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The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7

Families and supporters of hostages that are being held in Gaza after they were kidnapped from Israel by Hamas gunmen on October 7, hold a demonstration to demand their immediate release, outside of the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, November 5, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville

In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities — not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization; certainty; preoccupation with cyber, targeting; professionalism; understanding; and risk management.

Israel’s intelligence community is among the most powerful in the world, certainly relative to the size of the country. Early warning is the historical cornerstone and a key element of Israel’s security doctrine. It failed catastrophically on October 7.

The early warning pillar was developed to bridge the inherent tension between Israel’s relatively small size, which has resulted in limited access to resources it can allocate to security needs, and the magnitude and intensity of the security threats with which it has always to deal.

These threats have grown over the years from knife attacks to the threat of a nuclear attack; from the threat of terrorism in the streets to the threat of precision weapons launched from a distance; and from the threat of lone wolves to threats from regional powers and even superpowers.

The main problem with early warning is that it requires not only an understanding of the present but a capacity to predict the future. The assessment of future events, when they concern human behavior, is always marked by great uncertainty and contains a built-in margin of error.

A quick analysis of the professional literature dealing with business strategies reveals that “outstanding organizations” only manage to achieve two-thirds of their long-term goals. If we translate this to intelligence work, this means that even those intelligence organizations that are the most outstanding in terms of information-gathering, analysis and understanding — even those that conduct the kind of in-depth soul-searching I advise in the second part of this article — will be wrong in their estimates of the future a third of the time.

The statement, “Once every 50 years, intelligence will be wrong in a way that leads to a severe blow to national security” exposes the need for a fundamental change in Israel’s security doctrine. Unlike the first decades of the State of Israel’s existence, when early warning was adopted as a central component, Israel is now in a situation where it is possible to increase the security margin. Israel is an economically and technologically strong country, both in absolute terms relative to its size and relative to its environment.

If the resources allocated to date provide a quality response to the country’s security challenges, then a wise increase in resources would create a level of security that reduces the problematic reliance on early warning. This resource increase should be based on careful risk management and should contain internal and external controls.

The security margin can be based on a clear technological and operational advantage over both known enemies and possible adversaries; broad and effective integrated land maneuvering capabilities, which are the insurance policy of national existence; accurate targeting and countering capabilities of both near and distant threats; aggregate power that creates deterrence and is a basis for effective international and regional alliances; use of security strengths as a lever to promote the solid economic base and national infrastructure; and a base of agreed values ​​that strengthens vital national cohesion.

One of the more effective uses of additional resources would be the further development of a strong intelligence community. This would form the basis for the detection of threats, accurate intelligence for targeting and operations, and a base cooperation with international and regional alliances. It would also provide an improved early warning capability that would allow at least two-thirds of the threats to be predicted in advance and thwarted ahead of time.

To develop such an intelligence community, we must draw relevant lessons from the failure of early warning on October 7. I suggest that there were seven failures, or “sins,” of intelligence that led to the catastrophe. The following is intended to open the conversation, not end it, and support analysis of the reasons for what happened and the lessons learned.

It is possible that some of the ideas raised here will turn out to be incorrect, but in this writer’s opinion, they should all be discussed. These failures are aimed at different levels of the intelligence work: from the decision-making at the top of the pyramid to the junior levels of collection and research, which are sometimes the most important, as can be learned from those who did think differently and tried to warn of what was to come.

“Sin” #1: Politicization. The year before the failure was not good for the intelligence community in this regard. The heads of that community found themselves in the midst of a political storm but seemed unable to steer the ship. They sent letters and early warnings up to the political level, but the necessary conclusions were not subsequently drawn by that level. Early warning of a change in the enemy’s intentions should have led to an obsessive preoccupation with operational early warning, but this did not happen. There were too many briefings by senior intelligence community members to the media on political matters, whether or not they were identified as such, which interfered with proper professional functioning.

Another significant issue was the failed handling of the refusal/non-volunteering initiatives. The failure to eliminate them decisively harmed the functioning of the intelligence echelons, shook them, and diverted attention away from the preoccupation with early warning.

Another relevant matter was the political statements made by former senior officials in the name of alleged intelligence analysis, which did not help.

“Sin” #2: Certainty. Predicting the future is inherently uncertain. It requires extreme caution. Alternatives must be presented, but they can never cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. A leading alternative must be determined and other alternatives evaluated according to their decreasing probability. Possible turning points need to be considered, together with the risks arising from their realization. There must be transparency with regard to the uncertainty levels of those alternatives and risks.

All of this has been eroded in recent years, at least as far as the assessment of Hamas in Gaza is concerned. This is the result of three main problems: excessive confidence in the assessment, which resulted in a failure to recognize how the adversary had changed; an effort to satisfy the demands of decision-makers and security system officials for higher certainty through an improbably precise description of a future reality; and the desire to give greater validity to the policy and operational recommendations of the intelligence.

“Sin” #3: Cyber. In recent years, cyber has occupied the attention of the intelligence community to a greater and greater extent. This is reflected in three characteristics: the focus of attention on cyber operations; shifting the balance sharply towards cyber at the expense of classic sigint, humint and visint; and an increased preoccupation with cyber threats to the State of Israel and defense that drew resources from other threats. Adapting the intelligence system to new capabilities is a welcome process, and the various efforts in the cyber domain have resulted in significant intelligence and operational achievements. The claim, to be clear, is that there was an imbalance in terms of the distribution of resources and quality personnel and their transfer from other intelligence tasks to cyber tasks.

“Sin” #4: Targeting. In recent years, the attention of intelligence personnel dealing with analysis and assessment has been directed toward dealing with operations. The greatest attention has been given to research that creates targets. There is no doubt that the contribution of accurate intelligence to operational activity – with an emphasis on accurate fire – that effectively damages the adversary and reduces collateral damage fulfills a vital need. The problem is that the focus on targeting resulted in the breaking down of the enemy into tiny elements, which resulted in a decreased ability to analyze that enemy as a strategic and operational entity. In addition, the preoccupation with promoting recommendations for policy and operational action and participating in their implementation seriously damaged the ability to perform an assessment detached from the perspective of the “blue side” regarding the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Despite the resource challenge, there is a need to maintain a dedicated group of intelligence personnel to deal exclusively with analysis and evaluation of the “red side.”

“Sin” #5: Professionalism. In recent years, the professionalism of analysis and assessment has been eroded in two areas that are critical to early warning, both of which failed on October 7: a political-strategic analysis of the perceptions, strategies and intentions of the other side; and a professional analysis of its military organizations and operations. This erosion caused Israel to view its adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, as armies rather than state-level entities. An analysis of the leaked NCO V from 8200 might indicate that looking at Hamas as a military system, rather than as a terrorist organization capable of only local and limited operations, could have led to a more substantial reference to the raid plan known as the “Wall of Jericho.” A reference of this kind was required in the fields of both collection and analysis for early warning and should have led to other conclusions and a different preparation by the Southern Command and the Gaza division against the potential threat.

“Sin” #6: Understanding. In recent years, intelligence organizations has given less respect to expertise from the fields of humanities and social sciences, which are in fact the basis of intelligence analysis and assessment. This eroded Israel’s understanding of the language and culture of the other side. In-depth knowledge of the history of the Middle East is required, as is the use of theoretical tools from fields in the social sciences, such as international relations, comparative politics, sociology, anthropology, economics, and more. The “best for technology” approach has replaced the “best for analysis and assessment” approach. Technological tools for language translation and the monitoring of human behavior were seen as substitutes for the knowledge and deep understanding once required of intelligence analysts. But rather than strengthen human ability, these tools actually weakened it and eroded the required ability for analysis and assessment.

“Sin” #7: Risk management. The senior intelligence officials committed to providing early warning with high certainty did not present its limitations and inherent risks, especially after the strategic early warnings that they allegedly passed on to the political level. Based on leaks from internal forums, it seems that they even saw it as a substitute for deploying forces and maintaining alertness. However, the problem of assessing and preparing for risk is consigned not only to intelligence officials but also to political and military decision-makers. An orderly risk analysis could have shown that the deployment of the IDF on the Gaza border was insufficient in the face of scenarios that were broader than a few raids at once, especially in the face of the dangerous course of action (DPA) of implementing the “Wall of Jericho” plan. The IDF and the decision-makers above it need to substantially improve the process of risk management.

The “seven sins” presented above represent a proposal for the analysis of the debriefings that will occur on the intelligence failure that led to October 7. They are critical to a re-strengthening of the analysis and assessment capacities that are the basis of early warning and that remain important components of the Israeli security doctrine.

Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7 first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Merz Says Criticism of Israel in Germany Has Become Pretext for Hatred of Jews

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz attends celebrations of the newly completed renovation of Reichenbach Strasse synagogue in Munich, Germany, Sept. 15, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Angelika Warmuth

Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Wednesday that criticism of Israel was increasingly being used in Germany as a pretext for stoking hatred against Jews.

Speaking at an event to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Central Council of Jews, Merz said that antisemitism had “become louder, more open, more brazen, more violent almost every day” since the Hamas-led attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, that ignited the Gaza war.

“‘Criticism of Israel‘ and the crudest perpetrator-victim reversal is increasingly a pretext under which the poison of antisemitism is spread,” he said.

Germany is Israel‘s second biggest weapons supplier after the US, and has long been one of its staunchest supporters, in part because of historical guilt for the Nazi Holocaust – a policy known as the “Staatsraison.”

Last month, however, Germany suspended exports of weaponry that could be used in the Gaza Strip because of Israel‘s plan to expand its operations there – the first time united Germany had acknowledged denying military support to its long-time ally.

The decision followed mounting pressure from the public and his junior coalition partner over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

In his speech in Berlin on Wednesday, Merz mentioned his about-turn, saying that criticism of the Israeli government “must be possible,” but added: “Our country suffers damage to its own soul when this criticism becomes a pretext for hatred of Jews, or if it even leads to the demand that Germany should turn its back on Israel.”

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Israeli Anti-Missile Laser System ‘Iron Beam’ Ready for Military Use This Year

Iron Beam laser defense system. Photo: X/Twitter screenshot

A low-cost, high-power laser-based system aimed at destroying incoming missiles has successfully completed testing and will be ready for operational use by the military later this year, Israel’s Defense Ministry said on Wednesday.

Co-developed by Elbit Systems and Rafael Advance Defense Systems, “Iron Beam” will complement Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow antimissile systems, which have been used to intercept thousands of rockets fired by Hamas terrorists in Gaza, by Hezbollah from Lebanon, and by the Houthis in Yemen.

Current rocket interceptors cost at least $50,000 each while the cost is negligible for lasers, which focus primarily on smaller missiles and drones. “Now that the Iron Beam’s performance has been proven, we anticipate a significant leap in air defense capabilities through the deployment of these long-range laser weapon systems,” the ministry said.

After years in development, the ministry said it tested Iron Beam for several weeks in southern Israel and proved its effectiveness in a “complete operational configuration by intercepting rockets, mortars, aircraft, and UAVs across a comprehensive range of operational scenarios.”

The first systems are set to be integrated into the military‘s air defenses by year-end, it said.

Shorter-range and less powerful laser systems are already in use.

Iron Beam is a ground-based, high-power laser air defense system designed to counter aerial threats, including rockets, mortars, and UAVs.

“This is the first time in the world that a high-power laser interception system has reached full operational maturity,” said defense ministry Director-General Amir Baram.

Rafael Chairman Yuval Steinitz said that Iron Beam, which is built with the company’s adaptive optics technology, “will undoubtedly be a game-changing system with unprecedented impact on modern warfare.”

For its part, Elbit was working on the development of high-power lasers for other military applications, “first and foremost an airborne laser that holds the potential for a strategic change in air defense capabilities,” CEO Bezhalel Machlis said.

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Iran and European Ministers Make Little Progress as Renewed UN Sanctions Loom, Diplomats Say

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi speaks during a meeting with foreign ambassadors in Tehran, Iran, July 12, 2025. Photo: Hamid Forootan/Iranian Foreign Ministry/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS

Iranian and European ministers made little progress in talks on Wednesday aimed at preventing international sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear program being reimposed at the end of this month, two European diplomats and one Iranian diplomat said.

Britain, France, and Germany, the so-called E3, launched a 30-day process at the end of August to reimpose UN sanctions. They set conditions for Tehran to meet during September to convince them to delay the “snapback mechanism.”

The offer by the E3 to put off the snapback for up to six months to enable serious negotiations is conditional on Iran restoring access for UN nuclear inspectors – who would also seek to account for Iran‘s large stock of enriched uranium – and engaging in talks with the US.

The status of Iran‘s enriched uranium stocks has been unknown since Israel and the US bombed Iranian nuclear sites in June.

TALKS WITH EUROPEANS FOLLOWED ACCORD WITH IAEA

Wednesday’s phone call between the E3 foreign ministers, the European Union foreign policy chief, and their Iranian counterpart followed an agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency last week on resuming cooperation, including, in principle, the inspection of nuclear sites.

Several Western diplomats have said, however, that the accord is not detailed enough, sets no timeframe and leaves the door open for Iran to continue stonewalling.

There has also been no indication of a willingness from Iran to resume talks with Washington.

Iran says it is still refining how it will work with the IAEA.

In the call, Iran‘s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi expressed willingness to reach a “fair and balanced” solution, according to a statement on Iranian state media.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran has entered into dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency with a responsible approach … on how Iran will fulfil its safeguards obligations in the new situation … It is now the turn of the opposing parties to use this opportunity to continue the diplomatic path and prevent an avoidable crisis,” Araqchi said.

GERMANY SAYS IRAN HAS NOT MET CONDITIONS

Germany’s foreign ministry said on X that the E3 had “underscored that Iran has yet to take the reasonable and precise actions necessary to reach an extension of Resolution 2231,” adding that sanctions would be reimposed unless there were “concrete actions in the coming days.”

The sanctions would hit Iran‘s financial, banking, hydrocarbons, and defense sectors.

Four European diplomats and an Iranian official said before the call that the most likely scenario would be the E3 going ahead with a reimposition of sanctions.

An Iranian diplomat said Tehran had reiterated that it would retaliate if the decision to restore UN sanctions was made.

“The understanding in Tehran is that the UN sanctions will be reimposed. That is why Tehran refuses to give concessions,” an Iranian official said.

The West says the advancement of Iran‘s nuclear program goes beyond civilian needs, while Tehran says it wants nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.

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