Professor Khalil Shakaki’s public opinion polls made headlines last month. After revealing Hamas documents, the IDF claimed that the Palestinian terrorist organization falsified the results of the polls conducted by Shakaki in the Gaza Strip, in order to create a false representation of the Gazan public’s support for Hamas after the October 7 massacre.

Shikaki, who is considered the leading pollster of Palestinian society, heads the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) located in Ramallah, and has been conducting public opinion polls since September 1993 with the beginning of the Oslo process.

The IDF found documents stating that Hamas falsified the data regarding the Gaza Strip in a survey conducted by Shikaki in March 2024.

For example, in one of the questions in the survey, Gazans were asked whether the “decision to attack Israel on October 7 was correct.” While the results of the survey published by Shikaki showed that 71% believed that the decision was correct, Hamas documents claim that only 31% believed so.

Another question was who Palestinians would vote for in a presidential election. While the results of the survey published by Shikaki showed that Hamas candidate Ismail Haniyeh would receive 48% compared to 22% for Fatah candidate Abu Mazen, and 23% responded that they would not participate in the elections, the IDF says that Hamas documents claim that the “true results” were 21% for Haniyeh, 26% for Abu Mazen, and 52% who would not participate in the elections.

Another question examined was the preferred way to achieve the Palestinian national goals. While the results of the survey in the Gaza Strip published by Shikaki showed that the armed struggle receives 39%, peaceful popular resistance 27%, and negotiations 23%, Hamas documents claim that the “true results” were 28% for armed struggle, 21% for peaceful popular resistance, and 50% for negotiations.

Ultimately, it’s very difficult to know if the polling data in the Gaza Strip was indeed falsified as part of a Hamas influence operation to strengthen its position among Palestinian society and global public opinion.

Although Shikaki himself claims that it is unlikely that the polls were falsified, it is important to consider two things when examining the claims of forgeries.

First, the polls show that the support figures for the October 7 attack, for Hamas, and for the armed struggle among the Palestinians in the West Bank — where it is not claimed that Hamas falsified the polls — are the same and even higher than those in the Gaza Strip.

For example, a survey from March 2024 showed that 71% of Palestinians in the West Bank believe that the decision to launch the attack on October 7 was correct, while in the June 2024 poll, the figure rises to 73%. In the Gaza Strip, the “false” figure was 71% in the March 2024 survey (compared to 31% according to Hamas documents), a figure that even dropped to 57% in the June 2024 poll.

Regarding the question of the presidential elections, according to the June 2024 poll, Ismail Haniyeh receives 38% compared to 21% for Abu Mazen in the Gaza Strip, while in the West Bank the gap is larger in favor of Haniyeh, who received 46% compared to only 5% for Abu Mazen. Also, on the question of what is the preferred way to realize the Palestinian national goals, the March 2024 poll shows that while in the Gaza Strip, according to the “false” data, the armed struggle receives 39% (while according to Hamas data it is 28%), in the West Bank the figure rises to 51%.

Thus, the question arises, is Hamas also successful in falsifying the polls in the West Bank, or is it really a matter of broad popular support for Hamas? Another explanation is that after months of war with Israel because of Hamas’ massacre on October 7, the population in Gaza (which, unlike in the West Bank, has felt the results of the war) does feel differently.

Reality shows us that in the eyes of the Palestinians, Hamas is the only organization that has succeeded in posing a security challenge to Israel and hitting its soft underbelly, while the Palestinian Authority and Fatah have failed in their mission.

Second, how can the roars of joy and jubilation in the Gaza Strip in particular and the Palestinian public in general be explained in light of the barbaric terrorist attack of October 7, when many Palestinians felt that the State of Israel was about to disappear? Doesn’t Hamas want us to know that Palestinian society is a peace-loving society whose entire goal is coexistence with the State of Israel and its citizens, and it is absolutely not a barbaric society that sanctifies the murder of Jews for the past hundred years?

Unfortunately, it seems that the reality of the last hundred years is the winning proof of the question of how the Palestinians think.

Dr. Ori Wertman is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of South Wales, UK, and a research fellow at The Israel Centre for Grand Strategy- ICGS. His recent book is Israel: National Security and Securitization (Springer, 2023).

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