Connect with us

RSS

Reconstruction of Gaza Is the Way to Regain Initiative in War on Hamas

An UNRWA aid truck at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Photo: Reuters/Amr Abdallah Dalsh

Israel’s wars, according to Israel’s traditional defense strategy, are aimed at thwarting and removing military threats, not at politically shaping the region. Hence our familiar focus on the military dimension. But the goal of the war in Gaza is more ambitious: the destruction of the Hamas regime.

Accordingly, its realization depends on additional dimensions. A slow reconstruction of parts of Gaza based on military achievements can regain the initiative, transfer the pressure back to Hamas, and serve as a lever for a hostage deal. This is also a one-time opportunity for Israel to physically shape the ruined Strip according to its interests. Once we finally get out of the strategic corner we’ve fallen into, we would be wise to return to the more modest Israeli approach to war. We will focus on the effective removal of threats and leave the business of political engineering to the powers.

A total war of attrition

Since the War of Independence, the State of Israel has not known such a long and comprehensive war as the current war in Gaza. The 1970-1971 War of Attrition lasted about a year and a half, but it did not have the scope of forces or continuity of the current war. The First Lebanon War officially lasted only three months.

Elsewhere, I have called the current war Israel’s first total war. I don’t mean “total war” in the sense with which the phrase is applied to the two world wars of the 20th century. Those wars were total in terms of general mobilization, the use of all means of war, including unconventional weapons, and the intentional targeting of civilian populations. The situation in Gaza is the opposite.

It is difficult to recall any other war in which one side fought while making sure to deliver supplies and humanitarian assistance to the enemy population. By the term “total war” I mean to highlight the contrast between this war and its goals from the limited war approach that has always characterized the State of Israel.

Contrary to our original defense strategy, in this war we set as a goal not only the destruction of the Hamas army, but also the destruction of the Hamas regime.

The historical precedents are misleading. In the First Lebanon War (1982), we expelled the PLO from Lebanon and tried to stabilize Maronite rule. The PLO, as we know, was a foreign entity in Lebanon, hated by most Lebanese. The Maronites were a strong local faction and the historical rulers of Lebanon.

The Sinai operation (1956) was indeed intended to damage and overthrow the Nasser regime, but the State of Israel was only a junior partner in the Anglo-French scheme.

Both these affairs are far from the ambition of the current war, which is to remove a neighboring regime that has a strong grip on Gaza. Both those wars are also remembered as total failures.

The historical failures highlight the logic of Israel’s modest approach to wars. Our strategy recognized Israel’s power limitations. No matter how victorious it is on the battlefield, Israel cannot forcefully influence the hatred and hostile intentions on the other side, much less engineer its politics. The core concept of this strategy — decisive defeat on the battlefield — was always reserved for the military dimension alone. Eliminating the immediate military threat was intended to restore security and allow Israel to avoid a prolonged war of attrition that would inevitably serve the other side.

That is exactly what Hamas was aiming for when it invaded Israel on October 7. Sinwar’s strategy was to drag Israel into an attritional war that would eventually exhaust the IDF in general and the reserve forces in particular, empty the munitions stockpile, and turn the international community against Israel.

Rehab program

The goals of the current war, therefore, must by necessity extend beyond Israel’s comfort zone and the healthy understanding that characterized us in the past. Under the circumstances of October 2023, there was no better alternative.

In the article “Sustainable Strategy,” I analyzed the process in which we deviated from the correct basic assumptions of Israeli strategy. Wrong assumptions, primarily the assumption that the State of Israel had become a regional power, maneuvered us into corner where we remain stuck today. I further argued that the flawed theory according to which we can influence the intentions of the enemies in order to “deter them” without paying attention to their combat capabilities is what allowed the building up of the terrorist armies that delivered the blow of October. We now cling to the opposite error.

Much has been written about the Israeli refusal to deal with the “day after” issue. In the absence of a civilian alternative, Hamas has not only returned to control and restored its power in the neighborhoods from which the IDF withdraws, but it does not even feel threatened. There is, therefore, no time constraint from Hamas’s point of view, even in the context of a hostage deal.

If “total victory” means a complete and lasting removal of Hamas, it should only be understood as a long-term strategy that includes not only the military defeat of Hamas and the collapse of its government but also the stabilization and pacification of the Strip. Israel will be required to take care of the stabilization of the Strip through civil, security, and economic control mechanisms.

Clear strategic thinking, not politicization of the war, is required. The analogy of the Second World War, which was used to establish the idea of ​​”absolute victory,” indicates what is required here. De-radicalization of Germany and Japan was possible not only thanks to their unconditional surrender but also to some civil-economic measures that were taken.

In an attempt to correct the mistake of three decades of appeasement and deterrence strategy, Israel is now making the opposite mistake. We set a clear political war goal — removing the rule of Hamas — but continue to refuse to carry out any non-military war planning.

In principle, I do not believe a war for regime change is the right idea for the State of Israel. But in a practical sense, we have attached ourselves to that aim by allowing the build-up of terrorist armies on our borders. This war should be considered a painful but one-time weaning process. If we have committed to this, it is necessary to see the constraint as an opportunity as well.

Resume initiative by dictating the terms of restoration

The truth must be told. The war is stuck.

The pressure on all fronts — a hostage deal, international hostility, the economy, the northern front, the internal front, even the combat stockpiles — is all on Israel. The military raids returning to the Strip and the operation that started in Rafah, as important as they are, will not restore Israel’s strategic initiative. It is also absolutely clear from Hamas’ demands in the negotiations that the war has moved to the stage where the parties are competing for the future political order in Gaza.

The rehabilitation of Gaza should be transformed from a Hamas demand in the negotiations, which the State of Israel is presented as refusing, to a strategic lever that will return the initiative to Israel and the pressure to Hamas.

Meanwhile, the desired end state for Israel must be discussed again. The current strategic vision according to which the Gaza Strip will become a “lawn mowing” space is correct but not satisfactory. Although it is too early and too painful at the moment, we must seize the crisis in Gaza as an opportunity for a redesign of the Palestinian arena.

Instead of repeatedly occupying the same neighborhoods in the Gaza Strip, Israel should take advantage of the reoccupation to create safe spaces for rehabilitation. These spaces can be secured by IDF activity around them and managed by an Arab-American-Palestinian coalition. All the actors mentioned desire such an initiative and are ready for it. Initiating this move would allow Israel to influence the way secured neighborhoods are restored, such as through the registration of citizens; prevention of the entry of Hamas operatives; kicking out Hamas-supporting UNRWA people; introducing alternative education and welfare systems, including an extensive de-radicalization program; and more. Humanitarian and economic support mechanisms can make these supervised rehabilitation areas attractive. The threat to Hamas rule would intensify as the areas of rehabilitation are stabilized and expanded.

As the reconstruction expands to more neighborhoods, Israel will also be able to participate in the urban re-planning of the Gaza Strip. Roads and transportation, employment centers, and other infrastructures will be rebuilt with Israeli interests in mind, like an open buffer zone and other security needs. As the economic planning of the Strip expands, Israel will be able to better build its financial oversight mechanisms, which have been neglected under the fault strategy. Replacing the terror-finance-based economy with a productive one for the people of Gaza should also contribute to de-radicalization.

Focusing and concentrating efforts on specific neighborhoods for rehabilitation will increase the chances of success and build the capacity for gradual expansion. Successful reconstruction areas will not only undermine Hamas’s self-confidence. It is possible that local prosperity, conditional on systematic de-radicalization, could also influence the West Bank as a pressure lever on the corrupt and terror-supporting Palestinian regime there.

Take politics out of the equation

The issue of “the day after” is stuck on the political level. The right wing in the coalition refuses to discuss it since its vision is not Palestinian self-government but settlement of the Strip. But the Israeli strategy should not relate to the political vision. As long as no one assumes the two million residents of the Gaza Strip will disappear, the discussion about restoring their lives stands on its own. Since the Six Day War, the State of Israel has preferred civilian control mechanisms that are as independent as possible for the Palestinian population. Even before the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, mayors were local and civil mechanisms functioned. The great 2002 anti-terror offensive in the West Bank was only possible because the IDF made sure the PA’s civil mechanism would continue to function. Today, the stabilization of the Gaza Strip as a safe and functioning civilian space is a condition for any political vision, settlement or disengagement, which includes the safe return of Israeli citizens to the Western Negev region.

The percolation of the concept of “decisive defeat” from the military level into the political culture has created a devastating paralysis. This paralysis played a role in the crisis that brought us to war and continues to play a destructive role.

It was absurd to think for years that we had the power to change the intentions of our enemies without overwhelming their military power. We are paying for this deterrence-based strategy today. It is essential that we do not now adhere to the mirror image of this error — a strategy of political defeat while stubbornly focusing on military means alone.

The rehabilitation of Gaza, as painful as the phrase may be to Israeli ears after the October attack, can and should be Israel’s ultimate weapon against Hamas. It is customary in wartime that the first stage of the campaign is intended to prepare the conditions for the next. In the current war, the ground maneuver did not cleanse the Gaza underground or eradicate the Hamas regime, but it created and can continue to create the conditions for the next stage. That stage should be dedicated to the stabilization and slow rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip.

Step by step, the IDF will secure limited locations and the reconstruction coalition will create a more attractive alternative in those areas. Time will turn against Hamas, the pressure will shift to it, and Israel will stop being seen as conducting a vengeful war and will start serving its own long-term interests. Above all, a quick hostage deal will return to the status of an existential interest of Hamas.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Eran Ortal recently retired from military service as commander of the Dado Center for Multidisciplinary Military Thinking. He is a well-known military thinker both in Israel and abroad. His works have been published in The Military Review, War on the Rocks, Small Wars Journal at the Hoover Institution, at Stanford, and elsewhere. His book The Battle Before the War (MOD 2022, in Hebrew) dealt with the IDF’s need to change, innovate and renew a decisive war approach. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post Reconstruction of Gaza Is the Way to Regain Initiative in War on Hamas first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Continue Reading
Click to comment

You must be logged in to post a comment Login

Leave a Reply

RSS

House of Commons tables report on antisemitism with recommendations for Canadian universities

The House of Commons has tabled a comprehensive report addressing antisemitism on Canadian university campuses, presenting 19 recommendations for federal, provincial, and institutional action.

Issued on Dec. 10, the report emphasizes the enforcement of campus codes of conduct, the prevention of hate speech, and the provision of antisemitism education through organizations that recognize the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism.

It also calls for universities to unequivocally denounce antisemitism, uphold academic freedom, and oppose anti-Israel movements such as Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS).

Additional measures include the creation of a national anti-hate fund, enhanced police training on hate crimes, and funding for Holocaust education that incorporates modern-day antisemitism.

Federal recommendations propose establishing a national review committee to assess the impact of campus antisemitism, creating specialized prosecution roles for hate crimes, and ensuring that Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) frameworks include Jewish identity. The report also suggests banning symbols of terrorist organizations, standardizing definitions for hate crimes, and ensuring that Zionists have fair access to public spaces.

Montreal MP Anthony Housefather, who initiated the Justice Committee hearings earlier this year and serves as the special advisor to the prime minister and cabinet on Canada’s Jewish community, expressed hope that the unanimous report will inform both federal and provincial governments on ways to address rising antisemitism in Canada.

Housefather and Deborah Lyons, the special envoy on Holocaust remembrance and combating antisemitism, spent the summer consulting with university administrators and Jewish campus organizations to develop recommendations aimed at enhancing the safety of Jewish students.

Housefather told The Canadian Jewish News that, while challenges persist, there has been progress: “While there have been a lot of problems we’ve had on campuses, we have not had encampments [this past semester],” he said, adding that “the codes of conduct have been enforced better at most universities.”

Pro-Palestinian groups established encampments at many Canadian universities last spring and summer, and in some cases were removed only after court injunctions or by police.

Canadian universities, such as Concordia and McGill, saw intensifying animosity by anti-Israel groups throughout the last year, with demonstrators carrying out violence, verbal threats, and property destruction at both Montreal campuses.

Schools such as the University of Calgary saw anti-Israel protesters trapping Jewish students in a lecture hall in November during a talk with former Israeli spokesperson Eylon Levy.

Abuse of podium infractions have occurred at schools such as York University and University of Toronto, where teachers have called Zionism a form of social violence and have expressed anti-Israel views to students.

Lyons expressed the critical need for action in the House of Commons report. “When our Jewish citizens are targeted, it threatens the democratic ideals of equality and justice for all Canadians,” she said. “We pride ourselves on being a diverse and inclusive multicultural society. In this moment, we are being put to the test. It is not an overreach to say that our shared humanity is at stake.”

In the report’s introduction, Nati Pressman, founder of Canadian Union of Jewish Students, is also quoted. “Across the country, Jewish students who used to wear Jewish symbols, like the Magen David, now hide them as they walk past protests, including my friends who used to wear kippot, who now instead wear baseball caps going to class. This is not because we are any less proud to be Jewish, but because our universities have allowed an environment where being openly Jewish could be a threat to our safety,” she said.

The dissenting report from Conservative members of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights emphasizes a “disturbing and unprecedented rise in antisemitism and hate crimes” under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government. It highlights a 165 percent increase in hate crimes since Trudeau took office, with 5,791 antisemitic incidents recorded in 2023 alone, following the Oct. 7, 2023, terror attacks in Israel.

The report stresses that “Jewish Canadians have the right to live in safety and without fear,” and calls for a unified response to combat violence, discrimination, and hatred.

While supporting most of the recommendations in the main report, the Conservative MPs argue that the Liberal government’s current approach to addressing antisemitism “is not working.”

They offer additional recommendations to strengthen Canada’s efforts, citing witness testimony and firsthand experience. “To protect our communities and uphold the values of equality and respect, it is imperative that we take decisive action against groups and ideologies that promote violence, hatred, and division,” says the dissenting report.

The post House of Commons tables report on antisemitism with recommendations for Canadian universities appeared first on The Canadian Jewish News.

Continue Reading

RSS

Now it’s time to review the 75-writer anthology called ‘On Being Jewish Now’

Perhaps the woman behind the book On Being Jewish Now is a bit like Philip Roth after all.

It was a whole lot easier to be a post-parochialism Jew prior to Oct. 7. Zibby Owens, a leading American bookfluencer—and author, and publisher, and more—had not “disproportionately” sought out Jewish books. So she explains in the introduction to the anthology she just edited, which she is promoting this week in Toronto with a Holy Blossom Temple event featuring Indigo CEO Heather Reisman.

Back then, as far as Owens was concerned, “A book was a book was a book.”

And then Oct. 7 happened and she was moved to action. She edited an anthology which benefits a non-profit she started, Artists Against Antisemitism. I say Owens did this but there are teams credited alongside. This is a group effort. There is staff. It is a book. It is also, in a sense, a fundraising pamphlet that happens to exist in book form, which means that to review it is also to take that into account. This is more complicated than you might think.

I like to do book reviews with an open mind. If you’re someone I have a close personal relationship with or, conversely, had some kind of falling out with (though no one is coming to mind for the latter), I’m not reviewing your book. But I’m not a robot, and will often have a pre-existing conception of an author and their work. Maybe I like their writing generally, or don’t. Maybe we’ve had nice interactions online, maybe less-nice. But I will just pick the thing up and see what it is.

This was put to the test by my having already angered one contributor to On Being Jewish Now enough that I received the first-to-my-knowledge video-format criticism of something I’d written. Or at least the only one that included a face-powder-application interlude before cutting to the chase.

It was bad form, you see, to write a book review of a book I hadn’t even read. I suppose it would have been… which is why I did nothing of the kind. I do review books for The Canadian Jewish News, plenty of ‘em, but that essay wasn’t a book review. It was a lengthy essay about Jewish literature in which I briefly mentioned the existence of On Being Jewish Now, as a thing that exists in the world. This is an extremely normal thing to do, but tell that to Instagram.

Well. Face-powder-gate—paired with the offer of a galley—brought it right up to the top of the pile. My curiosity was piqued.

Here’s another important angle, at least I think it is: This could be a case of biases cancelling each other out, as I am, like the contributors, a Jew who’s troubled by post-Oct. 7 antisemitism, and who cares about the continued existence of Israel. I am an author and essayist (“artist” might be pushing it) with skin in the game, as well as an opinion writer and podcaster with a pretty decent track record if I may say so of covering incidents of literary antisemitism specifically. It was a bit jarring to find that I had become enemy du jour of a bunch of people with give or take my own views on the issue at hand. It had an element of, you got the wrong guy!

So, without further ado: I have read every page of On Being Jewish Now. Hadn’t then, have now. What I wrote previously was not a review of it. What follows is one—even if it may not be the kind of write-up that my detractors were wishing for.

***

As the title suggests, On Being Jewish Now prompted contributors—American, for the most part—to write essays foregrounding not just the Jewish aspects of their lives, but the way this shifted after Oct. 7. There are, one presumes, Jews who felt plenty Jewish prior, and still do. Also Jews who were exclusively thinking about sports betting or nail art or differential equations in the beforetimes and who have not changed their routines. But Jewishness is now more central for many of us, in ways that are hard to articulate. The book is an effort to articulate those, and to tell Jews who feel weird at the moment that they—we—are not alone.

A lot of it was relatable: the anxieties over public pronouncements of Jewishness, ones that would not have occurred to me on Oct. 6. If my kid wore Hanukkah pyjamas on pyjama day, what would happen? (Nothing happens when my kids wear these outside, which they do, often, and in a neighbourhood pretty darn committed to the freeing of Palestine.) There is something maddening, in the sense of insanity-inducing, about anxiety that feels simultaneously founded and unfounded. 

It is also about the ambiguity of Jewish visibility, for Jews who are not in observant garb. The star-of-David necklace—whether someone would or would not feel comfortable wearing one, how one feels when spotting one on someone else—figures prominently. In her essay, Rabbi Rebecca Keren Eisenstadt Jablonski mentions some Jews responding to Oct. 7 by putting up a mezuzah, others by taking theirs down. This succinctly sums up the weirdness of our moment. 

A range of religious observance levels and trajectories on that front are represented, but this is not—a la the recent child-sized essay book What Jewish Looks Like—a collection that gives the impression that the typical North American Jew is member of a visible (unambiguously non-white) minority group. There are nods to geographic and racial diversity (socioeconomic, not so much; getting to this), but it is for the most part stories of Ashkenazi Jews in parts of the United States where many Jews live. This seems entirely appropriate. 

It nevertheless borrows from the language of ‘woke’—“trauma” used to describe things that did not happen to you personally, Jewish joy, holding space, things of that nature. It positions Jewish literature in the same way that Palestinian literature is positioned now, and that various other groups’ literatures have at moments where their oppression was the current news story. Someone I was discussing the book with described it—not derisively, just descriptively—as right-wing, and I had to say I wasn’t sure if that’s it. It defies that kind of categorization.

A lot is about online life, both because that’s how we live now, and because of how recent lockdowns were. Former Real Housewife of New York Jill Zarin explains that she “lost about 30,000 followers” on social media for posting about antisemitism. It’s unclear how she knows this—people don’t generally send you a note when they unfollow, which is assuming we’re talking people, not bots, to begin with—but, maybe? 

The aforementioned Aliza Licht’s essay, “Being a Jewish Activist Wasn’t on Brand for Me,” describes a different experience: “People warned me that I would lose followers by [posting pro-Israel and anti-antisemitism content]. I’ve more than doubled my following.” Licht, whose three-paragraph bio explains that she is, among other things, “a personal branding expert,” is, without a question, an expert on personal branding. Points for self-awareness.

On Being Jewish Now is a remarkably polished and well-packaged effort, given the time frame. But the writing quality varies tremendously. American-Israeli author Ilana Kurshan’s moving essay about a pre-school world travel game in wartime Israel sits alongside the serious-topic-addressing but not particularly insightful musings of a writer whose job is “Chief Grief Officer®,” the registered-trademark symbol a part of her title. 

The essays are grouped into thematic sections, with one on humour called, “You Have to Laugh.” While I’m sure the writers therein have made people laugh elsewhere, it’s a mix of essays that don’t appear to be going for comedy (a sweet remembrance of New York Jewish garment-industry and discount-shopping of yore ends with an it-can-happen-here epiphany) and ones that gesture at Jewish-humour tropes without really landing, like a joke about observing the Sabbath “except” if “[t]here’s a sale at Bergdorf’s.” 

Some of the essays themselves read like ad copy. “American Girl Dolls and Jewish Joy,” by a co-creator of the dolls ($161 USD a doll) with a 1990s Jewish theme. And it’s like, I’m not mad at the dolls, I don’t object to their existence, but I suppose I do object to the idea that to properly fight antisemitism I am to read about how wonderful they are. 

The well-known writer Daphne Merkin’s description of her stance regarding the Middle East itself made sense, and is the unspoken undercurrent to many of the essays. In effect, to oppose anti-Jewish hatred locally, you don’t need to have any particular stance or comprehension level where Israel’s military actions are concerned. Being awful to Jews locally isn’t just wrong on its own, but does not make life better for Palestinians. A point that cannot be repeated enough.

***

The format is unusual in that the bios are quite lengthy (as in, a third of the essay may be its bio), and appear immediately after each one, rather than in a separate author-bios section at the end. Amy Ephron (sister of the late Nora) manages hers in two sentences, a rare exception. The ratio of bio to essay is remarkable and therefore a reviewer would be remiss to not remark on it. 

The bios are not particularly connected with the On Being Jewish Now theme, apart from the fact that they are about people who are being Jewish now. Some read like longform LinkedIn profiles, including not just comprehensively detailed accolades but info like where a seasoned professional went to college. 

Others involve cozy asides, often featuring rambunctious canines: “When not writing, she is making art, listening to lo-fi on vinyl, fangirling theater, and otherwise being grateful for her life with her husband, two grown daughters, and too spoiled dogs.” Or: “When not working, she enjoys playing tennis and pickleball and spending time with family and friends, including her adorable Pomeranian, Bossi.” Another “is a proud single mom to two incredible kids, one poorly trained dog, and two cats.” Another: “She lives in Westchester, New York, with her husband, four children, and two very bossy dogs.” 

Having owned and loved a bossy dog, as a reader, I get it. As a book reviewer, however, I need to make sense of the function this sort of information is serving. 

An ungenerous read would be that this is an unpaid effort and the extended bio was a kind of compensation—a chance to self-promote, or self-indulge. 

A more generous one: this is about emphasizing the humanity of Jews. See, Jews are just normal people who love their pets! (Something I would not dispute.) 

The bios explain that these are not ordinary Jews but ones with standing in mainstream society. They bios say, in effect, it might feel like everyone in a position of cultural influence is posting Free Palestine, but not everyone-everyone! Look at all these bestselling authors, who are proudly Team Jews! The bios serve, collectively, as a point about American Jewish achievement. 

Whatever the reason or reasons for the long and prominently placed bios, they have the effect of making what might otherwise have read like an essay collection read instead like a Rolodex.  

***

On Being Jewish Now is not merely an attempt at capturing what it’s like to be Jewish these days. It’s raising money for a new non-profit, a 501(c)(3), the tax code for a type of American good-works endeavour, one with the hard-to-argue-with moniker, Artists Against Antisemitism. I spent a while on its website trying to figure out what Artists Against Antisemitism are offering, and the publicly available offerings seem primarily to consist of outbound links to other organizations and the recommendation that people read books such as David Baddiel’s Jews Don’t Count, and information on how to donate to or volunteer for Artists Against Antisemitism, as well as an auction with money going to Artists Against Antisemitism. Per the description on its own website, “The money we raise through donations goes to running our organization and developing projects like awareness-raising campaigns, resource guides, community arts projects, celebrations, etc.” 

I spent a good long while on this website and could not figure out what the organization does-does, if that makes sense, so I emailed Owens to ask more about the organization’s initiatives. I got a response from Jill Santopolo, a founding member of Artists Against Antisemitism, pointing me to, among other things, a virtual (online) art gallery hosted by TheArtistsAgainstAntisemitism.com, and an Instagram-hosted (online) event promoting Jewish romance authors

As best as I can understand, Artists Against Antisemitism thus far consists mainly in the realm of content creation and aggregation, with an awareness-raising component. It is not literary-award-allotting organization a la the Giller Prize, but rather the sort of charity that auctions off an acrylic painting of Ruth Bader Ginsburg or some online face time with Mayim Bialik.

Here is where a point must be made—one with uh broader applicability—about the need to look critically even at charitable endeavours whose names and missions we agree with. In some cases, this means investigating flows of funds. In this case, however, it’s about questioning whether awareness-raising initiatives have the intended impact. How has the bureaucratic apparatus established in recent years to address other forms of bigotry worked out? At a moment when other forms of DEI are coming under “scrutiny,” is extending DEI to the Jewish cause the best path forward?

I read through the handbook for bookstores looking to avoid antisemitism, and while it contains useful practical information about Jewish holidays and what to do if aggressive sorts are going to lose their minds because your bookstore dared platform A Zionist, it mostly reads like DEI but inclusive of Jews. Bookstores are asked to “Celebrate Jewish American Heritage Month in May” and then “Celebrate Jewish Book Month the month before Chanukah” and also to “Promote Jewish authors in intersectional displays (i.e. Women’s History Month).” 

Along the same lines, Project Shema, an Artists Against Antisemitism-recommended—and auction-supported—“training and support organization” that was “built by progressive Jews,” operates under the assumption that bringing in educators will deprogram antisemites in a workplace or campus, and is the best use of finite resources. But it is not the role of journalists to say, well, they clearly mean well, and leave it at that.

The CJN’s opinion editor Phoebe Maltz Bovy can be reached at pbovy@thecjn.ca, not to mention @phoebebovy on Bluesky, and @bovymaltz on X. She is also on The CJN’s weekly podcast Bonjour ChaiFor more opinions about Jewish culture wars, subscribe to the free Bonjour Chai newsletter on Substack.

The post Now it’s time to review the 75-writer anthology called ‘On Being Jewish Now’ appeared first on The Canadian Jewish News.

Continue Reading

RSS

Blinken Lays Out US Hopes for Syria’s Political Transition

A drone view shows Umayyad square in Damascus, after Syrian rebels ousted President Bashar al-Assad, Syria, Dec. 10, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano

The United States on Tuesday laid out its hopes for Syria’s political transition following President Bashar al-Assad’s ouster, saying it would recognize a future Syrian government that amounts to a credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governing body.

It is the clearest definition outlined by Washington since Syria’s opposition militias overthrew Assad in a shockingly fast takeover after 13 years of civil war. Assad and his family fled to Russia.

The Biden administration, along with governments in the region and the West, has been scrambling to find ways to engage with the Syrian rebel groups including leading rebel faction Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group formerly allied with Al Qaeda and which is designated a terrorist organization by the US, European Union, Turkey, and the UN.

Blinken’s statement did not mention HTS but made repeated emphasis on the need for any future Syrian government to be inclusive and respect the rights of minorities while ensuring that Syria is not used as a base for terrorism.

“This transition process should lead to credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance that meets international standards of transparency and accountability, consistent with the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254,” Blinken said.

“The United States will recognize and fully support a future Syria government that results from this process,” he added.

The United States cut diplomatic ties with Syria and shut down its embassy in Damascus in 2012.

Washington in 2013 designated HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani a terrorist, saying al Qaeda in Iraq had tasked him with overthrowing Assad’s rule and establishing Islamic sharia law in Syria. It said the Nusra Front, the predecessor of HTS, carried out suicide attacks that killed civilians and espoused a violent sectarian vision.

The transition process and the new Syrian government should also facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to all in need, and ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are safely destroyed, Blinken added.

US President Joe Biden and his top aides described the moment as a historic opportunity for the Syrian people who have for decades lived under the oppressive rule of Assad but also warned the country faced a period of risk and uncertainty.

Meanwhile, a top White House official said on Tuesday that US troops will be staying in Syria after the fall of Assad as part of a counter-terrorism mission focused on destroying Islamic State terrorists.

“Those troops are there for a very specific and important reason, not as some sort of bargaining chip,” US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer said in an interview at the Reuters NEXT conference in New York.

US troops “have been there now for the better part of a decade or more to fight ISIS … we are still committed to that mission.”

Asked directly whether US troops are staying, Finer said, “Yes.”

Separately, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said on Tuesday that the US has asked HTS to help locate and free missing American journalist Austin Tice as it liberates the country’s prisons in the aftermath of Assad’s overthrow.

Washington is telling all parties in Syria that Tice, who was abducted in Syria in 2012, is a top US priority, Miller told a press briefing.

“In all of our communications with parties that we know talk to HTS, we have sent very clearly the message that as they move through Syria liberating prisons, that our top priority is the return of Austin Tice,” he said.

“We want anyone who’s operating on the ground in Syria to be on the lookout for him, and if they do find him, to return to him to us safely as soon as possible.”

The post Blinken Lays Out US Hopes for Syria’s Political Transition first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Continue Reading

Copyright © 2017 - 2023 Jewish Post & News