murdered 70-year-old Reuven Shmerling in a warehouse in the Israeli Arab city of Kafr Qassem, east of Tel Aviv, in 2017.

Mudar Abu Daya and Musa Ekhleil – Serving a life sentence each. Stabbed and murdered Erez Levanon as he was praying in a forest near Bat Ayin, southwest of Bethlehem in 2007.

Musa Sarahneh – Serving a life sentence. Drove a suicide bomber to carry out an attack in which 2 were murdered and 28 were wounded in Jerusalem in 2002.

Muhammad Al-Tous – Serving a life sentence. Fatah. Commanded terrorist cell that attacked 5 civilian buses in 1985, wounding 16 passengers. Also directed the murder of Zalman Abolnik in 1984 as well as Meir Ben Yair and Michal Cohen in 1985. Helped murder Mordechai Suissa and Edna Harari in 1985.

Muhammad Falana – Serving a life sentence. Planted a bomb near the town of Dolev in 1992, murdering 1 and injuring 6.

Nael Barghouti – Serving a life sentence. Stabbed and murdered Israeli bus driver Mordechai Yekuel in 1978.

Nael Yassin – Serving a life sentence. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PA policeman. Shot and murdered Israeli border policeman Yosef Tabjeh and injured another while they were on a joint Israeli-PA patrol near Qalqilya in 2000. (Note: As part of the “peace process” prior to the PA terror war launched in Sept 2000, Israel and the PA would do joint security patrols.) Afterwards, he was involved in dozens of shootings and bombings until he was arrested.

Samir Yasser Ghaith – Serving a life sentence. Led a group of terrorists in murdering 25-year-old law student Moran Amit at the Armon Hanatziv Promenade in Jerusalem in 2002 as well as other attacks.

Ammar Mardi – Serving one life sentence. Kidnapped and murdered Yuri Gushchin from the Pisgat Ze’ev neighborhood of Jerusalem in 2001.

Abd Al-Majid Mahdi – Serving a life sentence. Fatah. Shot and murdered his Israeli employer, Gadi Rejwan, in the Atarot neighborhood of Jerusalem in 2002.

Othman Abu Khurj – Serving a life sentence. Murdered 16-year-old Aliza Malka and injured 3 other teens in a drive-by shooting near Kibbutz Merav in 2001.

Alaa Ahmad Abd Al-Mun’im Salah – Serving a life sentence. Murdered Yossi Zandani in 1994 and was recruited to murder an Israeli citizen and use his body as a hostage to release imprisoned terrorists, as is happening today.

Iyad Hreibat – Serving a life sentence.

Ayham Sabah – A murderer serving only a 35-year sentence. (He was a minor when he murdered). Stabbed and murdered Tuvia Yanai Weissman in 2016 at a supermarket.

Itamar Marcus is Palestinian Media Watch (PMW)’s Founder and Director. Ephraim D. Tepler is a contributor to Palestinian Media Watch. A version of this article originally appeared at PMW.

The post The Names and Crimes of 80 Dangerous Terrorist Murderers That Were Released by Israel first appeared on Algemeiner.com.