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The Seven ‘Sins’ of Intelligence After October 7
Families and supporters of hostages that are being held in Gaza after they were kidnapped from Israel by Hamas gunmen on October 7, hold a demonstration to demand their immediate release, outside of the Houses of Parliament in London, Britain, November 5, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Toby Melville
In the wake of the massive intelligence failure of October 7, fundamental changes will have to be made to Israeli national security doctrine. The intelligence community is obliged to improve its early warning capabilities — not merely in an attempt to prevent another great failure of the kind that might occur once in 50 years, but to improve its ability to contribute to the ongoing security effort. Israeli intelligence committed seven “sins” in the lead-up to October 7 that will have to be examined closely if the required changes are to be put in place. Those “sins” are politicization; certainty; preoccupation with cyber, targeting; professionalism; understanding; and risk management.
Israel’s intelligence community is among the most powerful in the world, certainly relative to the size of the country. Early warning is the historical cornerstone and a key element of Israel’s security doctrine. It failed catastrophically on October 7.
The early warning pillar was developed to bridge the inherent tension between Israel’s relatively small size, which has resulted in limited access to resources it can allocate to security needs, and the magnitude and intensity of the security threats with which it has always to deal.
These threats have grown over the years from knife attacks to the threat of a nuclear attack; from the threat of terrorism in the streets to the threat of precision weapons launched from a distance; and from the threat of lone wolves to threats from regional powers and even superpowers.
The main problem with early warning is that it requires not only an understanding of the present but a capacity to predict the future. The assessment of future events, when they concern human behavior, is always marked by great uncertainty and contains a built-in margin of error.
A quick analysis of the professional literature dealing with business strategies reveals that “outstanding organizations” only manage to achieve two-thirds of their long-term goals. If we translate this to intelligence work, this means that even those intelligence organizations that are the most outstanding in terms of information-gathering, analysis and understanding — even those that conduct the kind of in-depth soul-searching I advise in the second part of this article — will be wrong in their estimates of the future a third of the time.
The statement, “Once every 50 years, intelligence will be wrong in a way that leads to a severe blow to national security” exposes the need for a fundamental change in Israel’s security doctrine. Unlike the first decades of the State of Israel’s existence, when early warning was adopted as a central component, Israel is now in a situation where it is possible to increase the security margin. Israel is an economically and technologically strong country, both in absolute terms relative to its size and relative to its environment.
If the resources allocated to date provide a quality response to the country’s security challenges, then a wise increase in resources would create a level of security that reduces the problematic reliance on early warning. This resource increase should be based on careful risk management and should contain internal and external controls.
The security margin can be based on a clear technological and operational advantage over both known enemies and possible adversaries; broad and effective integrated land maneuvering capabilities, which are the insurance policy of national existence; accurate targeting and countering capabilities of both near and distant threats; aggregate power that creates deterrence and is a basis for effective international and regional alliances; use of security strengths as a lever to promote the solid economic base and national infrastructure; and a base of agreed values that strengthens vital national cohesion.
One of the more effective uses of additional resources would be the further development of a strong intelligence community. This would form the basis for the detection of threats, accurate intelligence for targeting and operations, and a base cooperation with international and regional alliances. It would also provide an improved early warning capability that would allow at least two-thirds of the threats to be predicted in advance and thwarted ahead of time.
To develop such an intelligence community, we must draw relevant lessons from the failure of early warning on October 7. I suggest that there were seven failures, or “sins,” of intelligence that led to the catastrophe. The following is intended to open the conversation, not end it, and support analysis of the reasons for what happened and the lessons learned.
It is possible that some of the ideas raised here will turn out to be incorrect, but in this writer’s opinion, they should all be discussed. These failures are aimed at different levels of the intelligence work: from the decision-making at the top of the pyramid to the junior levels of collection and research, which are sometimes the most important, as can be learned from those who did think differently and tried to warn of what was to come.
“Sin” #1: Politicization. The year before the failure was not good for the intelligence community in this regard. The heads of that community found themselves in the midst of a political storm but seemed unable to steer the ship. They sent letters and early warnings up to the political level, but the necessary conclusions were not subsequently drawn by that level. Early warning of a change in the enemy’s intentions should have led to an obsessive preoccupation with operational early warning, but this did not happen. There were too many briefings by senior intelligence community members to the media on political matters, whether or not they were identified as such, which interfered with proper professional functioning.
Another significant issue was the failed handling of the refusal/non-volunteering initiatives. The failure to eliminate them decisively harmed the functioning of the intelligence echelons, shook them, and diverted attention away from the preoccupation with early warning.
Another relevant matter was the political statements made by former senior officials in the name of alleged intelligence analysis, which did not help.
“Sin” #2: Certainty. Predicting the future is inherently uncertain. It requires extreme caution. Alternatives must be presented, but they can never cover the entire spectrum of possibilities. A leading alternative must be determined and other alternatives evaluated according to their decreasing probability. Possible turning points need to be considered, together with the risks arising from their realization. There must be transparency with regard to the uncertainty levels of those alternatives and risks.
All of this has been eroded in recent years, at least as far as the assessment of Hamas in Gaza is concerned. This is the result of three main problems: excessive confidence in the assessment, which resulted in a failure to recognize how the adversary had changed; an effort to satisfy the demands of decision-makers and security system officials for higher certainty through an improbably precise description of a future reality; and the desire to give greater validity to the policy and operational recommendations of the intelligence.
“Sin” #3: Cyber. In recent years, cyber has occupied the attention of the intelligence community to a greater and greater extent. This is reflected in three characteristics: the focus of attention on cyber operations; shifting the balance sharply towards cyber at the expense of classic sigint, humint and visint; and an increased preoccupation with cyber threats to the State of Israel and defense that drew resources from other threats. Adapting the intelligence system to new capabilities is a welcome process, and the various efforts in the cyber domain have resulted in significant intelligence and operational achievements. The claim, to be clear, is that there was an imbalance in terms of the distribution of resources and quality personnel and their transfer from other intelligence tasks to cyber tasks.
“Sin” #4: Targeting. In recent years, the attention of intelligence personnel dealing with analysis and assessment has been directed toward dealing with operations. The greatest attention has been given to research that creates targets. There is no doubt that the contribution of accurate intelligence to operational activity – with an emphasis on accurate fire – that effectively damages the adversary and reduces collateral damage fulfills a vital need. The problem is that the focus on targeting resulted in the breaking down of the enemy into tiny elements, which resulted in a decreased ability to analyze that enemy as a strategic and operational entity. In addition, the preoccupation with promoting recommendations for policy and operational action and participating in their implementation seriously damaged the ability to perform an assessment detached from the perspective of the “blue side” regarding the adversary’s intentions and capabilities. Despite the resource challenge, there is a need to maintain a dedicated group of intelligence personnel to deal exclusively with analysis and evaluation of the “red side.”
“Sin” #5: Professionalism. In recent years, the professionalism of analysis and assessment has been eroded in two areas that are critical to early warning, both of which failed on October 7: a political-strategic analysis of the perceptions, strategies and intentions of the other side; and a professional analysis of its military organizations and operations. This erosion caused Israel to view its adversaries, Hezbollah and Hamas, as armies rather than state-level entities. An analysis of the leaked NCO V from 8200 might indicate that looking at Hamas as a military system, rather than as a terrorist organization capable of only local and limited operations, could have led to a more substantial reference to the raid plan known as the “Wall of Jericho.” A reference of this kind was required in the fields of both collection and analysis for early warning and should have led to other conclusions and a different preparation by the Southern Command and the Gaza division against the potential threat.
“Sin” #6: Understanding. In recent years, intelligence organizations has given less respect to expertise from the fields of humanities and social sciences, which are in fact the basis of intelligence analysis and assessment. This eroded Israel’s understanding of the language and culture of the other side. In-depth knowledge of the history of the Middle East is required, as is the use of theoretical tools from fields in the social sciences, such as international relations, comparative politics, sociology, anthropology, economics, and more. The “best for technology” approach has replaced the “best for analysis and assessment” approach. Technological tools for language translation and the monitoring of human behavior were seen as substitutes for the knowledge and deep understanding once required of intelligence analysts. But rather than strengthen human ability, these tools actually weakened it and eroded the required ability for analysis and assessment.
“Sin” #7: Risk management. The senior intelligence officials committed to providing early warning with high certainty did not present its limitations and inherent risks, especially after the strategic early warnings that they allegedly passed on to the political level. Based on leaks from internal forums, it seems that they even saw it as a substitute for deploying forces and maintaining alertness. However, the problem of assessing and preparing for risk is consigned not only to intelligence officials but also to political and military decision-makers. An orderly risk analysis could have shown that the deployment of the IDF on the Gaza border was insufficient in the face of scenarios that were broader than a few raids at once, especially in the face of the dangerous course of action (DPA) of implementing the “Wall of Jericho” plan. The IDF and the decision-makers above it need to substantially improve the process of risk management.
The “seven sins” presented above represent a proposal for the analysis of the debriefings that will occur on the intelligence failure that led to October 7. They are critical to a re-strengthening of the analysis and assessment capacities that are the basis of early warning and that remain important components of the Israeli security doctrine.
Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and an expert in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is a cyber security strategist and a consultant to leading companies in Israel. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Israel Declares Start of Gaza Ground Operations, No Progress Seen in Talks
Palestinians inspect the damage at the site of an Israeli strike on a tent camp sheltering displaced people, in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, May 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Hatem Khaled
The Israeli military said on Sunday it had begun “extensive ground operations” in northern and southern Gaza, stepping up a new campaign in the enclave.
Israel made its announcement after sources on both sides said there had been no progress in a new round of indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas in Qatar.
The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the latest Doha talks included discussions on a truce and hostage deal as well as a proposal to end the war in return for the exile of Hamas militants and the demilitarization of the enclave – terms Hamas has previously rejected.
The substance of the statement was in line with previous declarations from Israel, but the timing, as negotiators meet, offered some prospect of flexibility in Israel’s position. A senior Israeli official said there had been no progress in the talks so far.
Israel’s military said it conducted a preliminary wave of strikes on more than 670 Hamas targets in Gaza over the past week to support its ground operation, dubbed “Gideon’s Chariots.”
It said it killed dozens of Hamas fighters. Palestinian health authorities say hundreds of people have been killed including many women and children.
Asked about the Doha talks, a Hamas official told Reuters: “Israel’s position remains unchanged, they want to release the prisoners (hostages) without a commitment to end the war.”
He reiterated that Hamas was proposing releasing all Israeli hostages in return for an end to the war, the pull-out of Israeli troops, an end to a blockade on aid for Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.
Israel’s declared goal in Gaza is the elimination of the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas, which attacked Israeli communities on October 7, 2023, killing about 1,200 people and seizing about 250 hostages.
The Israeli military campaign has devastated the enclave, pushing nearly all residents from their homes and killing more than 53,000 people, according to Gaza health authorities.
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Pope Leo Urges Unity for Divided Church, Vows Not To Be ‘Autocrat’
Pope Leo XIV waves to the faithful from the popemobile ahead of his inaugural Mass in Saint Peter’s Square, at the Vatican, May 18, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Alessandro Garofalo
Pope Leo XIV formally began his reign on Sunday by reaching out to conservatives who felt orphaned under his predecessor, calling for unity, vowing to preserve the Catholic Church’s heritage and not rule like “an autocrat.”
After a first ride in the popemobile through an estimated crowd of up to 200,000 in St. Peter’s Square and surrounding streets, Leo was officially installed as the 267th pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church at an outdoor Mass.
Well-wishers waved US and Peruvian flags, with people from both countries claiming him as the first pope from their nations. Born in Chicago, the 69-year-old pontiff spent many years as a missionary in Peru and also has Peruvian citizenship.
Robert Prevost, a relative unknown on the world stage who only became a cardinal two years ago, was elected pope on May 8 after a short conclave of cardinals that lasted barely 24 hours.
He succeeded Francis, an Argentine, who died on April 21 after leading the Church for 12 often turbulent years during which he battled with traditionalists and championed the poor and marginalized.
In his sermon, read in fluent Italian, Leo said that as leader of the world’s 1.4 billion Roman Catholics, he would continue Francis’ legacy on social issues such as combating poverty and protecting the environment.
He vowed to face up to “the questions, concerns and challenges of today’s world” and, in a nod to conservatives, he promised to preserve “the rich heritage of the Christian faith,” repeatedly calling for unity.
Crowds chanted “Viva il Papa” (Long Live the Pope) and “Papa Leone,” his name in Italian, as he waved from the open-topped popemobile ahead of his inaugural Mass, which was attended by dozens of world leaders.
US Vice President JD Vance, a Catholic convert who clashed with Francis over the White House’s hardline immigration policies, led a US delegation alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is also Catholic.
Vance briefly shook hands with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the start of the ceremony. The two men last met in February in the White House, when they clashed fiercely in front of the world’s media.
Zelensky and Leo were to have a private meeting later on Sunday, while Vance was expected to see the pope on Monday.
In a brief appeal at the end of the Mass, Leo addressed several global conflicts. He said Ukraine was being “martyred,” a phrase often used by Francis, and called for a “just and lasting peace” there.
He also mentioned the humanitarian situation in Gaza, saying people in the Palestinian enclave were being “reduced to starvation.”
Among those in the crowds on Sunday were many pilgrims from the US and Peru.
Dominic Venditti, from Seattle, said he was “extremely excited” by the new pope. “I like how emotional and kind he is,” he said. “I love his background.”
APPEAL FOR UNITY
Since becoming pope, Leo has already signaled some key priorities for his papacy, including a warning about the dangers posed by artificial intelligence and the importance of bringing peace to the world and to the Church itself.
Francis’ papacy left a divided Church, with conservatives accusing him of sowing confusion, particularly with his extemporaneous remarks on issues of sexual morality such as same-sex unions.
Saying he was taking up his mission “with fear and trembling,” Leo used the words “unity” or “united” seven times on Sunday and the word “harmony” four times.
“It is never a question of capturing others by force, by religious propaganda or by means of power. Instead, it is always and only a question of loving, as Jesus did,” he said, in apparent reference to a war of words between Catholics who define themselves as conservative or progressive.
Conservatives also accused Francis of ruling in a heavy-handed way and lamented that he belittled their concerns and did not consult widely before making decisions.
Referring to St. Peter, the 1st century Christian apostle from whom popes derive their authority, Leo said: “Peter must shepherd the flock without ever yielding to the temptation to be an autocrat, lording it over those entrusted to him. On the contrary, he is called to serve the faith of his brothers and sisters, and to walk alongside them.”
Many world leaders attended the ceremony, including the presidents of Israel, Peru and Nigeria, the prime ministers of Italy, Canada and Australia, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
European royals also took their place in the VIP seats near the main altar, including Spanish King Felipe and Queen Letizia.
Leo shook many of their hands at the end of the ceremony, and hugged his brother Louis, who had traveled from Florida.
As part of the ceremony, Leo received two symbolic items: a liturgical vestment known as a pallium, a sash of lambswool representing his role as a shepherd, and the “fisherman’s ring,” recalling St. Peter, who was a fisherman.
The ceremonial gold signet ring is specially cast for each new pope and can be used by Leo to seal documents, although this purpose has fallen out of use in modern times.
It shows St. Peter holding the keys to Heaven and will be broken after his death or resignation.
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The ‘Nakba’ Is Not Our Problem
Pro-Palestinian demonstrators during a protest against Israel to mark the 77th anniversary of the “Nakba” or catastrophe, in Berlin, Germany, May 15, 2025. REUTERS/Axel Schmidt
JNS.org – A smattering of Arabic words has entered the English language in recent years, the direct result of more than a century of conflict between the Zionist movement and Arab regimes determined to prevent the Jews from exercising self-determination in their historic homeland.
These words include fedayeen, which refers to the armed Palestinian factions; intifada, which denotes successive violent Palestinian uprisings against Israel; and naksa, which pertains to the defeat sustained by the Arab armies in their failed bid to destroy Israel during the June 1967 war.
At the top of this list, however, is nakba, the word in Arabic for “disaster” or “catastrophe.” The emergence of the Palestinian refugee question following Israel’s 1948-49 War of Independence is now widely described as “The Nakba,” and the term has become a stick wielded by anti-Zionists to beat Israel and, increasingly, Jews outside.
Last Thursday, a date which the U.N. General Assembly has named for an annual “Nakba Day,” workers at a cluster of Jewish-owned businesses in the English city of Manchester arrived at the building housing their offices to find that it had been badly vandalized overnight. The front of the building, located in a neighborhood with a significant Jewish community, was splattered with red paint. An external wall displayed the crudely painted words “Happy Nakba Day.”
The culprits were a group called Palestine Action, a pro-Hamas collective of activists whose sole mission is to intimidate the Jewish community in the United Kingdom in much the same way as Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists did back in the 1930s. Its equivalents in the United States are groups like Within Our Lifetime and Students for Justice in Palestine, who have shown themselves equally enthused when it comes to intimidating Jewish communities by conducting loud, sometimes violent, demonstrations outside synagogues and other communal facilities, all too frequently showering Jews with the kind of abuse that was once the preserve of neo-Nazis. These thugs, cosplaying with keffiyehs instead of swastika armbands, can reasonably be described as the neo-neo-Nazis.
The overarching point here is that ideological constructs like nakba play a key role in enabling the intimidation they practice. It allows them to diminish the historic victimhood of the Jews, born of centuries of stateless disempowerment, with dimwitted formulas equating the nakba with the Nazi Holocaust. It also enables them to camouflage hate speech and hate crimes as human-rights advocacy—a key reason why law enforcement, in the United States as well as in Canada, Australia and most of Europe, has been found sorely wanting when it comes to dealing with the surge of antisemitism globally.
Part of the response needs to be legislative. That means clamping down on both sides of the Atlantic on groups that glorify designated terrorist organizations by preventing them from fundraising; policing their access to social media; and restricting their demonstrations to static events in a specific location with a predetermined limit on attendees, rather than a march that anyone can join, along with an outright ban on any such events in the environs of Jewish community buildings.
These are not independent civil society organizations, as they pretend to be, but rather extensions of terrorist organizations like Hamas and—in the case of Samidoun, another group describing itself as a “solidarity” organization—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. If we cannot ban them outright, we need to contain them much more effectively. We can start by framing the issue as a national security challenge and worry less about their “freedom of speech.”
But this is also a fight that takes us into the realm of ideas and arguments. We need to stop thinking about the nakba as a Palestinian narrative of pain deserving of empathy by exposing it for what it is—another tool in the arsenal of groups whose goal is to bring about the elimination of Israel as a Jewish state.
When it was originally introduced in the late 1940s, the word nakba had nothing to do with the plight of the Palestinian refugees or their dubious claim to be the uninterrupted, indigenous inhabitants of a land seized by dispossessing foreign colonists. Popularized by the late Syrian writer Constantine Zureik in a 1948 book titled The Meaning of Disaster, the nakba described therein was, as the Israeli scholar Shany Mor has crisply pointed out, simply “the failure of the Arabs to defeat the Jews.”
Zureik was agonized by this defeat, calling it “one of the harshest of the trials and tribulations with which the Arabs have been inflicted throughout their long history.” His story is fundamentally a story of national humiliation and wounded pride. Yet there is absolutely no reason why Jews should be remotely troubled by the neurosis it projects. Their defeat was our victory and our liberation, and we should unreservedly rejoice in that fact.
The only aspect of the nakba that we should worry about is the impact it has on us as a community, as well as on the status of Israel as a sovereign member of the international society of states. As Mizrahi Jews know well (my own family among them), the nakba assembled in Zureik’s imagination really was a “catastrophe”— for us. Resoundingly defeated on the battlefield by the superior courage and tactical nous of the nascent Israeli Defense Forces, the Arabs compensated by turning on the defenseless Jews in their midst. From Libya to Iraq, ancient and established Jewish communities were the victims of a cowardly, spiteful policy of expropriation, mob violence and expulsion.
The inheritors of that policy are the various groups that compose the Palestinian solidarity movement today. Apoplectic at the realization that they have been unable to dislodge the “Zionists”—and knowing now that the main consequence of the Oct. 7, 2023 pogrom in Israel has been the destruction of Gaza—they, too, have turned on the Jews in their midst.
They have done so with one major advantage that the original neo-Nazis never had: sympathy and endorsement from academics, celebrities, politicians and even the United Nations. Indeed, the world body hosted a two-day seminar on “Ending the Nakba” at its New York headquarters at the same time that pro-Hamas fanatics were causing havoc just a few blocks downtown. Even so, we should take heart at the knowledge that nakba is not so much a symbol of resistance as it is defeat. Just as the rejectionists and eliminationists have lost previous wars through a combination of political stupidity, diplomatic ineptitude and military flimsiness, so, too, can they lose this one.
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