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Most Russians Don’t Support Israel, Even as It Fights for Its Survival

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi during a meeting in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 7, 2023. Photo: Sputnik/Sergei Bobylev/Pool via REUTERS

It is hard not to notice that the war Israel is waging, with the support of the United States and other allies in the Western bloc, against Iran’s terrorist alliance and its radical Islamist Arab proxies — Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and others — has its reflection in the ideological, political, and diplomatic discourse of post-Soviet conflicts, primarily the Russian-Ukrainian  and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts.

This also introduces adjustments to the foreign policy stance of those USSR successor states that have various geopolitical interests in the Middle East.

A prime example in this regard is the Russian Federation, whose return as a key player in the second half of the 2000s became an important factor in the new configuration of political forces in the region. In Israel, the early Middle Eastern reflections of Russia’s bid to reclaim its status as a global superpower was met with mixed assessments. Optimists were inclined to believe that Moscow was returning to the Middle East not as a proponent of any particular ideology, but out of purely pragmatic considerations. Therefore, even if global geopolitical interests might, in principle, place Israel and Russia on opposite sides of the barricades, this would not necessarily lead to direct confrontation between the two countries, leaving ample room for cooperation beyond points of disagreement.

On the other hand, pessimists were convinced that Russia would sooner or later revert to the global political models and views of the late Soviet era — including seeing Israel as a potential adversary, given its strategic partnership with the United States.

Consequently, the dynamics of a potential intensification of US-Russian competition in the Middle East would ultimately shift almost any discrepancies between Jerusalem and Moscow from the category of “disagreements between partners” to that of “direct confrontation, leaving little room for compromise,” according to experts and staff from relevant Israeli, American, and Russian think tanks.

Initially, Moscow indeed attempted — with some success at times — to position itself as a party capable of cooperating with virtually all actors in the Middle Eastern conflict and even mediating between them.

However, after October 7, 2023, Russia explicitly supported Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian bloc as a whole. At the same time, the profile of the rapidly developing Russian-Israeli relations of the past decade sharply diminished, although Moscow and Jerusalem attempted to maintain a semblance of “business as usual”.

In other words, recent events appear to conclude the nearly 15 year debate between “Kremlin optimists” and “Kremlin pessimists.” The current situation fits into a normative framework characteristic of a substantial and influential segment of Russia’s foreign policy elites: Russia’s strategic partner in the region is Iran, which supplies critically important weapons for use on the Ukrainian front and secures Russia’s “southern flanks” in terms of geopolitical interests. This logic does not, however, extend to Russia’s view of Israel’s interests, as Israel is a strategic ally of Russia’s adversary — the United States. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that numerous practical steps and statements by Russian leaders have been widely interpreted as expressing solidarity with Iran’s Arab satellites, including Hamas and Hezbollah.

 “Overnight” Shifts in Russian Public Discourse

The Russian public’s response has closely mirrored the foreign policy positions of the Russian political establishment, shaped largely by state-controlled information channels, as outlined in Part 1 of this article.

According to one of the earliest sociological surveys conducted in the USSR — though not fully representative, it provided some insight into the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and the internal and external policies of Soviet leadership — Israel was among the top five enemies of the USSR, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and China.

This survey, conducted by Professor B. Grushin in the late 1960s, highlighted these perceptions. However, after the collapse of the USSR and a shift in foreign policy, attitudes toward Israel appeared to change drastically. Regular sociological measurements by the reputable Yuri Levada Center in Moscow, beginning in the late 1980s, indicated that in the absence of state-driven anti-Israel or anti-Semitic sentiment, Russian public opinion toward Israel was predominantly neutral (“similar to other countries in the region”) or mildly positive.

From the mid-1990s and over the next 25 years, approximately 60% of respondents consistently reported a lack of hostility or animosity toward Israel. About one-fifth of those surveyed expressed positive sentiments or interest in Israel, while an average of only 1 in 10 respondents indicated a negative view of the country. Isolated years marked by “spikes” in anti-Israel or “negatively neutral” attitudes — such as during the 2006 Lebanon War, noted in the first part of our article—were unfortunate exceptions.

Despite this generally neutral or favorable stance, research from this and other sociological agencies found that a considerable legacy of Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda persisted in the public consciousness, particularly among older individuals, residents of rural areas, and those with lower levels of education and income.

Superficially, the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict seems to have little effect on current levels of anti-Semitism in Russia or public attitudes toward Israel. Only 3% of Russians closely follow Middle Eastern political news or actively seek related information, primarily those who have traveled to Israel or have relatives or close friends there. Another 17% follow the situation “from time to time,” while the majority remain indifferent, uninformed, or simply do not follow developments in the region. Three-quarters of respondents stated they do not support either side in the conflict, while 10% expressed sympathy for both. Among the remaining respondents, support was almost evenly split: 8% sided with Israelis, and 7% with Arabs. This neutrality is gradually increasing, as previous surveys showed support levels at 12% and 10%, respectively.

Nevertheless, anti-Zionism, though less overt than in the Soviet era, remains an “acceptable” expression of latent antisemitism among certain groups. This includes belief in Zionist conspiracies and notions of Jewish plans for global dominance. “Traces of this ideological indoctrination and propaganda, along with a rejection of liberal values and democracy,” note the authors of a 2020 study by the Levada Center, commissioned by the Russian Jewish Congress, “are still evident today in attitudes toward Israel and Jewish emigration.”

The reversion of Russian leadership to Soviet-era narratives on the Arab-Israeli conflict has notably shifted public sentiment. In an October 2024 Levada Center survey, respondents had a favorable view of China (81%), Brazil (55%), Turkey (52%), and Iran (50%), with only 27% expressing positive views of Israel — comparable to views of France (20%), the UN (19%), the EU (16%), the US (16%), and Ukraine (14%).

This is a marked contrast from 2013, when respondents viewed Israel as a friendly state. In September 2018, 52% of Russians surveyed by the Public Opinion Foundation also viewed Israel as friendly, with only 16% holding an opposing view.

Who Is Responsible for the Middle Eastern Conflict?

There is little doubt that the current decline in public sympathy for Israel stems from the official rhetoric and stance of Russian authorities. This trend has had a noticeable impact on Russian public opinion.

survey conducted by the Levada Center in late October 2023 revealed that while two-thirds (66%) of respondents did not support either side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, those who sympathized with the Palestinian Arabs (in this case, Hamas) outnumbered those sympathetic to Israel by 3.5 times. Support for Israel was more common among members of the “internet party” — younger people aged 25-39 and residents of major cities.

In general, compared to data from 2007–2010, the share of supporters of Palestinian Arabs in the conflict with Israel has doubled (from 9–14% to 21%), while support for the Jewish State has similarly halved, dropping to 6%.

Nevertheless, Russians largely consider the United States and NATO countries to be primarily responsible for ongoing bloodshed and instability in the Middle East — a view shaped by both Soviet-era and current Russian state propaganda. The belief that the US and NATO bear the main responsibility is most prevalent among older respondents (44% of those aged 55 and older), low-income respondents (44%), those who believe the country is on the right track (40%), and those who rely on television for information (44%).

However, compared to the 2023 survey, support for this viewpoint has dropped by nearly a quarter — from 45% to 38% — largely due to a nearly twofold increase (from 12% to 22%) in those blaming Israel entirely. The proportion attributing responsibility to Hamas and Palestinian extremists has remained steady over the past year, with less than 10% of respondents holding this view. Meanwhile, the percentage assigning blame to Iran and its allies, or to Russia, hovered around or below the margin of error.

Some demographic divides are present, though not pronounced, along lines of gender, age, political outlook, and socioeconomic status. Men (27%), respondents aged 55 and older, and those who believe “things in Russia are going in the right direction” (25%) are more likely to hold Israel responsible for the continuation and escalation of the conflict. On the other hand, younger respondents under 24 (13%), more affluent respondents (10% of those able to afford durable goods), and those who believe the country is on the wrong track (13%) are more likely to attribute responsibility to Hamas and Palestinian Arabs.

Interest within Russian society in Israel’s conflict with Arab terrorist groups has noticeably waned over the year since the beginning of the IDF’s “Operation Iron Swords” in Gaza. While over 80% of Russians surveyed by the Levada Center in September 2024 stated that they were aware of Israel’s war with Hamas, only one in five respondents (19%) reported closely following the developments — almost half the figure from October 2023 (32%). Nearly two-thirds (62%) of respondents said they had “heard something but without details,” which is only slightly higher than the previous year (56%). Those who admitted to hearing about the conflict “for the first time during the survey” nearly doubled, reaching 18% in September 2024 compared to 11% in October 2023.

In other words, Russian public engagement with Israel’s fight against Iranian-backed Arab terror — and the Middle Eastern conflict more broadly — remains limited. The “television party,” which represents a significant portion of Russian society, continues to follow official narratives. Should a direct confrontation between Russia and Israel occur in the Middle East, Russian society is likely to accept it with the same “understanding” that many Russians displayed toward the military aggression against Ukraine.

That said, another perspective also exists, such as among the dwindling number of “optimists” in Israel who argue that the differences, or even sharp disagreements, between Israel and Russia on various issues do not reflect a fundamental conflict of interests between the two nations but rather the current global context of Russia’s interests. They believe that if the context shifts or Israel’s role within it changes, so too could the state of Russian-Israeli relations — and, with it, Russian public sentiment.

In any case, if this shift does happen, it likely won’t occur until after the wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have concluded — something that does not appear imminent.

Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin lectures in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and is Academic Chairman of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies in Herzliya, Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Most Russians Don’t Support Israel, Even as It Fights for Its Survival first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Iranian Media Claims Obtaining ‘Sensitive’ Israeli Intelligence Materials

FILE PHOTO: The atomic symbol and the Iranian flag are seen in this illustration, July 21, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo

i24 NewsIranian and Iran-affiliated media claimed on Saturday that the Islamic Republic had obtained a trove of “strategic and sensitive” Israeli intelligence materials related to Israel’s nuclear facilities and defense plans.

“Iran’s intelligence apparatus has obtained a vast quantity of strategic and sensitive information and documents belonging to the Zionist regime,” Iran’s state broadcaster said, referring to Israel in the manner accepted in those Muslim or Arab states that don’t recognize its legitimacy. The statement was also relayed by the Lebanese site Al-Mayadeen, affiliated with the Iran-backed jihadists of Hezbollah.

The reports did not include any details on the documents or how Iran had obtained them.

The intelligence reportedly included “thousands of documents related to that regime’s nuclear plans and facilities,” it added.

According to the reports, “the data haul was extracted during a covert operation and included a vast volume of materials including documents, images, and videos.”

The report comes amid high tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, over which it is in talks with the US administration of President Donald Trump.

Iranian-Israeli tensions reached an all-time high since the October 7 massacre and the subsequent Gaza war, including Iranian rocket fire on Israel and Israeli aerial raids in Iran that devastated much of the regime’s air defenses.

Israel, which regards the prospect of the antisemitic mullah regime obtaining a nuclear weapon as an existential threat, has indicated it could resort to a military strike against Iran’s installations should talks fail to curb uranium enrichment.

The post Iranian Media Claims Obtaining ‘Sensitive’ Israeli Intelligence Materials first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Israel Retrieves Body of Thai Hostage from Gaza

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz looks on, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, in Jerusalem, Nov. 7, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun

The Israeli military has retrieved the body of a Thai hostage who had been held in Gaza since Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack, Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Saturday.

Nattapong Pinta’s body was held by a Palestinian terrorist group called the Mujahedeen Brigades, and was recovered from the area of Rafah in southern Gaza, Katz said. His family in Thailand has been notified.

Pinta, an agricultural worker, was abducted from Kibbutz Nir Oz, a small Israeli community near the Gaza border where a quarter of the population was killed or taken hostage during the Hamas attack that triggered the devastating war in Gaza.

Israel’s military said Pinta had been abducted alive and killed by his captors, who had also killed and taken to Gaza the bodies of two more Israeli-American hostages that were retrieved earlier this week.

There was no immediate comment from the Mujahedeen Brigades, who have previously denied killing their captives, or from Hamas. The Israeli military said the Brigades were still holding the body of another foreign national. Only 20 of the 55 remaining hostages are believed to still be alive.

The Mujahedeen Brigades also held and killed Israeli hostage Shiri Bibas and her two young sons, according to Israeli authorities. Their bodies were returned during a two-month ceasefire, which collapsed in March after the two sides could not agree on terms for extending it to a second phase.

Israel has since expanded its offensive across the Gaza Strip as US, Qatari and Egyptian-led efforts to secure another ceasefire have faltered.

US-BACKED AID GROUP HALTS DISTRIBUTIONS

The United Nations has warned that most of Gaza’s 2.3 million population is at risk of famine after an 11-week Israeli blockade of the enclave, with the rate of young children suffering from acute malnutrition nearly tripling.

Aid distribution was halted on Friday after the US-and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation said overcrowding had made it unsafe to continue operations. It was unclear whether aid had resumed on Saturday.

The GHF began distributing food packages in Gaza at the end of May, overseeing a new model of aid distribution which the United Nations says is neither impartial nor neutral. It says it has provided around 9 million meals so far.

The Israeli military said on Saturday that 350 trucks of humanitarian aid belonging to U.N. and other international relief groups were transferred this week via the Kerem Shalom crossing into Gaza.

The war erupted after Hamas-led terrorists took 251 hostages and killed 1,200 people, most of them civilians, in the October 7, 2023 attack, Israel’s single deadliest day.

The post Israel Retrieves Body of Thai Hostage from Gaza first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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US Mulls Giving Millions to Controversial Gaza Aid Foundation, Sources Say

Palestinians carry aid supplies which they received from the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, in the central Gaza Strip, May 29, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed/File Photo

The State Department is weighing giving $500 million to the new foundation providing aid to war-shattered Gaza, according to two knowledgeable sources and two former US officials, a move that would involve the US more deeply in a controversial aid effort that has been beset by violence and chaos.

The sources and former US officials, all of whom requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said that money for Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) would come from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is being folded into the US State Department.

The plan has met resistance from some US officials concerned with the deadly shootings of Palestinians near aid distribution sites and the competence of the GHF, the two sources said.

The GHF, which has been fiercely criticized by humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations, for an alleged lack of neutrality, began distributing aid last week amid warnings that most of Gaza’s 2.3 million population is at risk of famine after an 11-week Israeli aid blockade, which was lifted on May 19 when limited deliveries were allowed to resume.

The foundation has seen senior personnel quit and had to pause handouts twice this week after crowds overwhelmed its distribution hubs.

The State Department and GHF did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Reuters has been unable to establish who is currently funding the GHF operations, which began in Gaza last week. The GHF uses private US security and logistics companies to transport aid into Gaza for distribution at so-called secure distribution sites.

On Thursday, Reuters reported that a Chicago-based private equity firm, McNally Capital, has an “economic interest” in the for-profit US contractor overseeing the logistics and security of GHF’s aid distribution hubs in the enclave.

While US President Donald Trump’s administration and Israel say they don’t finance the GHF operation, both have been pressing the United Nations and international aid groups to work with it.

The US and Israel argue that aid distributed by a long-established U.N. aid network was diverted to Hamas. Hamas has denied that.

USAID has been all but dismantled. Some 80 percent of its programs have been canceled and its staff face termination as part of President Donald Trump’s drive to align US foreign policy with his “America First” agenda.

One source with knowledge of the matter and one former senior official said the proposal to give the $500 million to GHF has been championed by acting deputy USAID Administrator Ken Jackson, who has helped oversee the agency’s dismemberment.

The source said that Israel requested the funds to underwrite GHF’s operations for 180 days.

The Israeli government did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The two sources said that some US officials have concerns with the plan because of the overcrowding that has affected the aid distribution hubs run by GHF’s contractor, and violence nearby.

Those officials also want well-established non-governmental organizations experienced in running aid operations in Gaza and elsewhere to be involved in the operation if the State Department approves the funds for GHF, a position that Israel likely will oppose, the sources said.

The post US Mulls Giving Millions to Controversial Gaza Aid Foundation, Sources Say first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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