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Will the Energy Sector Help Prevent a War Between Israel and Hezbollah?
Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah addresses his supporters through a screen during a rally commemorating the annual Hezbollah Martyrs’ Day, in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Photo: Reuters/Aziz Taher
The maritime border agreement signed by Israel and Lebanon in October 2022 constituted a significant development in the relationship between the two countries. The potential for natural gas exploration in Lebanon’s waters, against the background of the economic and political crisis in that country, was seen at the time as a tempting incentive to persuade Hezbollah to agree to the pact. The underlying assumption of the agreement was that it represented a meaningful step that could help ease the strained relations between Israel and Hezbollah, and possibly serve as a basis for future agreements on energy and economic collaboration.
That assumption is now facing a significant test following the events of October 7. While it appears that Hamas’ attack caught Hezbollah by surprise, the organization rallied to assist “its Palestinian brothers” out of a commitment to “the unity of the arenas.” With that said, Hezbollah is conducting itself in the conflict quite deliberately, maintaining a set of “rules of the game” that are accepted by both itself and Israel. In the background, the United States is making clear that it opposes widespread escalation.
As part of Washington’s efforts to prevent escalation on the northern front, intensive clandestine contacts have taken place in recent weeks between Israel and Lebanon/ Hezbollah regarding points of contention related to the land border between the two countries, as well as energy issues. For the purpose of these negotiations, the Americans have deployed Special Envoy for Energy Affairs Amos Hochstein, who helped mediate the original border deal signed in October 2022.
A January 6 article by Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of Hezbollah-affiliated newspaper Al-Akhbar, noted that Hochstein is implicitly connected to the residents of Beirut in Lebanon regarding the renewal of drilling by the French company Total in Lebanese economic waters and the current negotiations with Israel. According to the report, Hochstein acknowledged that “the suspension of energy activities stems from political motives” and indicated that Total plans to carry out additional drilling in Block 9 (following earlier drilling that was unsuccessful), as well as in Blocks 8 and 10, hinting that drilling will not proceed as long as the conflict continues. Other reports suggest that American assistance for the recovery of the Lebanese energy sector is being presented as a condition for calming the winds of war against Israel.
The American assumption that the Lebanese energy sector can be leveraged to moderate Hezbollah is based on the fact that Lebanon’s energy crisis, which served as the backdrop for the signing of the agreement in 2022, has only worsened since then. Lebanon’s Electricité du Liban (EDL) is now only able to provide an average of about four hours of electricity per day to the residents of Beirut, and there is no capability to improve this any time soon.
General demand for electricity in Lebanon stands at about 3,500 megawatts, but its power plants, which rely entirely on oil, can only reach approximately 1,800 megawatts. In recent years, Lebanon tried to purchase electricity from Turkey using special ships equipped with generators anchored in the port of Beirut. But those efforts were abandoned due to accumulating debts and security issues. Last year, an attempt was made to purchase electricity from Jordan that would use natural gas from Israel, but the agreement faced difficulties due to American sanctions on Syria (through which the electricity grid passes from Jordan to Lebanon). Even if this deal were to materialize, the grid connections would only serve about 10% of Lebanon’s electricity demand. As a result of this state of affairs, most Lebanese residents who can afford it rely on private generators powered by solar energy in their yards and basements. Around 50,000 households have solar panels on their roofs (approximately 4% of the 1.3 million households in Lebanon).
Despite the high hopes the Lebanese government is pinning on gas exploration in its waters, the security of Lebanon’s energy supply is not expected to improve over the next few years. That is because Lebanon’s energy sector relies entirely on oil imports, including for electricity generation, transportation, heating, and industry. Even if Lebanon were to discover gas in its waters this year, the country has neither gas infrastructure nor power stations capable of using gas.
Furthermore, while the first drilling by Total in October 2023 did not yield positive results, a gas find on the next drilling would not help Lebanon’s energy crisis in the short term. It would take five to seven years from a gas discovery for Lebanon to begin to benefit from export revenues or the local use of the gas, because infrastructure would have to be built from scratch.
Until that time, Lebanon will remain dependent on the importation of crude oil from Syria and Iraq. Due to its massive debts, Lebanon is almost incapable of paying for the oil. Instead, it provides various services to Iraqi citizens, such as medical services. The crude oil Lebanon receives is sent to refineries in Greece, Turkey, and Russia, and in return, Lebanon receives solar and gasoline for the operation of power stations and transportation at reduced costs and fees. Attempts to obtain cheaper fuel from Iran through the sea have been blocked by the United States.
The serious state of Lebanon’s energy sector requires the country to pursue dramatic initiatives in terms of infrastructure and connectivity. However, such initiatives cannot be advanced without major external assistance, and the United States plays a pivotal role in this regard. For example, the time it will take to establish an export infrastructure for gas from Lebanon could be significantly shortened if Lebanon were to collaborate with Israel and transfer the gas through shared export facilities, possibly to be established by the American company Chevron. Simultaneously, Lebanon could try to make additional electricity connections to Syria and Jordan, but this would only be possible with the consent of the United States (due to sanctions on Syria) and Israel’s agreement to supply additional gas to power stations in Jordan for electricity production.
Last year, the Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water published a plan to install significant renewable energy capacity in the next five years, including 680 megawatts of solar energy, 742 megawatts of wind energy, and 394 megawatts of hydroelectric energy. However, these ambitious plans cannot be implemented without direct assistance from countries like the United States and France, because Lebanese companies lack the expertise to undertake projects of such magnitude.
An interesting perspective was provided last month in Doha at a quadrilateral meeting of energy ministers from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The meeting focused on the possibility of activating the Arab Gas Pipeline to supply gas from Egypt to Lebanon. Since Israel also passes gas through this pipeline to Jordan and Egypt, the implication is that Israeli gas could reach Lebanon. As mentioned, this idea was raised about a year ago to assist Lebanon in coping with the severe crisis in its electricity market and to prevent Iranian involvement.
While the move garnered support from the most relevant players, including Egypt and Israel, it ultimately did not materialize due to American sanctions on the Assad regime. The gas pipeline passes through Syria on its way to Lebanon, as do the power lines from Jordan, and the United States was not willing to be flexible in its policy towards the Syrian regime despite having offered assistance to the Lebanese. During the meeting, the Syrians claimed to have fixed pipeline issues to enable the transportation of gas, though it was clear that Damascus was seeking to convey a political message rather than express a genuine commitment to implement this solution. Regardless, this development highlights the severity of the crisis in Lebanon’s energy sector, which is manifested in prolonged and consistent power outages severe enough to promote a willingness by the country to explore unconventional solutions.
Despite the importance of energy potential for Lebanon, it is not considered a game-changer for Hezbollah in the current negotiation process. However, it provides a framework for negotiations as they are currently unfolding, with successful American mediation that has gained the trust of all parties, including Hezbollah. The latter seeks, within its overall considerations, and with due deference to its patron Tehran’s considerations regarding the Gaza conflict, to clarify to the Lebanese public that it is adopting a responsible position. It is, in fact, the player most capable of improving the economic situation in Lebanon.
In this regard, the maritime agreement, which allows exploration in the field of energy for Lebanon, is perceived (though it has not yet had any tangible success) as a positive step in the overall attempt to salvage the Lebanese economy. One should not overlook the regional context of gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past decade. Lebanon might eventually integrate into this regional framework for the export of gas to Turkey and Europe.
Ambassador (ret.) Michael Harari joined the Israeli Foreign Ministry and served more than 30 years in a range of diplomatic roles in Israel and abroad, including (among others) in Cairo, London and Nicosia. His final position abroad was as Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus (2010-2015). Today he serves as a consultant in the fields of strategy, policy and energy and lectures in the Political Science Department at the Jezreel Valley College.
Dr. Elai Rettig is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Studies and a senior research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in energy geopolitics and national security. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.
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Turkey Has Become ‘the Central Nerve Center for Hamas Abroad’

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks during a joint statement to the media in Baghdad, Iraq, April 22, 2024. Photo: AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/Pool via REUTERS
JNS.org – A Hamas terror cell in Nablus that received instructions and funding from the organization’s overseas headquarters in Turkey was dismantled by Israeli security forces in recent weeks in what observers say is part of a broader pattern of Turkey serving as a permissive hub for Hamas’s terror operations.
According to a joint statement by the Israel Police and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) issued on March 25, “a terror cell from Nablus was thwarted, which acted under the guidance and funding of Hamas headquarters in Turkey to carry out shooting and explosive device attacks.” The statement added that “an M-16 rifle and tens of thousands of dollars in cash were handed over during the investigation.”
Six suspects from Nablus were arrested between January and February in a joint operation by the Shin Bet, the Israel Police Central Unit of the Judea and Samaria District and the Israel Defense Forces.
The investigation revealed that the suspects had received approximately $40,000 from Hamas in Turkey to carry out shooting and bombing attacks against Israeli security forces and other targets in Judea and Samaria.
The Shin Bet stated that “the investigation revealed that the cell operated under direct guidance from the Hamas terror organization in Turkey,” and that “significant evidence was gathered which not only thwarted the planned attacks but also enabled the indictment of all involved.”
One of the suspects led security forces to a hidden roadside bomb buried near a key junction in Samaria. The large metal container filled with explosives was destroyed in a controlled demolition by police sappers.
Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and former head of IDF Military Intelligence’s Department for Palestinian Affairs, told JNS on Wednesday, “Turkey at this stage constitutes one of Hamas’s most important operational hubs abroad.”
Milshtein noted that “in Lebanon, there’s been a decline [of Hamas activities] since the war—and Hezbollah is angry at Hamas for trying to heat up the border with rocket fire. In Syria, there is still rebuilding [of Hamas] after Assad’s fall, but it remains limited. As a result, Turkey has become a central nerve center.”
Milshtein added that Istanbul is home to Zaher Jabarin, the successor of Saleh al-Arouri, the late Hamas deputy political bureau chief [eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on Jan. 2, 2024] who was responsible for Hamas’s Judea and Samaria operations across a variety of fields. “Most operations in Judea and Samaria—especially military ones—are promoted from there,” said Milshtein.
He added, “I assess carefully that Hamas finds it very convenient to operate in Turkey. There’s freedom of action, though not the same intense support as from Iran or Hezbollah. As long as they don’t establish military bases like in Syria, they are allowed to work freely, and of course, it is known that their focus is on promoting terrorism.”
Milshtein said there had been several reports indicating that “it’s not just a free hand, but also training, mainly in intelligence and commando fields, by Turkish security elements.” And, he stressed, “Turkey is a central NATO member.”
Under Jabarin, the core of Hamas’s Judea and Samaria command is run by operatives deported as part of the 2011 Shalit prisoner exchange.
“A minority are in Qatar and Gaza—where a number of senior headquarters operatives were eliminated during the war—but the core is in Turkey, led by Mousa Dudin,” said Milshtein.
A number of these terrorists were involved in attacks such as orchestrating the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in 2014. Milshtein said that this network also continues to explore “breakthrough moves like undermining the Palestinian Authority’s hold on the West Bank,” a strategic vision led by Arouri until his elimination.
Regarding potential counteraction, Milshtein said, “The question of operating against the headquarters in Turkey is very complex, similar to operating against Hamas figures in Qatar. Against those in Lebanon or Syria, there has been no problem, but any assassinations, even quiet ones, in an arena like Turkey would mean friction with Erdoğan, especially now that Ankara is more deeply involved in Syria.”
He concluded, “I assume that as with Arouri and Haniyeh, there would be a theoretical possibility to act against Hamas operatives from Turkey if and when they leave the country for a more convenient arena, such as Iran or Lebanon.”
Michael Barak, senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) and a specialist on radical Islamist and jihadist movements, told JNS on Tuesday, “Turkey is a base for the Muslim Brotherhood. There are networks there that help Hamas with funding, support, religious rulings, and logistics. Turkey has become a reception point for Brotherhood members.”
Barak confirmed that “a Hamas headquarters still exists there—in Istanbul and Ankara—and it is integrated into educational institutions, including universities.”
He cited the example of Professor Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad financier in the 1990s who was deported from the United States and now operates from a university-affiliated think tank in Ankara. “There he hosts Hamas figures,” Barak said. “Al-Arian maintains ties with Hamas, runs webinars with them on Zoom, and manages Brotherhood-Hamas links, including in India.”
Barak emphasized: “All of these Muslim Brotherhood assets in Turkey assist Hamas—whether through dawa [Islamic outreach], financing, or religious rulings.”
He added that Turkey has become “a reception point for Muslim Brotherhood figures from Libya, Iraq, and Yemen.”
On March 30, during a Ramadan prayer service, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared, “May Allah, for the sake of his name … destroy and devastate Zionist Israel.”
He also prayed for “mercy upon the martyrs” of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and wished a “speedy recovery” to their wounded terrorists.
Erdoğan has intensified his anti-Israel rhetoric since the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre in southern Israel, comparing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler and asserting that “Turkey is a country that speaks openly with Hamas leaders and firmly backs them.” Throughout the conflict, Erdoğan has met openly with Hamas officials and even threatened military action against Israel, according to the Washington D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Tyler Stapleton, director of congressional relations at FDD, warned, “Erdoğan’s call for the destruction of Israel should force the United States to begin an escalatory ladder of responses to hold Turkey’s leadership accountable.” He said the US should reassess arms sales to Turkey, warning that “Turkey’s ability to purchase advanced fighter aircraft like the F-35 should trigger congressional review.” He added that Washington “should continue to outline restrictions on foreign military financing and the exclusion of Turkey from NATO exercises” as initial steps to address Erdoğan’s hostility against Israel.
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Half a Matzah

Rabbi Yosef Rice packs handmade matzah into 425 Passover packages at the Palm Beach Synagogue Tuesday March 23, 2021 in Palm Beach. MEGHAN McCARTHY/Palm Beach Daily NewsPbn 032321 Passover 07
JNS.org – Passover is around the corner, and I will be so presumptuous as to suggest that you may have opened your favorite Haggadah to have a look and start preparing for the big seder night.
Seder means “order.” And one of the items in the order of the seder agenda is yachatz. Well, what is yachatz?
It’s one of the first things we do on seder night, even before anyone says the “Ma Nishtanah.” We break the middle matzah of the three matzahs on our seder plates. The larger part is put away for the afikomen and the smaller part remains inside the seder plate throughout the recital of the Haggadah, until we say the blessing of “Hamotzi.”
This is true lechem oni, the bread of poverty. Not only is it matzah; it is plain flour and water with no flavoring whatsoever—just a flat, tasteless wafer but broken as well. Back in Egypt, the slaves were fed the simplest, cheapest food. Bread of affliction, prisoners’ bread, what the most miserable pauper might be able to afford, a mere morsel rather than a proper meal. And now that it’s been broken, it is a morsel of a morsel.
It’s bad enough that the Jews were forced to eat a matzah, but now they are eating a broken matzah.
Rabbi Shlomo Riskin has pointed out that, seeing as the custom is to show the broken matzah during the recital of the Haggadah, and therefore, we say all of maggid, virtually the entire Haggadah, over half a matzah. And he makes a very powerful conclusion.
The whole Haggadah over half a matzah. And isn’t life just like that?
There is always something eluding us. For some, it may be health, for others wealth or success, nachas or happiness in general. Somehow, as much as we achieve in life, there is always something more that we want that keeps slipping out of our grasp.
Isn’t it so true … our whole life is but half a matzah.
Our Sages taught, “No person dies having achieved even half of his ambitions and desires.”
“Really?” you may say. Aren’t there many individuals who have achieved everything they set out to achieve? I know a couple of guys who seem to fit the description of “the man who has everything.” Just have a look at the Forbes list of billionaires.
The answer is yes, there are such people. The problem is that as soon as they achieve one ambition, they have broader horizons, and new and bigger ambitions. With each success, our ambitions develop further.
Elon Musk is currently the world’s richest man. He’s made enough money to look after his great-, great-, great-grandchildren and their great-grandchildren, too! So, he needed a new challenge. Now his challenge is to balance the United States’ budget. (That may be harder than becoming the world’s richest man!)
The rabbis put it simply.“If a man has $100, he wants $200. And if he gets $200, he then wants $400.” And so it goes on and on.
Take the lottery. When we are in the fantasy stage of winning, we are prepared to give a big percentage of our winnings away to charity, and family and friends. “Master of the Universe, if you help me buy the winning ticket, I promise to give 20% to tzedakah. I will renovate the synagogue, refurbish the seats—just tell me and I’ll get it done. But once you do win (you should be so lucky!), and it is no longer make-believe Monopoly money but cash in your pocket. And suddenly, it’s not that easy to give away.
Take the story of Harry, the guy who won $50 million. His family heard about the win before he did, and they were worried he might have a heart attack when he heard the news. So, they called his doctor to come and give him the good news. This way, if Harry went into shock or had a coronary, the doctor would be there with a remedy on the spot to administer an antidote.
In comes the doctor and says, “Harry, my friend, what would you say if I told you that you just won the state lottery? 50 million smackers?” And Harry replies, “Doc, you’ve been so good to me all these years. If I won the lottery, I would give you half!”
And the doctor dropped dead of a heart attack!
It’s easy to give it away when you don’t have it. But when you do have it, it’s not so easy. When it’s yours, you don’t give half away so quickly.
The truth is that we do go through life with only half a matzah; we never seem to get to the full one. While many of our dreams and aspirations do materialize to one extent or another, there is always something that remains frustratingly, mysteriously, almost hauntingly elusive.
But let me ask you. Just because we can’t have it all, do we desist from acquiring as much as we can? Do we say it’s either all or nothing? Or do we settle for as much as we can acquire? Do we turn down a deal that will make us a profit, even if it doesn’t make us instant millionaires?
The Kotzker Rebbe was renowned for his sharp wit and wisdom. He once asked his disciples, “What is the enemy of good?” One said that the enemy of good is bad. Another suggested that it must be evil. But the Rebbe said “wrong” to all their answers.
“Do you really want to know what the enemy of good is? I will tell you,” he said. “The enemy of good is excellence.” The Kotzker Rebbe explained that many people strive for excellence, but because they cannot achieve excellence, they stop trying altogether.
How many of us never achieved success in any given field of endeavor because it just wasn’t right, the conditions were not suitable or because “if I can’t do it right, I’d rather not do it at all.” So, what happened? Nothing. While we were waiting for the perfect opportunity, every other opportunity passed us by, and we were left with nothing.
“All or nothing” sounds very idealistic and principled. But it is not practical. When we say “All or nothing,” we usually wind up with nothing.
The seder reminds us that if the whole Haggadah can be recited over a broken matzah, then there is nothing wrong with half a matzah. If “half a loaf is better than no loaf,” then half a matzah is better than no matzah.
Yes, says the Kotzker, the greatest enemy of good is not evil, but excellence. And the unrealistic demand for perfection … or nothing.
So, take half a matzah. Take the broken morsel. It doesn’t have to be the end, the ultimate. But it can be a beginning and a good beginning.
Say kiddush. Put on tefillin. Light the Shabbat candles. Come to the shiur (a class on Jewish learning), even if you won’t become a rabbi. Do the deal, even if it isn’t the mother of all deals. And get married, even if he or she isn’t the fulfillment of every single fantasy. Don’t make the mistake of saying “All or nothing.” You don’t have to settle for second best; just start somewhere, even if it is only a morsel of a morsel.
Yes, we recite the whole Haggadah on half a matzah. And we can live our whole life on half a matzah. And it can still be very satisfying indeed.
I wish you Passover seders that satisfy, physically and spiritually. Chag Kasher v’Sameach!
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J Street’s Dishonest, Anti-Israel, Anti-Peace, Anti-Democracy Manifesto

J Street president Jeremy Ben-Ami addressing the 2019 J Street National Conference. Photo: J Street via Flickr.
JNS.org – Since its founding, J Street has established itself as a far-left extremist organization that represents only a sliver of American Jewry. However, it attracts disproportionate media attention because it serves as a “man bites dog” story—Jews who oppose Israel. J Street published a 10-point manifesto to rationalize its positions, but its raison d’être can be summarized in a single sentence: To lobby the US government to impose the views of a small group residing far from Israel, who neither participate in its elections nor contribute their children to its military, upon the people of Israel, who alone bear the consequences of these misguided policies.
J Street’s manifesto opens by graciously acknowledging that “Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people,” but it quickly distorts history. It fails to mention that, beginning with the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the international community recognized the Jewish people’s right to a national home in Palestine. Nor does it acknowledge that two-thirds of the land originally designated for the Jewish homeland was unilaterally excised to create Jordan.
The root of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the atrocities of Oct. 7, 2023, stems from the Islamist desire to eradicate the Jewish people—a goal first championed in the 1920s by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Hitler-collaborating Mufti of Jerusalem. By 1947, Palestinians had already rejected multiple statehood offers, including the 1937 Peel Plan, the 1939 British White Paper and the 1947 U.N. partition plan. Instead of negotiating, Arab nations launched a war intended to annihilate Israel, not create a Palestinian state. The outcome of the war was the 19-year occupation of the West Bank by Jordan and of Gaza by Egypt. During that period, there were no demands by the Palestinians, the United Nations, human-rights organizations, campus activists or anyone else to end the occupation and create a Palestinian state. J Street conveniently ignores the repeated Palestinian refusals of autonomy in 1979 and statehood offers in 2000 and 2008.
Contrary to its assertion, Palestine was never the national home of the Palestinian people. The Jewish people trace their indigeneity to the Land of Israel to their exile from Egypt. If it had not been for foreign conquerors, Israel would be more than 3,000 years old. Still, Jews have been sovereign in their homeland altogether for more than 500 years. Arabs did not arrive in what the Romans first called Palaestina until the seventh-century Muslim conquest, and “Palestine” was never an independent state. In the early 20th century, Palestinian nationalism was not driven by a desire for independence but by the aspiration to become part of Greater Syria.
J Street claims that most American Jews support a Palestinian state. However, a May 2024 poll found that only 12% supported a state with no conditions, while just 25% would accept one that is demilitarized and accepts Israel as a Jewish state. What Americans think is irrelevant anyway. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians want a Palestinian state.
- A February 2025 survey by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs found that 75% of Israeli Jews opposed a Palestinian state.
- A 2024 PSR survey reported that 57% of Palestinians opposed a two-state solution, while 48% supported violent “armed struggle.”
Despite these facts, J Street insists that the two-state solution is the only way forward and that granting Palestinians independence is essential to guarantee Israelis’ safety. However, history has disproven this notion. Israel gave up land in the Oslo Accords and got suicide bombings; it withdrew from Gaza and got missile attacks culminating in the horrors of Oct. 7. Palestinian Islamists reject any Jewish presence, and the “secular” Palestinian Authority is committed to the destruction of Israel in stages.
J Street insists peace requires “statesmanship, diplomacy and compromise,” three characteristics totally absent from Palestinian society. It also overlooks that their vision would require the politically unacceptable evacuation of 100,000 or more Israelis from their homes.
J Street speciously claims that the “occupation” prevents its “acceptance.” This is demonstrably false. Israel has relations with 159 out of the 193 U.N. member states. Regionally, the Arab-Israeli conflict is over. Israel has formal relations with Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates.
J Street claims Israel’s policies threaten bipartisan support in the United States, yet Congress overwhelmingly backs Israel. Efforts to condition foreign aid, supported by J Street, were rejected.
J Street insists that American Jews can be “pro-Israel” while criticizing the Israeli government. However, Israelis have no obligation to listen to those who don’t live with the consequences. J Street lobbies the US government to coerce Israel’s democratically elected leaders, which is neither democratic nor pro-Israel.
J Street ignores that Israel was ready to withdraw from captured territories in exchange for peace after 1967, only to be met with the Arab League’s “Three No’s”: no peace, no recognition and no negotiations. The 2009 Fatah conference reiterated this stance: no recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and no end to armed struggle.
In yet another omission, J Street says that Israel’s “occupation” was supposed to be temporary, forgetting that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, the basis for all peace talks, tied Israeli withdrawal to the Arab states ending their belligerency. Israel was not obligated to give up all the territory it captured but still withdrew from roughly 94%. The Palestinians were not mentioned and given no political rights.
J Street criticizes Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, but says nothing about the repression of Palestinian rights by Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
During the Obama administration, most Jews disagreed with his call to halt settlement construction. In 2019, only 25% supported dismantling all settlements; 41% supported dismantling some, while 28% opposed dismantling any. Meanwhile, a December 2024 poll found that only 29% of Israeli Jews opposed annexation, while 40% supported it.
The manifesto calls for “The 23-State Solution.” This is interesting because opponents of Palestinian statehood have long pointed out that since there are already 22 Arab states, there is no reason for a 23rd. Many people also note that Jordan is both geographically and demographically a Palestinian state. Yet another fact is that most Palestinians live in what was historically Palestine.
J Street falsely equates the “historical and emotional ties” to the land of Palestinians and Jews. They argue that adding another Arab state will lead to Israel’s acceptance by its adversaries and global recognition. The former, however, cannot be placated, and the latter has already been achieved.
The fact that all the peace agreements with Israel were made without concessions to the Palestinians proves that they are unnecessary. The Abraham Accords succeeded because the UAE and Bahrain were fed up with Palestinian intransigence and decided to put their interests first. J Street argues that Saudi Arabia will be different; however, the Saudis will likely follow the example of the others who normalized ties with Israel and bypassed the Palestinians—provided they get what they want from the United States.
J Street backs a return to the disastrous Iran nuclear deal and advocates a “diplomacy-first approach,” oblivious to the fruitless negotiations pursued by the Biden administration that allowed Iran to advance to the point it has the uranium to build multiple weapons.
Point eight reminds us that J Street added pro-democracy to its tagline. The problem is that it doesn’t support democracy unless the outcome suits its needs. The group rejects the democratic process in Israel because it disagrees with the representatives chosen by the people. The group also claims to support bipartisanship, yet it exclusively funds Democrats, including those who are openly hostile to Israel.
Regarding combating antisemitism, J Street defends antisemitic rhetoric under the guise of “criticism of Israel.” It falsely claims that right-wing groups exaggerate campus antisemitism while Jewish students face unprecedented harassment almost exclusively from the left. They mention “longstanding allies,” but not the fact that many turned on and often expelled Jewish students while endorsing Hamas. J Street defends radical groups that glorify terrorism, opposes anti-boycott legislation and objects to effective methods for motivating administrators to protect Jewish students.
Like other demonizers of Israel, J Street speciously attacks the internationally recognized (including the United States) definition of antisemitism proffered by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance for conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism by ignoring its explicit declaration: “Criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”
In its final catchall point that “everything else also matters,” J Street argues Jewish voters are not hawkish single-issue Israel voters. True, Jews don’t rank Israel high among the issues that determine their vote, and yet they consistently vote for pro-Israel candidates and oppose those who are anti-Israel.
The manifesto complains about “powerful and well-funded” lobbies, meaning AIPAC, which have those traits because they represent the bulk of the pro-Israel community. After years of being the largest “pro-Israel” PAC and filling Democratic candidates’ coffers, their funding is now dwarfed by AIPAC’s bipartisan support.
Reflecting its anti-democratic agenda, J Street denigrates “hawkish” voters, meaning conservative and Orthodox Jews who, in the last election, overwhelmingly favored Donald Trump in part or whole because of his positions on Israel. Kamala Harris, meanwhile, received the lowest percentage of the Jewish vote of any Democrat since Michael Dukakis, partly due to President Joe Biden’s policy toward Israel.
J Street pretends to represent Jewish interests, but its actions tell a different story. It supports policies that endanger Israel, disregards the will of Israelis and Arabs, and undermines Israel’s democracy.
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