A year has passed since the beginning of the war that Israel, with the support of its allies, primarily the United States, has been waging against the “Axis of Evil” — an anti-Western alliance consisting of Iran, its satellites (Syria, Iraq), and terrorist proxies that have effectively taken control of their respective regions, such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

As the conflict escalates, the issue of international support for Israel’s actions has become increasingly pressing.

Of particular concern to Jerusalem, naturally, is the stance of Western countries, especially Israel’s allies, most notably the United States and several key European nations.

As the fighting intensifies, the diplomatic rhetoric of these governments has increasingly emphasized the “humanitarian dimension” of the conflict, largely driven by the growing trends in local public opinion, which are not always favorable to the Jewish State. However, a closer look reveals that the sympathies of some segments of the public in democratic countries towards the Palestinian Arabs do not, in most cases, translate into support for the radical Islamist terrorist groups in the Middle East. The primary diplomatic message from Washington and the majority of its NATO partners remains steadfast support for Israel’s right to self-defense.

Another perspective is that of the so-called “Global South,” a diverse and loosely organized conglomerate of developing and moderately developed countries from the Third World and, to some extent, the former Second World. The majority of these nations tend to hold either moderately pro-Palestinian views regarding the current Middle Eastern conflict or, more commonly, remain neutral. However, this does not prevent both groups from almost automatically voting in favor of anti-Israel resolutions at the UN, in line with the traditions of the still residual “Non-Aligned Movement.” The approach of regimes vying for leadership of the “Global South” looks fundamentally different. Competing for this status, they attempt, to varying degrees, to challenge the global economic and political dominance of the so-called “Global West,” typically associated with the US-led bloc of “old” and “old-new” democracies of both the New and Old Worlds.

The discussion is generally about Russia, China, and, to a lesser extent, India. While Delhi, whose relations with Jerusalem have reached a state of strategic partnership in recent years, maintains a largely neutral position in the conflict between Israel and Iran, as well as its Arab proxies, Moscow and Beijing have taken sides — and it’s clearly not Israel’s side.

China’s support for Iran remains largely moral, and Tehran has little chance of dragging Beijing into a direct confrontation with Israel. However, Russia’s support for its current closest partner in the region — Iran — is significantly more tangible, despite some differences between them. This includes direct solidarity from Moscow with Tehran’s Arab satellites, including Hamas and Hezbollah.

All of this significantly distinguishes the current situation from Moscow’s previous strategy of balancing and mediating between nearly all parties involved in the Middle East conflict, which was intended to position itself as an “impartial mediator.”

Factors of Views of Israel in the Russians Public Discourse

Over the course of 12 months of Israel’s war with Iranian proxies, the Russian leadership’s propaganda and diplomatic efforts in support of these regimes and groups, often loosely and not always convincingly framed as “solidarity with the Palestinians,” have become quite significant. On the flip side of this trend, there has been a series of anti-Israel moves, featuring elements bordering on antisemitism.

Unsurprisingly, the reaction of Russian society, which is highly susceptible to official propaganda — particularly pro-Kremlin television (which, according to polls, remains the main source of information for Russians) — and “patriotic” Telegram channels, has also shifted.

Public sentiment among Russians, who were generally quite favorable toward Israel in the past, changed almost instantly. This is notable given that, according to public opinion monitoring conducted by the reputable Levada Center since 1988, Israel has historically been viewed positively in Russia. The country’s economically established, younger, and better-educated citizens, as well as residents of Moscow, have been the most likely to show interest in and sympathy toward Israel.

Twenty years ago, in 2004, over two-thirds of respondents in a Levada Center poll reported very positive or somewhat positive attitudes toward Israel, while fewer than one-fifth of those surveyed held the opposite view. One possible factor contributing to such favorable sentiments was the emerging public partnership between Jerusalem and Moscow in the fight against terrorist groups. This included Russia’s willingness — expressed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a visit to Israel — to learn from Israel’s experience following the Beslan school tragedy in North Ossetia, where an attack by armed Islamists killed over 350 people, half of them children.

However, by 2006, the proportion of those with positive views of Israel had dropped by about half, while the share of those holding negative opinions increased from less than 20% to over 30%.

A March 2006 poll appears to have captured a surge in public frustration, likely driven by the sharp and widely discussed response from official Jerusalem to Moscow’s refusal to classify Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorist organizations. This frustration was compounded by the high-level reception of a Hamas delegation in the same month (and again a year later), led by Khaled Mashal, the head of the group’s political bureau and one of Israel’s most bitter enemies. Additionally, the Hamas delegation’s meeting with Patriarch Alexy II, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, was seen by many as not just political but also religious legitimization of the radical Islamist group.

These negative sentiments among the Russian public regarding Israel were, at the very least, not softened during the 34-day Second Lebanon War in July–August 2006, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched an operation against Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian Shia terrorist group controlling southern and eastern Lebanon.

The rise in Russian-Israeli relations began in the second half of the 2000s, as Russia reestablished itself as a significant player in the Middle East. Moscow recognized that, unlike the Soviet Union, modern Russia could not rely solely on its ties to the Arab world and sought greater understanding with Israel as well. This approach was positively received by Israel’s leadership at the time. The shift toward a close partnership with Russia was considered one of the foreign policy priorities of Benjamin Netanyahu’s second government (2009–2013). Netanyahu viewed his personal relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin as a valuable political asset.

Most of the second decade of the 21st century indeed saw a significant revitalization of Russian-Israeli relations, including rapid growth in mutual trade, as well as increased cooperation in economic, technological, scientific, cultural, and humanitarian sectors — although the scale of this cooperation lagged behind the real potential of both countries. Political dialogue at the highest levels was also very active. While these political and diplomatic contacts were “more symbolic than practical,” as noted by prominent Russian political analyst Fyodor Lukyanov, this symbolism reflected an unusual situation where “Russia’s relations with Israel were better than with almost the entire Arab world. Apart from the Iran issue, there were few significant points of differences between Moscow and Tel Aviv [sic]. Meanwhile, Russia’s cooling relations with most Arab regimes were tied to its support for Syria.”

This positive portrayal of Russian-Israeli relations in both federal and regional Russian media was paralleled by a gradual improvement in Russian public opinion toward Israel. By 2010, according to Levada Center data, favorable attitudes toward Israel had peaked at 70%. However, over the next decade, this support steadily declined. A notable exception was a sharp drop in 2014, likely in response to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) anti-terror operation in Gaza, Protective Edge. Nonetheless, this dip was short-lived, and thanks to the relatively balanced position taken by Russian authorities during the conflict, public sympathies for Israel rebounded to around 60%. This level of support remained fairly stable over the following four years.

The 2015–2017 agreements on the “deconfliction” of Russian and Israeli interests in Syria, as well as numerous meetings — around two dozen – between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu, likely played a key role in the development of their relations. Netanyahu, who valued his warm personal relationship with Putin as a crucial factor in bilateral cooperation and a significant resource for both his foreign and domestic policies, met with Putin roughly twice as often as he met with US presidents during the same period. However, even at that time, it was clear that this was more of a tactical partnership, based on overlapping interests and mutually agreed-upon “rules of the game.” As a result, there were lingering concerns that if the political landscape changed, so would the interests.

The first signal that these fears were well-founded came with the incident in the skies over Syria on September 23, 2018. During this incident, one of the dozens of missiles fired by Syrian air defense batteries equipped with Russian S-200 systems shot down a Russian IL-20 electronic intelligence aircraft. The Russian side quickly blamed the Israeli Air Force, which had been conducting an operation to destroy Iranian equipment intended for the production of precision missiles in Syria. According to Israeli and foreign media, by the time the Syrian forces began their “indiscriminate firing,” the Israeli F-16s had already completed their mission and were back in Israeli airspace.

Despite this, the Russian Ministry of Defense — and to a lesser extent, the Kremlin—blamed Israel without substantiation. However, both Jerusalem and Moscow soon moved to de-escalate the diplomatic conflict, clearly showing a desire to maintain their coordination mechanism in Syria. It was harder to ignore the “patriotic” campaigns in many Russian media outlets, including federal TV channels, where numerous public figures competed in making harsh anti-Israel statements, some of which bordered on or crossed into antisemitism. Although this media campaign was quickly wound down—likely due to guidance from relevant authorities—it became evident that the reintroduction of Soviet-era anti-Israel and antisemitic clichés into Russia’s legitimate public discourse was a real possibility, should such narratives be required by the government.

The impact of this political atmosphere on the Russian public was quickly evident. The once-positive attitude of Russians toward Israel began to sharply decline, while negative sentiment toward the Jewish State increased in parallel. For example, compared to 2018, when 60% of surveyed Russians still had a “very positive” or “mostly positive” view of Israel, and less than one-fifth held an opposing view, by 2020 Israel’s positive rating had dropped by 10%, while negative perceptions rose by 50%.

This trend accelerated dramatically after the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, and even more so with the onset of Israel’s war with the Iranian bloc in October 2023. Although Israel, unlike NATO member states that provided Ukraine with security guarantees, did not directly align itself with the Western coalition opposing Russia, official Jerusalem condemned the Russian invasion, offered significant humanitarian and material aid to Ukraine, provided diplomatic and political support, and supplied the Ukrainian Armed Forces with some types of defensive and non-lethal equipment. Despite attempts to maintain a sense of “business as usual,” this approach caused notable irritation within the Russian leadership. Consequently, public support for Israel among Russians dropped to 35%, a historic low, nearly matching the share of those holding a negative view of Israel for the first time in Levada Center’s years of polling.

By September 2024, 51% of Russians expressed a negative attitude toward Israel, marking a 34 percentage point increase from 2018. Meanwhile, positive sentiment toward Israel fell by 32 percentage points, reaching just 27%.

Since the collapse of the USSR, Russian-Israeli relations have experienced both highs and lows, but the current situation, where the number of Russians with a negative view of Israel nearly doubles the number of its supporters, is unprecedented in the post-Soviet era.

It seems reasonable to assume that the opinions and sentiments of Russians, at least regarding the subject of this text, are largely — if not entirely — a reflection of the foreign policy vision of the Russian political establishment, shaped by the tools it controls to influence public consciousness. In other words, we are witnessing a phenomenon that, until recently, appeared to be a relic of the distant past.

Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin lectures in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and is Academic Chairman of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies in Herzliya, Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

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