In the first decade of independence, Ukraine was quite distinctly divided into a number of regions, which differed greatly from each other in terms of ethno-identification and linguistic composition:

1. Western Ukraine: oblasts that were part of Austria-Hungary before World War I (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattya, and Chernivtsi) and Volyn and Rivne oblasts that were part of Poland in the interwar period. This region of Ukraine was the least Russified and Sovietized. The legacy of the Ukrainian national movement was strong here, including the fresh memory of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (abbreviated UPA) armed struggle against Soviet rule (especially in the first three oblasts, where Greek Catholics rather than Orthodox Christians predominate among the believers);

2. Central Ukraine. This region more or less fits within the boundaries of The Cossack Hetmanate, or Hetmanshchyna, a semi-independent Ukrainian state entity that existed in the 17th-18th centuries (Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy and Kirovohrad oblasts). It was characterized by the stable preservation of the Ukrainian language in villages and small towns, with the prevalence of “surzhik” (mixed Ukrainian-Russian idiom) and the local variant of the Russian language in larger cities. The level of national self-consciousness of the local Ukrainian population was quite high, but, unlike in Western Ukraine, the tradition of the Ukrainian national movement was significantly disrupted by the long process of Sovietization and Russification;

3. Southern and Eastern Ukraine: oblasts that were once part of Sloboda Ukraine (Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts) and Novorossiya Governorate (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). This region was characterized by a significant presence of ethnically Russian population, total dominance of the Russian language in cities and in some (ethnically predominantly non-Ukrainian) villages, mass transition of the local Ukrainian population to surzhik (in villages) and to the Russian language (in urban areas). The ethnic self-consciousness of a significant part of the local Ukrainian population was severely eroded.

Kyiv, like other large cities in Central Ukraine, was predominantly Russian-speaking. However, a significant part of its population had a high level of political and national consciousness, which brought the capital closer to Western Ukraine and — in combination with significant migration from western oblasts as well as from villages — paved the way for linguistic Ukrainianization.

Crimea was the most Russified region of Ukraine. The Russian language (its status as an official language along with Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar was legally recognized in the region) unambiguously dominated in all spheres, there was no Ukrainian-language education system, and there was only one district of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea — Krasnoperekopsky district — where ethnic Ukrainians were a relative majority.

Outside of Western Ukraine, addressing strangers in Ukrainian by default in both official and everyday communication was not the norm — despite the fact that Ukrainian was proclaimed the only state language. Demands to recognize Russian as a second state language were articulated openly by politicians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Russian aggression in 2014 led to a gradual change of this situation. After the full-scale invasion began in 2022, it changed dramatically. I got to visit Ukraine many times after the Russian aggression began in 2014 — I traveled to Kyiv, Lviv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Kremenchug, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Uzhgorod, Khust, Mukachevo, as well as Mariupol (occupied by the Russians in 2022) and Bakhmut (now completely destroyed), which are practically on the line of contact. On behalf of the Jewish Agency, I also visited occupied Crimea twice (in Simferopol, Bakhchysarai and Yevpatoria). Shortly after the full-scale invasion began, I traveled to Ukraine and visited the country only a few times thereafter. I also had many conversations with refugees from Ukraine in Moldova, Poland and Hungary. This empirical experience, as well as information from the Ukrainian media, allows me to form my own preliminary impression of the social, ethno-identification and linguistic processes developing in Ukraine itself and among Ukrainian refugees outside of it.

The first thing that immediately catches the eye is the almost universal complete exclusion of the Russian language from all official and semi-official spheres of use. A very significant part of the population has switched or is switching to Ukrainian in informal communication. At the same time, under stress or in situations of trustful communication, people accustomed to conversing in Russian often involuntarily resort to the Russian language. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian society as a whole is strategically aimed at maximizing its distance from Russia and Russians, including both in language and culture, as well as at the complete switching of the younger generations to the Ukrainian language, which is facilitated by the elimination of Russian-language schools and classes.

The rapid growth of settlements in Western Ukraine due to the arrival of numerous migrants from the east, from areas occupied by the Russians or in close proximity to the zone of active hostilities, is noteworthy. Some of these predominantly Russian-speaking migrants, having found themselves in places with total predominance of the Ukrainian language, feel insecure about their Ukrainian language competence, fearing that their Ukrainian speech will be perceived by the locals as a ridiculous and uneducated surzhik. In this regard, I have seen announcements in some stores and cafes in Lviv that read something like “Russian speakers, you are not ridiculous. You are encouraged to speak Ukrainian.” Migrants from the East settle not only in large urban centers, but also in villages.

I happened to visit many villages in Transcarpathia and in the Hungarian villages adjacent to the border. It is striking that while in the villages on the Hungarian side of the border there are abandoned houses (because young people often leave the villages and move to the cities), there is nothing like that on the Ukrainian side of the border. The locals explain this by the fact that migrants from the east buy or rent almost all available housing in the west of Ukraine. It goes without saying that the closer to the border with EU countries, the safer it is, as there is little chance of Russian missile attacks.

For almost three years of full-scale war, Ukrainian society has adapted to quasi-normal functioning in the environment where mortal danger exists not only on the line of contact, but also in the rear. It is important to emphasize that quasi-normal life continues not only in the west of the country, but also in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Kryvyi Rih, which are dozens of kilometers away from the front line and are exposed almost daily to rocket fire and drone attacks. At the same time, the war fatigue and lack of prospects accumulated in society are becoming evident. There is a feeling that Western allies are not letting Ukraine win, combined with the realization that without their help it is impossible to continue active and quite successful resistance to Russian aggression. We should not forget that Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military are suffering from a growing PTSD, which will inevitably manifest itself in the future, when the active phase of the conflict is over.

Apart from the horrors of war, a powerful factor traumatizing the public consciousness is the feeling of injustice regarding the distribution of the war burden within Ukrainian society itself. In this regard, Ukrainians often refer to the Russian saying meaning “war to some is boon to others.” While some Ukrainians have been fighting at the front for the third year already, others are quietly living abroad, evading conscription in Ukraine or doing their army service far from the front. The lack of proper rotation at the front, associated with the actual failure of mobilization efforts, is the direct cause of this situation. At the same time, the notorious TCCs (Territorial Centers of Recruitment and Social Support) often simply detain men in public places and send them to the army, including the elderly and sick. I can confirm this by personal experience. TCC representatives stopped me twice and sought to verify whether I am really over 60 years old (because I apparently look too young) and whether I really do not have Ukrainian citizenship (apparently, I speak Ukrainian too well). Against this background, Ukrainian government officials of different levels, as well as other influential individuals and their family members have reservations from mobilization.

Moreover, many of them, according to a significant part of the population, earn money from the war through various corruption schemes. The impossibility of organizing anti-government protests (“Maidan”) and holding elections during the war reinforces the feeling of hopelessness. In this context, there is a sad joke that goes like this: “There is only one way to defeat corruption in Ukraine: shoot all the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada, then shoot all those who will come to their funerals, and only then hold elections.”

As a result of the full-scale Russian invasion, millions of Ukrainians became refugees abroad, causing the largest migration crisis in Europe since World War II. It should be noted that at the first stage, the Ukrainian authorities themselves de facto called on those unfit for active service from the most threatened areas to temporarily leave the country in order to save their lives and reduce the burden on the Ukrainian economy. During the chaos of the first weeks of the full-scale invasion, a significant number of men of conscription age (up to 60 years old) also left Ukraine. Some of them were able to do so by taking advantage of the corruption in the Ukrainian border services. The presence of Ukrainian refugees in Poland is particularly noticeable.

It is not uncommon to see Ukrainian inscriptions in the Polish capital. For example, ATMs offer Ukrainian as one of the options along with Polish and English. Ukrainian, surzhik and Ukrainian variant of Russian can be heard in Warsaw and beyond very often. It is very obvious that a significant part of the technical staff in hotels, small stores, etc., are Ukrainians. Many of them, despite the patriotic feelings they demonstrate, do not intend to return to Ukraine in the foreseeable future — or ever.

At the same time, there is a kind of “shuttle migration” between Poland and Ukraine, when women living in Poland visit their husbands who remain in Ukraine, because they are in the army or simply cannot leave the country because they have not reached the age of 60. This situation, being indefinitely stretched in time, naturally creates a lot of problems for maintaining normal family relations. It is obvious that Ukraine’s irreversible demographic losses as a result of emigration due to the war will be even higher than those resulting from combat losses and civilian casualties caused by Russian shelling and bombing. This subject is widely discussed in Ukrainian society, and the authorities are making some, so far not very successful, efforts to return at least some of the refugees from abroad.

In this grim situation, many Ukrainians, primarily those who can be regarded as the intellectual elite and expert community, see the Jewish State as a successful model of survival and development in extreme conditions. They see Israel as a model of a small, dynamically developing state that has successfully resisted external aggression from an uncompromising enemy, many times superior in human and material resources, which denies the right of this state to exist and whose goal is to destroy it completely. There are strong sympathies for Israel among ordinary Ukrainian citizens as well, as I have witnessed more than once in the course of direct communication with them in various situations. This is facilitated, in particular, by Israel’s war against Iran, which is the closest ally of Russia. To Ukrainians, Jews are not some “exotic people” but “neighbors”. There are many natives of Ukraine in Israel, and natives of Ukraine played a decisive role in the establishment of the Jewish state. In addition, many Ukrainians are personally acquainted with Jews now living in Israel. All this allows them to perceive the Israeli model as partly “their own” and as fundamentally implementable in Ukrainian conditions.

To summarize, I can say that the majority of Ukrainian society and its elites have come to terms with the idea that the liberation of the Russian-occupied territories is impossible in the foreseeable future. In this regard, against the background of accumulated fatigue, it needs a respite, which can be provided by a ceasefire agreement along the existing lines of contact. At the same time, there is no question of an official renunciation of the territories seized by Russian troops or any normalization of relations between Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian society is mostly convinced that Russia is an immanent enemy of Ukraine, so the resumption of active armed confrontation is inevitable.

The author is a contributor to the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, where a version of this article was originally published.

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