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Why Is the Gaza War Different?
FILE PHOTO: A militant fires a rocket launcher during what the terror group Hamas says is an engagement with its fighters during a battle with Israeli forces amid Israel’s ground offensive in a location given as near Beit Hanoun, Gaza, in this still image taken from video released November 17, 2023. Hamas Military Wing/Handout via REUTERS/File Photo
JNS.org – The current Israeli operation in Gaza has led to an unprecedented wave of fury against the Jewish state in Western capitals. Massive demonstrations have brought hundreds of thousands of people to the streets in Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere. Muslim residents of these cities are clearly over-represented among the demonstrators, but they are not the only participants.
The official slogans of such protests tend to focus on a call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. Many of the banners and slogans on display, however, are unambiguous in their support for Hamas, the Islamist movement that governs Gaza and which carried out the Oct. 7 massacres that precipitated the current war.
The scale and volume of these protests are without precedent. The Gaza war itself, however, and the massacre that preceded it, are neither unique nor without very recent parallel. This raises an interesting question as to the reasons for the particular virulence and fury currently directed against the Israeli war effort.
The closest recent parallel to the current Gaza war, both in terms of the actions that triggered it and regarding the way it is being conducted from a military point of view is the U.S.-led Coalition’s war against Islamic State in the period 2014-19. This war indeed contained a number of episodes of urban combat that directly resemble the current action being undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces in the Gaza Strip.
Mosul and Gaza
I am one of the fairly small group of journalists who covered the ISIS war from close up and who are currently engaged in reporting on the Gaza war. Both the similarities in the wars and the enormous difference in Western perception of them are striking.
Regarding the actions that triggered the conflicts, the similarities are unmistakable. In each case, an Arab movement of Sunni political Islam set out on a campaign of wholesale slaughter against a non-Arab and non-Muslim population in the Levant: Kurdish-speaking Yazidis in the ISIS case, Israeli Jews in that of Hamas.
But can one usefully compare the 21st century, Start-Up Nation, Westernized Israelis with the beleaguered, impoverished non-Arab minorities of northern Syria? The answer is yes. The similarity lies not in the area of their technological development, but rather in the intentions of their enemies towards them.
This became apparent on Oct. 7, 2023. For around 12 hours on that day, the ultra-modern technological defense structures of the State of Israel malfunctioned and ceased to operate. In that mercifully short period, there was little to differentiate between the treatment meted out to the Israeli Jewish communities of the “Gaza envelope,” and that afforded the non-Arab, non-Muslim minorities that faced the onslaught of ISIS on the Nineveh Plains in the summer of 2014.
I was in the Gaza area on Oct. 8, 2023, and in Syria in August 2014. The murderous, indiscriminate slaughter that triggered the ISIS and Hamas wars was of a piece.
When one turns to look at the response, there are also clear parallels. The war to destroy Islamic State required the conquest of an area far larger than that of the Gaza Strip. But in the episodes of urban combat which this included, the similarities are striking.
The current Israeli campaign in Gaza particularly resembles the Coalition’s battle against ISIS in the Iraqi city of Mosul. The latter was the largest urban center that the ISIS jihadis controlled. Getting them out of there took nine months of fighting. The brunt on the ground was borne by units of the Iraqi armed forces, with U.S. air support crucial to their eventual success.
The Mosul fighting—involving the slow enveloping by conventional infantry and armored forces of a well-dug-in jihadi enemy—closely resembled what has been taking place in Gaza since the Israeli ground incursion began on Oct. 27.
The ratio of the dead
Examination of the casualty rates of civilian and military dead in Mosul and currently in Gaza further indicates the similarities. In both cases, the figures must be treated with some skepticism.
Regarding Mosul, estimates vary widely. Figures for the number of ISIS fighters killed range from 7,000 to 25,000. Regarding the number of civilians killed, again, the span is wide. At the lower end, the Associated Press quoted figures suggesting between 9,000 and 11,000 civilians died in the course of the Mosul fighting. The Iraqi Kurdish Asayish intelligence service, meanwhile, estimates that around 40,000 civilians were killed.
In terms of ratio, this means that estimates suggest that there were anywhere between one and four civilians killed in Mosul for each ISIS fighter slain.
Regarding Gaza, the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry in the Strip claims that 20,000 Gazans have been killed so far in the Israeli incursion. The ‘ministry’ records that all those killed are civilians, i.e., it asks observers to believe that not a single Hamas fighter has lost his life in the fighting.
Ron Ben-Yishai, most veteran of Israel’s war correspondents (and very far from an apologist for the current Israeli government), quoted Israeli military sources this week as estimating that somewhere between 7,000 and 9,000 Hamas fighters have been killed in the fighting.
In so far as it can be currently ascertained, the ratio of civilian to military dead in Gaza appears then to broadly resemble that of Mosul.
So similar precipitating events, and comparable military campaigns. Yet the response in the West has been starkly different. No one demonstrated for the civilians killed by coalition bombing during the ISIS war (I personally witnessed enormous mass graves in Raqqa city, rapidly dug by Islamic State to bury the victims of that bombing). There were no furious crowds in Western cities denouncing “genocide.” Most in the West understood, rather, that the deeds of Islamic State and its ideology made it necessary that it be removed from power, in spite of the undoubted ugliness and the deaths of innocents that this would involve.
So what’s the answer? Why this stark contrast? It is difficult not to conclude that the unique place of the Jew in parts of both Islamic and Western political culture and consciousness lies somewhere at the root of the cause. Perhaps some more pleasant explanation can be found. The discrepancy, in any case, is obvious, and enormous.
The post Why Is the Gaza War Different? first appeared on Algemeiner.com.
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Israeli Strike on Tehran Kills Bodyguard of Slain Hezbollah Chief

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi lays a wreath as he visits the burial site of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 3, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A member of Lebanese armed group Hezbollah was killed in an Israeli air strike on Tehran alongside a member of an Iran-aligned Iraqi armed group, a senior Lebanese security source told Reuters and the Iraqi group said on Saturday.
The source identified the Hezbollah member as Abu Ali Khalil, who had served as a bodyguard for Hezbollah’s slain chief Hassan Nasrallah. The source said Khalil had been on a religious pilgrimage to Iraq when he met up with a member of the Kataeb Sayyed Al-Shuhada group.
They traveled together to Tehran and were both killed in an Israeli strike there, along with Khalil’s son, the senior security source said. Hezbollah has not joined in Iran’s air strikes against Israel from Lebanon.
Kataeb Sayyed Al-Shuhada published a statement confirming that both the head of its security unit and Khalil had been killed in an Israeli strike.
Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli aerial attack on Beirut’s southern suburbs in September.
Israel and Iran have been trading strikes for nine consecutive days since Israel launched attacks on Iran, saying Tehran was on the verge of developing nuclear weapons. Iran has said it does not seek nuclear weapons.
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Hamas Financial Officer and Commander Eliminated by IDF in the Gaza Strip

Israeli soldiers operate during a ground operation in the southern Gaza Strip, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, July 3, 2024. Photo: Ohad Zwigenberg/Pool via REUTERS
i24 News – The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), in cooperation with the General Security Service (Shin Bet), announced on Friday the killing of Ibrahim Abu Shamala, a senior financial official in Hamas’ military wing.
The operation took place on June 17th in the central Gaza Strip.
Abu Shamala held several key positions, including financial officer for Hamas’ military wing and assistant to Marwan Issa, the deputy commander of Hamas’ military wing until his elimination in March 2024.
He was responsible for managing all the financial resources of Hamas’ military wing in Gaza, overseeing the planning and execution of the group’s war budget. This involved handling and smuggling millions of dollars into the Gaza Strip to fund Hamas’ military operations.
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Report: Wary of Assassination by Israel, Khamenei Names 3 Potential Successors

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei waves during a meeting in Tehran, Iran, May 20, 2025. Photo: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS
i24 News – Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei named three senior clerics as candidates to succeed him should he be killed, the New York Times reported on Saturday citing unnamed Iranian officials. It is understood the Ayatollah fears he could be assassinated in the coming days.
Khamenei reportedly mostly speaks with his commanders through a trusted aide now, suspending electronic communications.
Khamenei has designated three senior religious figures as candidates to replace him as well as choosing successors in the military chain of command in the likely event that additional senior officials be eliminated.
Earlier on Saturday Israel confirmed the elimination of Saeed Izadi and Bhanam Shahriari.
Shahriari, head of Iran’s Quds Force Weapons Transfer Unit, responsible for arming Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, was killed in an Israeli airstrike over 1,000 km from Israel in western Iran.
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