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The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7
Families and supporters of hostages that are being held in Gaza after they were kidnapped from Israel by Hamas gunmen on October 7, hold a demonstration to demand their immediate release, outside of the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, November 5, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville
In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities — not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization; certainty; preoccupation with cyber, targeting; professionalism; understanding; and risk management.
Israel’s intelligence community is among the most powerful in the world, certainly relative to the size of the country. Early warning is the historical cornerstone and a key element of Israel’s security doctrine. It failed catastrophically on October 7.
The early warning pillar was developed to bridge the inherent tension between Israel’s relatively small size, which has resulted in limited access to resources it can allocate to security needs, and the magnitude and intensity of the security threats with which it has always to deal.
These threats have grown over the years from knife attacks to the threat of a nuclear attack; from the threat of terrorism in the streets to the threat of precision weapons launched from a distance; and from the threat of lone wolves to threats from regional powers and even superpowers.
The main problem with early warning is that it requires not only an understanding of the present but a capacity to predict the future. The assessment of future events, when they concern human behavior, is always marked by great uncertainty and contains a built-in margin of error.
A quick analysis of the professional literature dealing with business strategies reveals that “outstanding organizations” only manage to achieve two-thirds of their long-term goals. If we translate this to intelligence work, this means that even those intelligence organizations that are the most outstanding in terms of information-gathering, analysis and understanding — even those that conduct the kind of in-depth soul-searching I advise in the second part of this article — will be wrong in their estimates of the future a third of the time.
The statement, “Once every 50 years, intelligence will be wrong in a way that leads to a severe blow to national security” exposes the need for a fundamental change in Israel’s security doctrine. Unlike the first decades of the State of Israel’s existence, when early warning was adopted as a central component, Israel is now in a situation where it is possible to increase the security margin. Israel is an economically and technologically strong country, both in absolute terms relative to its size and relative to its environment.
If the resources allocated to date provide a quality response to the country’s security challenges, then a wise increase in resources would create a level of security that reduces the problematic reliance on early warning. This resource increase should be based on careful risk management and should contain internal and external controls.
The security margin can be based on a clear technological and operational advantage over both known enemies and possible adversaries; broad and effective integrated land maneuvering capabilities, which are the insurance policy of national existence; accurate targeting and countering capabilities of both near and distant threats; aggregate power that creates deterrence and is a basis for effective international and regional alliances; use of security strengths as a lever to promote the solid economic base and national infrastructure; and a base of agreed values that strengthens vital national cohesion.
One of the more effective uses of additional resources would be the further development of a strong intelligence community. This would form the basis for the detection of threats, accurate intelligence for targeting and operations, and a base cooperation with international and regional alliances. It would also provide an improved early warning capability that would allow at least two-thirds of the threats to be predicted in advance and thwarted ahead of time.
To develop such an intelligence community, we must draw relevant lessons from the failure of early warning on October 7. I suggest that there were seven failures, or “sins,” of intelligence that led to the catastrophe. The following is intended to open the conversation, not end it, and support analysis of the reasons for what happened and the lessons learned.
It is possible that some of the ideas raised here will turn out to be incorrect, but in this writer’s opinion, they should all be discussed. These failures are aimed at different levels of the intelligence work: from the decision-making at the top of the pyramid to the junior levels of collection and research, which are sometimes the most important, as can be learned from those who did think differently and tried to warn of what was to come.
“Sin” #1: Politicization. The year before the failure was not good for the intelligence community in this regard. The heads of that community found themselves in the midst of a political storm but seemed unable to steer the ship. They sent letters and early warnings up to the political level, but the necessary conclusions were not subsequently drawn by that level. Early warning of a change in the enemy’s intentions should have led to an obsessive preoccupation with operational early warning, but this did not happen. There were too many briefings by senior intelligence community members to the media on political matters, whether or not they were identified as such, which interfered with proper professional functioning.
Another significant issue was the failed handling of the refusal/non-volunteering initiatives. The failure to eliminate them decisively harmed the functioning of the intelligence echelons, shook them, and diverted attention away from the preoccupation with early warning.
Another relevant matter was the political statements made by former senior officials in the name of alleged intelligence analysis, which did not help.
“Sin” #2: Certainty. Predicting the future is inherently uncertain. It requires extreme caution. Alternatives must be presented, but they can never cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. A leading alternative must be determined and other alternatives evaluated according to their decreasing probability. Possible turning points need to be considered, together with the risks arising from their realization. There must be transparency with regard to the uncertainty levels of those alternatives and risks.
All of this has been eroded in recent years, at least as far as the assessment of Hamas in Gaza is concerned. This is the result of three main problems: excessive confidence in the assessment, which resulted in a failure to recognize how the adversary had changed; an effort to satisfy the demands of decision-makers and security system officials for higher certainty through an improbably precise description of a future reality; and the desire to give greater validity to the policy and operational recommendations of the intelligence.
“Sin” #3: Cyber. In recent years, cyber has occupied the attention of the intelligence community to a greater and greater extent. This is reflected in three characteristics: the focus of attention on cyber operations; shifting the balance sharply towards cyber at the expense of classic sigint, humint and visint; and an increased preoccupation with cyber threats to the State of Israel and defense that drew resources from other threats. Adapting the intelligence system to new capabilities is a welcome process, and the various efforts in the cyber domain have resulted in significant intelligence and operational achievements. The claim, to be clear, is that there was an imbalance in terms of the distribution of resources and quality personnel and their transfer from other intelligence tasks to cyber tasks.
“Sin” #4: Targeting. In recent years, the attention of intelligence personnel dealing with analysis and assessment has been directed toward dealing with operations. The greatest attention has been given to research that creates targets. There is no doubt that the contribution of accurate intelligence to operational activity – with an emphasis on accurate fire – that effectively damages the adversary and reduces collateral damage fulfills a vital need. The problem is that the focus on targeting resulted in the breaking down of the enemy into tiny elements, which resulted in a decreased ability to analyze that enemy as a strategic and operational entity. In addition, the preoccupation with promoting recommendations for policy and operational action and participating in their implementation seriously damaged the ability to perform an assessment detached from the perspective of the “blue side” regarding the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Despite the resource challenge, there is a need to maintain a dedicated group of intelligence personnel to deal exclusively with analysis and evaluation of the “red side.”
“Sin” #5: Professionalism. In recent years, the professionalism of analysis and assessment has been eroded in two areas that are critical to early warning, both of which failed on October 7: a political-strategic analysis of the perceptions, strategies and intentions of the other side; and a professional analysis of its military organizations and operations. This erosion caused Israel to view its adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, as armies rather than state-level entities. An analysis of the leaked NCO V from 8200 might indicate that looking at Hamas as a military system, rather than as a terrorist organization capable of only local and limited operations, could have led to a more substantial reference to the raid plan known as the “Wall of Jericho.” A reference of this kind was required in the fields of both collection and analysis for early warning and should have led to other conclusions and a different preparation by the Southern Command and the Gaza division against the potential threat.
“Sin” #6: Understanding. In recent years, intelligence organizations has given less respect to expertise from the fields of humanities and social sciences, which are in fact the basis of intelligence analysis and assessment. This eroded Israel’s understanding of the language and culture of the other side. In-depth knowledge of the history of the Middle East is required, as is the use of theoretical tools from fields in the social sciences, such as international relations, comparative politics, sociology, anthropology, economics, and more. The “best for technology” approach has replaced the “best for analysis and assessment” approach. Technological tools for language translation and the monitoring of human behavior were seen as substitutes for the knowledge and deep understanding once required of intelligence analysts. But rather than strengthen human ability, these tools actually weakened it and eroded the required ability for analysis and assessment.
“Sin” #7: Risk management. The senior intelligence officials committed to providing early warning with high certainty did not present its limitations and inherent risks, especially after the strategic early warnings that they allegedly passed on to the political level. Based on leaks from internal forums, it seems that they even saw it as a substitute for deploying forces and maintaining alertness. However, the problem of assessing and preparing for risk is consigned not only to intelligence officials but also to political and military decision-makers. An orderly risk analysis could have shown that the deployment of the IDF on the Gaza border was insufficient in the face of scenarios that were broader than a few raids at once, especially in the face of the dangerous course of action (DPA) of implementing the “Wall of Jericho” plan. The IDF and the decision-makers above it need to substantially improve the process of risk management.
The “seven sins” presented above represent a proposal for the analysis of the debriefings that will occur on the intelligence failure that led to October 7. They are critical to a re-strengthening of the analysis and assessment capacities that are the basis of early warning and that remain important components of the Israeli security doctrine.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Iranian Media Claims Obtaining ‘Sensitive’ Israeli Intelligence Materials

FILE PHOTO: The atomic symbol and the Iranian flag are seen in this illustration, July 21, 2022. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo
i24 News – Iranian and Iran-affiliated media claimed on Saturday that the Islamic Republic had obtained a trove of “strategic and sensitive” Israeli intelligence materials related to Israel’s nuclear facilities and defense plans.
“Iran’s intelligence apparatus has obtained a vast quantity of strategic and sensitive information and documents belonging to the Zionist regime,” Iran’s state broadcaster said, referring to Israel in the manner accepted in those Muslim or Arab states that don’t recognize its legitimacy. The statement was also relayed by the Lebanese site Al-Mayadeen, affiliated with the Iran-backed jihadists of Hezbollah.
The reports did not include any details on the documents or how Iran had obtained them.
The intelligence reportedly included “thousands of documents related to that regime’s nuclear plans and facilities,” it added.
According to the reports, “the data haul was extracted during a covert operation and included a vast volume of materials including documents, images, and videos.”
The report comes amid high tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, over which it is in talks with the US administration of President Donald Trump.
Iranian-Israeli tensions reached an all-time high since the October 7 massacre and the subsequent Gaza war, including Iranian rocket fire on Israel and Israeli aerial raids in Iran that devastated much of the regime’s air defenses.
Israel, which regards the prospect of the antisemitic mullah regime obtaining a nuclear weapon as an existential threat, has indicated it could resort to a military strike against Iran’s installations should talks fail to curb uranium enrichment.
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Israel Retrieves Body of Thai Hostage from Gaza

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz looks on, amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, in Jerusalem, Nov. 7, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun
The Israeli military has retrieved the body of a Thai hostage who had been held in Gaza since Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack, Defense Minister Israel Katz said on Saturday.
Nattapong Pinta’s body was held by a Palestinian terrorist group called the Mujahedeen Brigades, and was recovered from the area of Rafah in southern Gaza, Katz said. His family in Thailand has been notified.
Pinta, an agricultural worker, was abducted from Kibbutz Nir Oz, a small Israeli community near the Gaza border where a quarter of the population was killed or taken hostage during the Hamas attack that triggered the devastating war in Gaza.
Israel’s military said Pinta had been abducted alive and killed by his captors, who had also killed and taken to Gaza the bodies of two more Israeli-American hostages that were retrieved earlier this week.
There was no immediate comment from the Mujahedeen Brigades, who have previously denied killing their captives, or from Hamas. The Israeli military said the Brigades were still holding the body of another foreign national. Only 20 of the 55 remaining hostages are believed to still be alive.
The Mujahedeen Brigades also held and killed Israeli hostage Shiri Bibas and her two young sons, according to Israeli authorities. Their bodies were returned during a two-month ceasefire, which collapsed in March after the two sides could not agree on terms for extending it to a second phase.
Israel has since expanded its offensive across the Gaza Strip as US, Qatari and Egyptian-led efforts to secure another ceasefire have faltered.
US-BACKED AID GROUP HALTS DISTRIBUTIONS
The United Nations has warned that most of Gaza’s 2.3 million population is at risk of famine after an 11-week Israeli blockade of the enclave, with the rate of young children suffering from acute malnutrition nearly tripling.
Aid distribution was halted on Friday after the US-and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation said overcrowding had made it unsafe to continue operations. It was unclear whether aid had resumed on Saturday.
The GHF began distributing food packages in Gaza at the end of May, overseeing a new model of aid distribution which the United Nations says is neither impartial nor neutral. It says it has provided around 9 million meals so far.
The Israeli military said on Saturday that 350 trucks of humanitarian aid belonging to U.N. and other international relief groups were transferred this week via the Kerem Shalom crossing into Gaza.
The war erupted after Hamas-led terrorists took 251 hostages and killed 1,200 people, most of them civilians, in the October 7, 2023 attack, Israel’s single deadliest day.
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US Mulls Giving Millions to Controversial Gaza Aid Foundation, Sources Say

Palestinians carry aid supplies which they received from the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, in the central Gaza Strip, May 29, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Ramadan Abed/File Photo
The State Department is weighing giving $500 million to the new foundation providing aid to war-shattered Gaza, according to two knowledgeable sources and two former US officials, a move that would involve the US more deeply in a controversial aid effort that has been beset by violence and chaos.
The sources and former US officials, all of whom requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said that money for Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) would come from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is being folded into the US State Department.
The plan has met resistance from some US officials concerned with the deadly shootings of Palestinians near aid distribution sites and the competence of the GHF, the two sources said.
The GHF, which has been fiercely criticized by humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations, for an alleged lack of neutrality, began distributing aid last week amid warnings that most of Gaza’s 2.3 million population is at risk of famine after an 11-week Israeli aid blockade, which was lifted on May 19 when limited deliveries were allowed to resume.
The foundation has seen senior personnel quit and had to pause handouts twice this week after crowds overwhelmed its distribution hubs.
The State Department and GHF did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Reuters has been unable to establish who is currently funding the GHF operations, which began in Gaza last week. The GHF uses private US security and logistics companies to transport aid into Gaza for distribution at so-called secure distribution sites.
On Thursday, Reuters reported that a Chicago-based private equity firm, McNally Capital, has an “economic interest” in the for-profit US contractor overseeing the logistics and security of GHF’s aid distribution hubs in the enclave.
While US President Donald Trump’s administration and Israel say they don’t finance the GHF operation, both have been pressing the United Nations and international aid groups to work with it.
The US and Israel argue that aid distributed by a long-established U.N. aid network was diverted to Hamas. Hamas has denied that.
USAID has been all but dismantled. Some 80 percent of its programs have been canceled and its staff face termination as part of President Donald Trump’s drive to align US foreign policy with his “America First” agenda.
One source with knowledge of the matter and one former senior official said the proposal to give the $500 million to GHF has been championed by acting deputy USAID Administrator Ken Jackson, who has helped oversee the agency’s dismemberment.
The source said that Israel requested the funds to underwrite GHF’s operations for 180 days.
The Israeli government did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The two sources said that some US officials have concerns with the plan because of the overcrowding that has affected the aid distribution hubs run by GHF’s contractor, and violence nearby.
Those officials also want well-established non-governmental organizations experienced in running aid operations in Gaza and elsewhere to be involved in the operation if the State Department approves the funds for GHF, a position that Israel likely will oppose, the sources said.
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