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The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7

Families and supporters of hostages that are being held in Gaza after they were kidnapped from Israel by Hamas gunmen on October 7, hold a demonstration to demand their immediate release, outside of the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, November 5, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville

In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities — not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization; certainty; preoccupation with cyber, targeting; professionalism; understanding; and risk management.

Israel’s intelligence community is among the most powerful in the world, certainly relative to the size of the country. Early warning is the historical cornerstone and a key element of Israel’s security doctrine. It failed catastrophically on October 7.

The early warning pillar was developed to bridge the inherent tension between Israel’s relatively small size, which has resulted in limited access to resources it can allocate to security needs, and the magnitude and intensity of the security threats with which it has always to deal.

These threats have grown over the years from knife attacks to the threat of a nuclear attack; from the threat of terrorism in the streets to the threat of precision weapons launched from a distance; and from the threat of lone wolves to threats from regional powers and even superpowers.

The main problem with early warning is that it requires not only an understanding of the present but a capacity to predict the future. The assessment of future events, when they concern human behavior, is always marked by great uncertainty and contains a built-in margin of error.

A quick analysis of the professional literature dealing with business strategies reveals that “outstanding organizations” only manage to achieve two-thirds of their long-term goals. If we translate this to intelligence work, this means that even those intelligence organizations that are the most outstanding in terms of information-gathering, analysis and understanding — even those that conduct the kind of in-depth soul-searching I advise in the second part of this article — will be wrong in their estimates of the future a third of the time.

The statement, “Once every 50 years, intelligence will be wrong in a way that leads to a severe blow to national security” exposes the need for a fundamental change in Israel’s security doctrine. Unlike the first decades of the State of Israel’s existence, when early warning was adopted as a central component, Israel is now in a situation where it is possible to increase the security margin. Israel is an economically and technologically strong country, both in absolute terms relative to its size and relative to its environment.

If the resources allocated to date provide a quality response to the country’s security challenges, then a wise increase in resources would create a level of security that reduces the problematic reliance on early warning. This resource increase should be based on careful risk management and should contain internal and external controls.

The security margin can be based on a clear technological and operational advantage over both known enemies and possible adversaries; broad and effective integrated land maneuvering capabilities, which are the insurance policy of national existence; accurate targeting and countering capabilities of both near and distant threats; aggregate power that creates deterrence and is a basis for effective international and regional alliances; use of security strengths as a lever to promote the solid economic base and national infrastructure; and a base of agreed values ​​that strengthens vital national cohesion.

One of the more effective uses of additional resources would be the further development of a strong intelligence community. This would form the basis for the detection of threats, accurate intelligence for targeting and operations, and a base cooperation with international and regional alliances. It would also provide an improved early warning capability that would allow at least two-thirds of the threats to be predicted in advance and thwarted ahead of time.

To develop such an intelligence community, we must draw relevant lessons from the failure of early warning on October 7. I suggest that there were seven failures, or “sins,” of intelligence that led to the catastrophe. The following is intended to open the conversation, not end it, and support analysis of the reasons for what happened and the lessons learned.

It is possible that some of the ideas raised here will turn out to be incorrect, but in this writer’s opinion, they should all be discussed. These failures are aimed at different levels of the intelligence work: from the decision-making at the top of the pyramid to the junior levels of collection and research, which are sometimes the most important, as can be learned from those who did think differently and tried to warn of what was to come.

“Sin” #1: Politicization. The year before the failure was not good for the intelligence community in this regard. The heads of that community found themselves in the midst of a political storm but seemed unable to steer the ship. They sent letters and early warnings up to the political level, but the necessary conclusions were not subsequently drawn by that level. Early warning of a change in the enemy’s intentions should have led to an obsessive preoccupation with operational early warning, but this did not happen. There were too many briefings by senior intelligence community members to the media on political matters, whether or not they were identified as such, which interfered with proper professional functioning.

Another significant issue was the failed handling of the refusal/non-volunteering initiatives. The failure to eliminate them decisively harmed the functioning of the intelligence echelons, shook them, and diverted attention away from the preoccupation with early warning.

Another relevant matter was the political statements made by former senior officials in the name of alleged intelligence analysis, which did not help.

“Sin” #2: Certainty. Predicting the future is inherently uncertain. It requires extreme caution. Alternatives must be presented, but they can never cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. A leading alternative must be determined and other alternatives evaluated according to their decreasing probability. Possible turning points need to be considered, together with the risks arising from their realization. There must be transparency with regard to the uncertainty levels of those alternatives and risks.

All of this has been eroded in recent years, at least as far as the assessment of Hamas in Gaza is concerned. This is the result of three main problems: excessive confidence in the assessment, which resulted in a failure to recognize how the adversary had changed; an effort to satisfy the demands of decision-makers and security system officials for higher certainty through an improbably precise description of a future reality; and the desire to give greater validity to the policy and operational recommendations of the intelligence.

“Sin” #3: Cyber. In recent years, cyber has occupied the attention of the intelligence community to a greater and greater extent. This is reflected in three characteristics: the focus of attention on cyber operations; shifting the balance sharply towards cyber at the expense of classic sigint, humint and visint; and an increased preoccupation with cyber threats to the State of Israel and defense that drew resources from other threats. Adapting the intelligence system to new capabilities is a welcome process, and the various efforts in the cyber domain have resulted in significant intelligence and operational achievements. The claim, to be clear, is that there was an imbalance in terms of the distribution of resources and quality personnel and their transfer from other intelligence tasks to cyber tasks.

“Sin” #4: Targeting. In recent years, the attention of intelligence personnel dealing with analysis and assessment has been directed toward dealing with operations. The greatest attention has been given to research that creates targets. There is no doubt that the contribution of accurate intelligence to operational activity – with an emphasis on accurate fire – that effectively damages the adversary and reduces collateral damage fulfills a vital need. The problem is that the focus on targeting resulted in the breaking down of the enemy into tiny elements, which resulted in a decreased ability to analyze that enemy as a strategic and operational entity. In addition, the preoccupation with promoting recommendations for policy and operational action and participating in their implementation seriously damaged the ability to perform an assessment detached from the perspective of the “blue side” regarding the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Despite the resource challenge, there is a need to maintain a dedicated group of intelligence personnel to deal exclusively with analysis and evaluation of the “red side.”

“Sin” #5: Professionalism. In recent years, the professionalism of analysis and assessment has been eroded in two areas that are critical to early warning, both of which failed on October 7: a political-strategic analysis of the perceptions, strategies and intentions of the other side; and a professional analysis of its military organizations and operations. This erosion caused Israel to view its adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, as armies rather than state-level entities. An analysis of the leaked NCO V from 8200 might indicate that looking at Hamas as a military system, rather than as a terrorist organization capable of only local and limited operations, could have led to a more substantial reference to the raid plan known as the “Wall of Jericho.” A reference of this kind was required in the fields of both collection and analysis for early warning and should have led to other conclusions and a different preparation by the Southern Command and the Gaza division against the potential threat.

“Sin” #6: Understanding. In recent years, intelligence organizations has given less respect to expertise from the fields of humanities and social sciences, which are in fact the basis of intelligence analysis and assessment. This eroded Israel’s understanding of the language and culture of the other side. In-depth knowledge of the history of the Middle East is required, as is the use of theoretical tools from fields in the social sciences, such as international relations, comparative politics, sociology, anthropology, economics, and more. The “best for technology” approach has replaced the “best for analysis and assessment” approach. Technological tools for language translation and the monitoring of human behavior were seen as substitutes for the knowledge and deep understanding once required of intelligence analysts. But rather than strengthen human ability, these tools actually weakened it and eroded the required ability for analysis and assessment.

“Sin” #7: Risk management. The senior intelligence officials committed to providing early warning with high certainty did not present its limitations and inherent risks, especially after the strategic early warnings that they allegedly passed on to the political level. Based on leaks from internal forums, it seems that they even saw it as a substitute for deploying forces and maintaining alertness. However, the problem of assessing and preparing for risk is consigned not only to intelligence officials but also to political and military decision-makers. An orderly risk analysis could have shown that the deployment of the IDF on the Gaza border was insufficient in the face of scenarios that were broader than a few raids at once, especially in the face of the dangerous course of action (DPA) of implementing the “Wall of Jericho” plan. The IDF and the decision-makers above it need to substantially improve the process of risk management.

The “seven sins” presented above represent a proposal for the analysis of the debriefings that will occur on the intelligence failure that led to October 7. They are critical to a re-strengthening of the analysis and assessment capacities that are the basis of early warning and that remain important components of the Israeli security doctrine.

Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.

The post The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7 first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Dozens of Celebrities Call for Ceasefire, Help Raise $2 Million for Gaza Palestinians at Benefit Concert

Billie Eilish and Finneas receive Album of the Year Award for “Hit Me Hard and Soft” during the iHeartRadio Music Awards at Dolby Theatre in Los Angeles, California, US, March 17, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mario Anzuoni

A star-studded list of celebrities helped raise money for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip amid the Israel-Hamas war as part of a fundraising campaign and benefit concert that took place at London’s Wembley Arena on Wednesday.

Ahead of the ‘Together for Palestine” concert, the campaign released a video featuring dozens of celebrities who called for a ceasefire in Gaza and to “stop the killing” of Palestinians during the ongoing war. They included Grammy-winning artists Billie Eilish and her brother Finneas, Oscar winners Cillian Murphy, Joaquin Phoenix, Javier Bardem, and Penelope Cruz; “Outlander” star Caitriona Balfe; Pakistani activist Malala Yousafzai; and Scottish actor Brian Cox.

“We have to tell the truth on behalf of the people of Palestine,” Cox said in the video.

“It’s important to speak out now, not when this is over, right now, while it’s happening, pressurize your government. Lend your support to those who are peacefully campaigning for Palestine. Call for a ceasefire, stop the killing,” added British comedian and actor Steve Coogan in the clip.

The video also included appearances by “The White Lotus” star Natasha Rothwell, “Bad Sisters” star Sharon Horgan, and “Weapons” actor Benedict Wong. It was released mere hours before the “Together for Palestine” benefit concert at Wembley Arena, which raised more than £1.5 million ($2 million). The event included performances from Bastille, James Blake, Jamie xx, and PinkPantheress, and Palestinian artists such as Sama’ Abdulhadi, Saint Levant, and Nia Barghouti, who is the daughter of Omar Barghouti, a leader of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel. 

Paloma Faith performed live wearing a dress made from a Palestinian keffiyeh. The event also featured a pre-recorded performance by Annie Lennox of her new song “Why? – For Gaza,” which she sang while wearing a T-shirt that said, “Let Gaza Live.”

The event, which was livestreamed on YouTube, was organized by British artist Brian Eno, who read the poem “Oh Rascal Shildren of Gaza” by Palestinian writer Khaled Juma. Speakers at the event included actors Richard Gere, Florence Pugh, and “Bridgerton” stars Nicola Coughlan and Charithra Chandran. Benedict Cumberbatch recited a Palestinian poem while broadcaster Mehdi Hasan led the audience in chanting “You can’t bomb the truth away.”

British-American documentarian Louis Theroux claimed on stage that Palestinians are “living under military occupation [and are] subject to slow, grinding relentless violence.” French former soccer player Eric Cantona called for Israeli athletes to be banned from all soccer competitions around the world, including FIFA and UEFA matches.

“I know that international football is more than just sport,” said the former Manchester United player. “It’s cultural; political. It’s soft power in the way that a country represents itself on a global stage. The time has come to suspend Israel from that privilege.” His comments elicited loud applause from the audience.

“FIFA and UEFA must suspend Israel,” he added. “[Soccer] clubs everywhere must refuse to play Israeli teams. Current players everywhere must refuse to play against Israeli teams … it’s time for everyone to get off the sidelines.” When Cantona asked the audience if they agreed that Israelis should be boycotted from all soccer matches, they replied in unison, “Yes!”

Francesca Albanese, the United Nations special rapporteur for the Palestinian territories said, “Palestinians continue to suffer while our governments turn a blind eye, or worse – they are complicit. They trade weapons. They host Israeli officials.” Both Pugh and Coughlan criticized their colleagues in Hollywood for staying silent about “grave violations of human rights in Gaza.”

“Silence in the face of such suffering is not neutrality. It is complicity. And empathy should not be this hard and it should have never been this hard,” said Pugh. She also applauded Nia’s Bargouti’s performance at the concert in an Instagram story. In the caption of the post, she told Bargouti that “[you] sang so beautifully and so powerfully considering the weight and meaning of this evening. I was blown away by your strength.”

Others who made an appearance at the event included actress Jameela Jamil, “Love Island” host Laura Whitmore, and the “Chicken Shop Date” YouTuber Amelia Dimoldenberg.

“Together For Palestine” said all ticket proceeds from the benefit concert will be given to Palestinian-led organizations on the ground in Gaza, through Choose Love, a British charity that supports humanitarian workers in conflict zones. The groups that will benefit from Wednesday’s concert include Taawon, which runs orphan care programs in Gaza, the Palestine Children’s Relief Fund, and the Palestinian Medical Relief Society.

Israel has long expressed concern that Hamas steals much of the humanitarian aid that is sent into Gaza for its own terrorist operations and to sell to Palestinian civilians at inflated prices.

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Italian Port Blocks Arms for Israel as Worker Protests Mount

Illustrative: Demonstrators participate in a pro-Palestinian protest in Piazza Duomo in Milan, Italy, on Nov. 23, 2024. Photo: Alessandro Bremec/NurPhoto via Reuters Connect

The Italian Adriatic port of Ravenna on Thursday refused entry to two trucks said to be carrying arms to Israel, as protests mount among Italian dockworkers and other labor groups against the offensive in Gaza.

The center-left mayor of Ravenna, Alessandro Barattoni, told reporters the port authority had accepted the request from him and the regional government to deny access to the lorries carrying explosives en route to the Israeli port of Haifa.

“The Italian state says it has blocked the sale of arms to Israel but it is unacceptable that, thank to bureaucratic loopholes, they can pass through Italy from other countries,” Barattoni said in a statement.

He did not provide details on where the containers had come from or provide evidence of their contents.

Similar action to block arms shipments to Israel has been taken by dockworkers in other European countries such as France, Sweden, and Greece.

Ravenna’s decision reflects growing mobilization in Italy against Israel‘s military campaign and in support of an international flotilla trying to deliver aid to the Palestinians.

A spokesperson from the Israeli embassy in Rome said they did not have sufficiently detailed information about the case and so declined to comment. Israel‘s government sometimes accuses Europea nations of bias against it and swallowing propaganda by the Hamas terrorist group whom it is fighting in Gaza.

On Friday Italy’s largest trade union body, the CGIL, will hold a national half-day strike and marches in Rome and other cities, while on Sept. 22 two other unions will halt work and try to block activity in the large ports of Genoa and Livorno.

“We won’t let a single pin through the port,” said Riccardo Rudino from the Calp dockers’ union in Genoa.

Israel launched its offensive after Hamas-led terrorists attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, killing more than 1,200 people and taking 251 hostages.

The CGIL said its protests were aimed at generating pressure on Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government “to suspend all commercial and military cooperation agreements with Israel, lift the humanitarian embargo, and recognize the State of Palestine.”

Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said on Thursday Italy would support EU sanctions against violent Israeli settlers and Israeli ministers who have made “unacceptable” comments on Gaza and the West Bank, and was open to considering trade sanctions.

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Israeli Tanks, Infantry Advance in Gaza City Offensive as Enclave Hit by Telecoms Blackout

Smoke rises following Israeli strikes during a military operation, in Gaza City, Sept. 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ebrahim Hajjaj

Israeli tanks were advancing on Thursday in two Gaza City areas that are gateways to the city center, while internet and phone lines were cut off across the Gaza Strip, a sign that ground operations were likely to further escalate imminently.

Israeli forces control Gaza City’s eastern suburbs and in recent days have been pounding the Sheikh Radwan and Tel Al-Hawa areas, from where they would be positioned to advance on central and western areas where most of the population is sheltering.

In separate developments, Israel attacked Hezbollah military targets in southern Lebanon, while two Israelis were killed at Allenby Crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, in what the Israeli military called a “terror attack.”

INFANTRY, TANKS, ARTILLERY ADVANCING TOWARDS INNER CITY

Israeli army spokesperson Nadav Shoshani said Israeli forces had been operating in the periphery of Gaza City for several weeks but since the night of Monday to Tuesday large numbers of troops had begun moving towards the inner city.

He said a combination of infantry, tanks, and artillery was advancing, backed up by the air force, and that it was a gradual process that would increase as time went on.

“The strategy right now is to defeat Hamas and apply pressure on Hamas, which can lead to a deal or can lead to rescue missions [to free hostages],” Shoshani told Reuters on the Israeli side of the border with Gaza.

A total of 48 hostages captured during the Hamas-led attack on southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, remain in Gaza and Israeli officials believe around 20 are still alive.

Hostage families have been imploring Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to stop the offensive on Gaza and instead negotiate a ceasefire with Hamas to free their loved ones, but Netanyahu says military victory will bring them home.

The armed wing of Hamas said on Thursday the hostages were distributed throughout the neighborhoods of Gaza City.

“The start of this criminal operation and its expansion means you will not receive any captive, alive or dead,” it said in a written statement.

MANY FLEEING AMID TELECOMS BLACKOUT, MANY MORE STAYING PUT

The Palestinian Telecommunications Company said in a statement that its services had been cut off “due to the ongoing aggression and the targeting of the main network routes.”

Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have fled Gaza City since Israel announced on Aug. 10 it intended to take control, but a greater number are staying put, either in battered homes among the ruins or in makeshift tent encampments.

The military has been dropping leaflets urging residents to flee towards a designated “humanitarian zone” in the south of the territory, but aid agencies say conditions there are dire, with insufficient food, medicine, shelter, and basic hygiene.

The World Health Organization warned on Thursday that critical shortages of blood in Gaza hospitals could see key services grind to a halt within days.

FAMILIES WITH BELONGINGS EVACUATE TOWARDS THE SOUTH

Along the coastal road, an unbroken column of every type of vehicle from carts and beaten-up cars to vans designed to carry goods was moving south, heavily laden with mattresses, gas cylinders, and entire families perching on their belongings.

“We are heading to go sleep on the streets towards the beach, like this, barefoot, we don’t know where to go,” said Yasser Saleh, speaking as he stood on the edge of a rickety trailer being pulled by a car.

The war was triggered by the Oct. 7 attacks, in which about 1,200 people were killed and 251 taken hostage.

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