Uncategorized
A scholar sees a common root for antisemitism and racism: ‘Christian supremacy’
(JTA) — Magda Teter’s new book, “Christian Supremacy,” begins in Charlottesville, Virginia, on Aug. 11, 2017. Hundreds of white nationalist neo-Nazis who ostensibly gathered to protest the removal of a statue of Confederate general Robert E. Lee from a local park broke into a chant: “Jews will not replace us.”
Other writers and scholars would note how antisemitism shaped white nationalism. But Teter, professor of history and the Shvidler Chair of Judaic Studies at Fordham University, saw something else: how centuries of Christian thought and practice fed the twin evils of antisemitism and racism.
“The ideology espoused by white supremacists in the US and in Europe is rooted in Christian ideas of social and religious hierarchy,” she writes. “These ideas developed, gradually, first in the Mediterranean and Europe in respect to Jews and then in respect to people of color in European colonies and in the US, before returning transformed back to Europe.”
In the book, subtitled “Reckoning with the Roots of Antisemitism and Racism,” she traces this idea from the writings of the early church fathers like Paul the Apostle, though centuries of Catholic and Protestant debates over the status of Jews in Europe, to the hardening of racist attitudes with the rise of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
Antisemitic laws and theology, she argues, developed within Christianity a “mental habit” of exclusion and dominance that would eventually be applied to people of color up to and including modern times.
Teter is careful to acknowledge the different forms antisemitism and racism have taken, distinguishing between the Jews’ experience of social and legal exclusion and near annihilation, and the enslavement, displacement and ongoing persecution of Black people. And yet, she writes, “that story began with Christianity’s theological relation with Jews and Judaism.”
Teter is previously the author of “Blood Libel: On The Trail of an Antisemitic Myth,” winner of the 2020 National Jewish Book Award. At Fordham, the Catholic university in the Bronx, she is helping assemble what may be the largest repository of artifacts and literature dedicated to the Jewish history of the borough.
We spoke Thursday about how groups like the Proud Boys embrace centuries-old notions of Christian superiority, how “whiteness” became a thing and how she, as a non-Jew raised in Poland, became a Jewish studies scholar.
Our conversation was edited for length and clarity.
Your book was conceived and written during the COVID lockdown. Where did the idea for the book come from?
It’s an accidental project. I’ve been teaching the history of antisemitism for years, and I live in Harlem so questions of race and racism are very stark in my daily life. And since I grew up in Poland, and American history was not something we were taught or studied, I’ve never been satisfied with the various explanations for the strength of antisemitism and history of racism. And as I mentioned in my prologue, I watched the Raoul Peck documentary, “I Am Not Your Negro,” which has a clip with James Baldwin saying that white people have to figure out why they invented the idea of the N-word and must “embrace this stranger that they have maligned so long.” You could also say that the European Christians created the idea of “the Jew” and that sort of caricature had absolutely nothing to do with flesh and blood Jews. I kept noticing these parallels, as an outsider, reading American and African-American history.
I was also thinking about this idea of servitude that was attached to Jews in Christian theology, and then in law.
You write in your book that “Over time, white European Christians branded both Jews and people of color with ‘badges of servitude’ and inferiority.” What do you mean by servitude in this context?
In Christian theology, from the earliest Christian texts, the idea of servitude and slavery is attached to the concept of Jews and Judaism. Paul does it in his Epistles. He uses this quote from the book of Genesis that “the elder shall serve the younger,” which becomes really embedded in Christian theology. It is the Jews, the elder people, who should serve the Christians, the younger people. Later on in medieval theology and canon law, Jews are in a servile position, consigned for their sin of rejecting Jesus to perpetual servitude. So even though Jews were free people and could live mostly where they wanted to live, marry whoever they wanted to marry — nobody was sold and some even had slaves — that idea of Jews as confined to perpetual servitude to Christians created a habit of thinking of Jews as having an inferior social status.
That language became secularized in modern times, and we see the development of the [antisemitic] trope of Jewish power: that they are in places where they shouldn’t be. I worked on fleshing out the parallels between the idea and then legal status of Jewish servitude and the conceptual perception of Black people in servile and inferior positions.
Magda Teter’s new book explores how “white European Christians branded both Jews and people of color with ‘badges of servitude’ and inferiority.” (Chuck Fishman)
What other kinds of parallels did you find between racism and antisemitism?
In the Christian theology, Black people, like Jews, will be seen as cursed by God. Jews were [portrayed as] lazy because they didn’t work physically — they made money and exploited Christians. Black people were [portrayed as] lazy because they were trying to avoid physical labor at the expense of white men. Both people were seen as carnal, both as sexually dangerous, and so on.
I was struck by the fact that the racist turn of Christian supremacy — justifying the enslavement of Black people on theological grounds — is a fairly late development, taking hold in the early modern period when Europeans established slaveholding empires.
That’s right. In the summer of 2020, the summer of George Floyd and Black Lives Matter, we were all thinking about these issues of race and racism and America. And as I was in the middle of writing the article that became the book, I felt that there was a deeper history that needed to be told, and that slavery is not bound by color until the enslavement of Black Africans by Europeans during the colonial expansion of Europe.
After the French Revolution, when Jews were offered “emancipation” in much of Europe, there were deep debates about whether they could be citizens and be entitled to the same rights and protections as Christian citizens of France and England and other countries. How was that debate informed by Christianity?
In pre-modern Europe, there was obviously both a religious and legal framework under which Jews existed. They had their place in a social hierarchy. After the French Revolution, people are creating a new political reality. The idea of equality obviously challenged the social hierarchies that existed, including the idea that Christians were the superior religion. And that begins to play a role on two levels. One is the level of, well, “how can you be equal and be our judges and make decisions about us?” It’s fear of power — political power and political equality. That challenges the habit of thinking that sees Jews as inferior, in servitude and otherwise insolent and arrogant.
The other level comes from Enlightenment scholars who begin to place Jews in the Middle East and in the Holy Land, in Palestine. Jews are no longer seen as European. They are seen as “Oriental,” and they are compared to the non-European religions and practices that these Enlightenment scholars have been studying. Their differences are now also racialized. “They are not like us, they can’t assimilate. They can never be Frenchmen, they can never be Germans.”
And I guess it’s a short step from that to regarding people with dark skin as inferior and subordinate.
That’s right. Enlightenment scholars are also trying to to understand why it is justified to enslave Black Africans and they do it through “scientific” and other means. They classify Africans as inferior intellectually and they create this idea of race.
I began to think about these European politicians and intellectuals in terms of creating their identities, and what I ended up arguing is what we saw in Charlottesville, what we’re seeing in Europe. It’s not necessarily just about hate, but it’s about exclusion and rejection of Jews and people of color from equality, from citizenship.
And the common thread here is that whiteness and Christianity become inseparable. You write that “freedom and liberty now came to be linked not only to Christianity, but to whiteness, and servitude and enslavement to blackness.”
That’s right. White Christian “liberty” becomes embedded and embodied in law.
Did you see any pitfalls in drawing parallels between the Black and Jewish experiences? I am thinking of those in either community who might say, “How dare you compare our suffering to theirs!”
Yes, I was tempered. I think what some call “comparative victimhood” has paralyzed conversations about this subject, and I kept it in my mind all the time. What I hope comes through is that there’s incredible value in a comparative approach. Coming from Jewish studies as my primary field, the comparison with the Black experience gave me clarity on the nature of antisemitism as well as on the nature of the Jewish experience, and vice versa: The Jewish experience can also give clarity to some of the aspects of anti-Black racism.
What’s an example?
So, for instance, questions like, “Are Jews white? Are they not white? When did they become white?” That’s a whole genre of scholarship. And when you look at it through the lens of law and ideology, you begin to see that from a legal perspective, Jews were considered white in the United States because they could immigrate and they could be naturalized according to law. They did not have to go to court to become American. Their rights to vote were not challenged. There was discrimination, they couldn’t stay in hotels and in some places they couldn’t find employment, but by law, they were considered citizens. The debate about the whiteness of Jews is creating a fog of misunderstanding.
Black Americans were targeted by specific legal statutes from the very beginning in the Constitution and then in naturalization law and so on. And then there was the backlash even after the Civil War to the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments [aimed at establishing political equality for Americans of all races].
Statues at the Strasbourg Cathedral depict Ecclesia and Synagoga, representing the triumph of the church, at left, and the servitude of Judaism, which is represented by a blindfolded figure, drooping and carrying a broken lance. (Edelseider/Wikimedia Commons)
How much do modern-day white supremacists, like the Oath Keepers or the Proud Boys, see themselves as Christian? Or is this a kind of white supremacy that doesn’t name itself Christian but doesn’t even realize how many of its ideas are based in theology?
I think they might not be conscious of this legacy, but neo-Nazis take from the legacy of the Nazis who themselves were not thinking of themselves as Christian necessarily. But what I argue in the book is that white Christian supremacy becomes white supremacy. It never discards the Christian sense of domination and superiority that emerges from its early relationship with Jews and Judaism.
In the United States, Black people serve as contrast figures to whiteness, in the law and in the culture. You cannot have whiteness without Blackness. For Christians, Jews serve as that contrast figure. Consciously or unconsciously, the Proud Boys are embracing that. They talk of “God-given” freedoms for white people. That is the Christian legacy.
You said that the Nazis didn’t necessarily see themselves as a Christian movement. But I must ask, even though it is not the scope of your book, was the Holocaust a culmination of white Christian supremacy? Because I think many Christian theologians would want to say that Nazism was godless, and a perversion of the true faith.
I’ll say that when exclusionary ideology is coupled with the power of the state, that’s where it can lead.
In the years since the Holocaust especially, there have been many efforts by Christian leaders to address the ideological failings of the past. You write about Nostra Aetate, the 1965 declaration by the Catholic Church absolving Jews of collective guilt in the death of Jesus and some Protestant documents of contrition. But I got the feeling you were disappointed that many denominations haven’t gone far enough in reckoning with the past.
There was a sort of a moral sense that something needs to be addressed after the Holocaust. But then it is not fully addressed. I don’t think anybody has addressed the issue of power — the roots of hate, yes, but not the dynamics of power. We’ll see where the book goes, but maybe theologians will begin to grapple with this legacy of superiority and domination, and the way hierarchical habits of thinking have been developed through theology and through religious culture.
What other impact do you hope the book may have?
White supremacy is very much in the air. We need to speak up against it, and make connections and allyships. I hope that maybe because the book deals with law and power, it may create bridges among people who care about “We the People” as a vision of people who are diverse, respectful and equal, and not the exclusionary vision offered by white and Christian supremacy.
A cross burns at a Ku Klux Klan rally on Aug. 8, 1925. (National Photo Company Collection)
I’d love to talk about your background. You’re not Jewish but you are chair of Jewish Studies at Fordham, a Catholic university. What drew you to the study of Judaism and the Jews?
I grew up in Poland with a father who from the time I was a little girl would point out to me that there had been Jews in Poland. We would drive through the countryside, and he’d say, “This used to be a Jewish town and there used to be a synagogue and there was the Jewish cemetery.” I grew up being very conscious of the past’s presence and this kind of stark absence of Jews in Poland, where in the 1970s when I grew up Jewish history was taboo.
As soon as Jewish books on Jewish subjects began to be published, including those that dealt with antisemitism, we would read it together. We would talk about it. He wouldn’t just shift the destruction and murder of Jews in Poland on to the Nazis.
There was no Jewish studies program in Poland when I was applying to universities, so I studied Hebrew in Israel, and then studied Yiddish in New York at YIVO. I came to Columbia University to get my PhD in Jewish history and my career went in the direction it did. I was a professor of history and director of the Jewish and Israel studies program at Wesleyan University. I came to Fordham eight years ago and created a program in Jewish studies.
Your previous book was about the blood libel, the historic canard that Jews murdered Christian children to use their blood. This one’s about antisemitism. I don’t want to presume, but is your interest in these subjects in any way an act of contrition?
I grew up in a very secular household. I did not grow up Catholic. But I think growing up in Poland made me very, very aware of antisemitism and the history of antisemitism. I got my PhD from Columbia University in Jewish history, which did not emphasize Jewish suffering, but Jewish life, and I have studied Jewish life and teach about Jewish life — not just about Jewish suffering.
However, in the last few years, antisemitism has certainly been on the minds of many of us. I also am committed to the idea of shared history, and therefore all my scholarship, as much as it is about Jews, it is also about the church and Poland and the law. Jews are an integral part of that history and culture. And, as such, I’m committed to that, to teaching about the vibrancy of Jewish life as much as the dynamics of what made that life difficult over the centuries.
—
The post A scholar sees a common root for antisemitism and racism: ‘Christian supremacy’ appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Uncategorized
Eight years after Tree of Life shooting, a Jewish burial society’s ranks have nearly doubled
After preparing five victims of the Tree of Life synagogue massacre for burial, members of Pittsburgh’s New Community Chevra Kadisha stood in a circle and held hands.
They had gathered like this before, taking a moment after their work to process what they had done. This time, they were caring for people murdered in their own community.
Volunteers from outside Pittsburgh had come to help. David Zimmer, a longtime member, remembered one visitor bringing a custom from another chevra kadisha.
“He passed around a piece of chocolate,” Zimmer recalled, “so that there should be something sweet.”
Eight years later, NCCK has nearly doubled in size. Before the attack, it had about 38 members, according to records reviewed by Patricia Cluss, one of its founders. Within four months, 11 people had joined. Today, it has 70.
The growth has brought more volunteers into some of the least visible work in Jewish communal life. A chevra kadisha, traditionally translated as a “holy society,” washes and prepares the dead for burial, dresses them in plain white shrouds and helps ensure they are treated with dignity. The work is considered a chesed shel emet, or true kindness, because the dead cannot repay those who care for them.
For NCCK, the aftermath of the attack also revealed another dimension of that care: The people accustomed to supporting others through loss needed support themselves.
Caring for their own
Pittsburgh’s NCCK was founded in 2004 to encourage greater participation in the Jewish tradition of caring for the dead. An Orthodox chevra kadisha already existed, and NCCK’s founders hoped to involve more Jews in the practice, regardless of their level of religious observance.
Cluss was among them. She had encountered an article about Reform Jews reviving Jewish burial practices that had fallen away in some communities. Until then, she had never heard of a chevra kadisha.
“I gotta do that,” she remembered thinking.
Deane Root joined early, too, drawn by an idea: What if Pittsburgh had a chevra kadisha open to anyone in the Jewish community? Root remembered a small group gathering, often in a member’s living room, to figure out the logistics of working with funeral homes and training volunteers.
Then came Oct. 27, 2018.
Root and his wife, Rabbi Doris Dyen, were approaching the Tree of Life synagogue building that Saturday morning when they heard a series of loud noises. They pulled into the parking lot and saw shattered glass.
Two NCCK members had been inside the synagogue, and the dead and wounded included people its members knew. At the Jewish Community Center of Greater Pittsburgh after the shooting, where families and friends gathered and waited for news, Root recalled that “not everybody knew for sure” what had happened to their loved ones.
When the victims were released for burial, NCCK began the work for which it had trained. Members also kept shmira, remaining with the dead and reciting Psalms until burial.
Allen Baum, who coordinates the NCCK men’s members, remembered that by the end, nearly every man in the group had participated in shifts. After the final tahara, the ritual preparation of a body for Jewish burial, they stood in a large circle, joined by women from NCCK as well.
Later, members gathered in a home, bringing food, reading poems and speaking about the people they had lost.Root was carrying the trauma of what he experienced that morning. He described a “video playing in my head constantly.”
Being together helped. “Let the community carry some of that burden,” Root remembered, “rather than keeping it all inside our own emotions and our own minds.”
A growing circle
Following the attack, younger Jews contacted NCCK after reading about its work. Some described joining as something they felt they needed to do as Jews. Others spoke of it as a form of social action.
Elana Glick, who joined NCCK around 2014 after her grandfather died, remembered that the group sometimes struggled to find enough volunteers before the massacre. Afterward, she said, the work became more public, even as members sought to preserve the privacy of the rituals.
At its annual dinner, Glick has watched the group grow. There have been “more and more tables added year after year because of people who have found this and wanted to be a part of this work,” she said.
“Being part of the chevra is one of the ways I feel most attached to my Judaism,” Glick said.
Sarit Wishnevski, executive director of Kavod v’Nichum, a national organization supporting chevrot kadisha and Jewish burial practices, has watched the movement become increasingly multigenerational. At the organization’s November 2025 gathering in Ojai, California, participants ranged from their 20s to their 80s, with one in their 90s.
The Jewish phrase l’dor v’dor is usually understood as passing something “from generation to generation.” Wishnevski suggested it can also mean practicing a tradition with generations alongside one another.
NCCK has also become a resource for other communities. Wishnevski called it a “really strong model,” citing materials its members have shared and their help with questions ranging from starting a group to making the work more inclusive of gender diversity.
The possibility of mass-casualty events has prompted other questions, too. “How will we be prepared?” Wishnevski said. “How will we show up if God forbid this happens here?”
Kavod v’Nichum is developing an emergency preparedness pilot effort. Wishnevski said the goal is not for a chevra kadisha to respond “in a silo,” but to build relationships with first responders, government agencies and other Jewish organizations.
Earlier this month, three NCCK members traveled to Chicago to teach other volunteers about something none would ever want to need: developing tahara liturgy for young children.
But most of the chevra kadisha’s work remains unseen, and the calls come without warning. “The only predictable thing is the unpredictability,” Baum said.
One summer, the men’s group went 11 weeks without a tahara. More recently, Cluss said, the women’s group performed 11 in two weeks. Sometimes volunteers arrive at a funeral home for one person and are asked whether they can stay for another. In recent years, NCCK has performed roughly 90 taharot annually.
For Cluss, the work had long been meaningful. After Tree of Life, she struggled to explain how that meaning had changed. Her daughter noticed something she hadn’t.
“Mom, do you ever notice when you’re talking about the chevra you always put your hand on your heart?”
Cluss hadn’t noticed.
The post Eight years after Tree of Life shooting, a Jewish burial society’s ranks have nearly doubled appeared first on The Forward.
Uncategorized
When a black hat and a toothbrush take on deeper meanings
דניאל גלאַיס באַנד „דער פֿאָיע און אַנדערע פּיעסעס“ (ה. לײוויק־פֿאַרלאַג, תּל־אָבֿיבֿ, 2026), נעמט אַרײַן צוועלף דראַמאַטישע ווערק אין פֿאַרשײדענע זשאַנערס: מעלאָדראַמעס, מאָנאָדראַמעס, משפּחה־דראַמעס און פּאָליטישע סאַטירעס.
די ווערק זײַנען פֿאַרשיידענע, אָבער זײ װערן צונױפֿגעקניפּט דורך אַ בשותּפֿותדיקן מאָטיװ פֿון זכּרון און זײַן כּוח פֿון תּיקון.
גלאַי איז געבוירן געוואָרן אין 1945 אין בוענאָס־אײַרעס, בײַ אַ משפּחה פֿון ייִדישע אימיגראַנטן. אין שטוב, אויף משפּחה־שׂימחות און אױף דער גאַס האָט ער געהערט ייִדיש, העברעיִש און שפּאַניש, װי אױך די קלאַסישע מוזיק, כּלי־זמר און טאַנגאָ.
זײַן טאַטע, זישע גאָלדוואַסער, איז געווען אַ שנײַדער און אַן אַמאַטאָרישער ייִדישער אַקטיאָר. דורך אים האָט דער יונגער דניאל אײַנגעזאַפּט די קלאַנגען, עמאָציעס און אינטאָנאַציעס פֿונעם ייִדישן טעאַטער.
צו פֿינף יאָר האָט גלאַי אָנגעהויבן זיך לערנען מוזיק, לכתּחילה אין בוענאָס־אײַרעס און דערנאָך אין תּל־אָבֿיבֿ. שפּעטער האָט ער באַקומען אַ מאַגיסטער אין קאָמפּאָזיציע פֿונעם שיקאַגע־אוניווערסיטעט.
דער ביאָגראַפֿישער הינטערגרונט העלפֿט פֿאַרשטיין די טיטל־פּיעסע „דער פֿאָיע“. דעם הױפּטהעלד פֿישעלעס פֿאָטער איז — ווי גלאַיס אייגענער טאַטע איז געווען — אַ שנײַדער, װאָס איז פֿאַרליבט אינעם טעאַטער.
דער טעאַטער, און בפֿרט דער פֿאָיע, װערט פֿאַרװאַנדלט אין אַ זכּרון־קאַמער, װוּ עס װערט אױסגעשפּילט די דראַמאַטישע ליבע־געשיכטע פֿון פֿישעלע און זײַן געליבטער רײזעלע. זײ באַװײַזן זיך אױף דער בינע אין דרײַ געשטאַלטן — װי קינדער, יונגע לײַט און דערװאַקסענע.
דער פֿאָיע איז מער ווי אַ טייל פֿונעם טעאַטער־בנין. דאָס אין אַ פּונקט װוּ דער זכּרון טרעפֿט זיך מיט דער ווירקלעכקייט. דער דערוואַקסענער פֿישל עקשטיין שטייט דאָ ווי אַ רואה ואינו נראה, אַן אומזעעוודיקער אָבסערוואַטאָר װאָס פּרוּווט צו פֿאַרבינדן „צוויי פּונקטן אין דער צײַט“.
בײַ גלאַין איז די קינדהײט ניט קײן אַלטע מעשׂה־שהיה, נאָר זי פֿאַרמאָגט אַ שליסל צום הײַנט: „דער סוד פֿון וואָס איך בין הײַנט, מײַנע טרוימען, ליבע און פּײַן, שטעקט אין אָט די נאָענטע קינדעריאָרן“, זאָגט פֿישל אינעם פֿאָיע.
ווען דער קליינער פֿישעלע קען ניט ענטפֿערן אויף אַ פֿראַגע פֿונעם כּפֿל־טאַבעלע, שרײַט ער אויס: „דרײַצן טויזנט מיליאַרד!“ דער קלאַס לאַכט אים אױס, אָבער פֿאַר אים שטעקט אין דער דאָזיקער צאָל אַ סוד, אַן „עניגמע“.
שפּעטער ווערט ער אַ באַרימטער פֿיזיקער. עס גײט דאָ ניט סתּם וועגן אַ שלעכטן תּלמיד, וואָס איז געקומען צום שׂכל. די עניגמאַטישע ריזיקע צאָל איז אַ סימן פֿון אַ שטאַרקן כּוח־הדמיון. די שול קען ניט דערקענען זײַן טאַלאַנט, אָבער דװקא אָט דער כּוח דערמעגלעכט זײַן אױפֿטו אין װיסנשאַפֿט.
אַן ענלעכע דינאַמיק שטעקט הינטער רייזעלעס דערפֿאָלג װי אַ טעאַטער־שטערן. פֿישעלע טרעפֿט זי אױפֿן מאַרק װוּ זי זינגט שטײענדיק אויף אַ פֿרוכטן־קעסטל. זי זאָגט צו אים: „זאָלסט װיסן…קונסט שטייט העכער פֿון אַלץ!“
דאָס קעסטל איז איינער פֿון גלאַיס בינע־חפֿצים מיט אַ סימבאָלישן באַטײַט. אַ פּשוטער טאָגטעגלעכער אָביעקט איז אַ מין זכּרון־פּושקע װאָס פֿאַרבאַהאַלט דעם חלום פֿון די קינדעריאָרן. דאָס קעסטל באַװײַזט זיך װידער אינעם פֿאָיע, װען די דערװאַקסענע רײזל זעצט זיך אַנידער כּדי אָפּצוגעבן זיך אַ דין־וחשבון פֿון איר לעבן.
אַזאַ מין פֿונקציע האָבן די בינע־חפֿצים אויך אין אַנדערע פּיעסעס. אין „באַכס פּאַרטיטע אין רע מאַזשאָר“ איז דאָס דער שוואַרצער הוט, װאָס די מאַמע טראָגט װען זי קומט צו איר טאָכטערס פּיאַנע־קאָנצערט.
אײן בליק אױף דעם הוט ברענגט די טאָכטער פֿון די כּלים אַרױס און מאַכט קאַליע דעם קאָנצערט. דער הוט איז דאָ אַ סימן פֿון דער מוטערס קאָנטראָל איבער דער טאָכטערס פּערזענלעכקײט — אַ פּראָבלעם, װאָס זײ בײדע מוזן לײזן.
אַ פּשוטער חפֿץ איז אָפֿט מאָל חשובֿער אײדער אַ בכּבֿודיקער. „דאָס ציינבערשטל און די כּתובֿה“ איז אַ פּיעסע װעגן אַ משפּחה־ברוגז. דער מאַן װאַרפֿט מיט כּעס זײַן טעלעפֿאָן אין דער װאַנט אַרײַן און צעברעכט על־פּי־צופֿאַל די כּתובֿה. דאָס צעבראָכענע גלאָז איז אַן אָנזאָגער פֿונעם משפּחה־קריזיס.
דער מאַן ציט זיך אַריבער אין אַן אַנדער דירה, אָבער קען ניט געפֿינען זײַן ציינבערשטל. אין צװישן געפֿינט די פֿרױ אָט דעם צײנבערשטל און דאָס גיט איר אַ תּירוץ צו טעלעפֿאָנירן דעם מאַן. דער סוף איז גוט; שלום־בית װערט אױפֿגעשטעלט.
גלאַי האָט געשריבן מוזיק צו די לידער פֿון פֿאַרשײדענע ייִדישע און העברעיִשע דיכטער. אין זײַן טעאַטער איז מוזיק ניט קיין באַפּוצונג, נאָר אַן אייגנאַרטיקע בינע־שפּראַך. אױך טאַנץ איז פֿאַר גלאַי, ווי ער האָט געזאָגט אין אַן אינטערוויו, „די שפּראַך פֿונעם גוף“, װאָס איז וויזועל, דינאַמיש און פֿאַרשטענדלעך פֿאַר אַלעמען.
אַ סינטעז צװישן װאָרט, קלאַנג און באַװעגונג קומט פֿאָר אין „אַ פֿריילעכס פֿאַר איסאַ“. אין דער פּיעסע, װאָס איז געװידמעט דער באַרימטער זינגערין איסאַ קרעמער, װערן איבערגעפֿלאָכטן לידער, טענץ, ביאָגראַפֿישע פּרטים, אַרכיוואַלע דאָקומענטן און חלומות.
אַ װיכטיקער זשאַנער אין גלאַיס דראַמאַטורגיע איז די גראָטעסקע סאַטירע. „ווי מאַכט מען חרובֿ אַ פֿאָלק“ איז אַ בינע־עקספּערימענט: חיים װיל װײַזן זײַן חבֿר יאַנקל װי אַזױ צו „צערײַסן אױף שטיקער“ גוטע אָרנטלעכע מענטשן דורך דעמאַגאָגיע און געװאַלט.
חיימס װערטער „מען האָט אַ מאָל גרינטלעך מתקן געװען דאָס פֿאָלק. איצט קומט די ריכטיקע שעה מאַכן פֿון אים אַש און פּאָרעך“ קלינגען ספּעציעל אַקטועל אין דער הײַנטיקער געשפּאַנטער פּאָליטישער אַטמאָספֿער סײַ אין אַמעריקע סײַ אין ישׂראל.
אין אַן אינטערוויו האָט גלאַי געזאָגט, אַז אַ קינסטלער דאַרף ניט בלויז שילדערן די װירקלעכקײט, נאָר אויך אָנווײַזן אויף אַ בעסערער וועלט מיט מער יושר און ליבע. זײַנע פּיעסעס זאָגן אָבער ניט צו, אַז קונסט קען ברענגען אַ תּיקון־עולם. צװישן זײַנע פּערסאָנאַזשן זײַנען ניטאָ קײן אידעאַלע העלדן. זײַן טעאַטער איז אַ פֿאָיע, װוּ מען טרעפֿט זיך פּנים־אל־פּנים מיט זיך אַלײן, מיט אַלע זײַנע שװאַכקײטן און חסרונות.
The post When a black hat and a toothbrush take on deeper meanings appeared first on The Forward.
Uncategorized
Israel’s future: What will actually change if Netanyahu loses?
Israel’s election on Tuesday could mark a dramatic turning point for a country battered by war, political turmoil and growing international isolation. If the opposition manages to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the consequences could extend far beyond a change of leadership. A new government could reverse the assault on democratic institutions, investigate the catastrophic failures of Oct. 7, end the extraordinary military exemptions enjoyed by the ultra-Orthodox, curb Jewish extremism in the West Bank and begin repairing Israel’s shattered relations with much of the world. For many Israelis, the stakes are nothing less than the country’s long-term survival.
The polls suggest that Netanyahu’s coalition will lose its parliamentary majority, but that may be the easy part. The opposition, led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, faces a potentially crippling contradiction: it seems like that it will be capable of commanding a majority in the 120-member Knesset only with the support of Arab parties, yet several of its leaders have promised not to rely on them. Unless they find a way around that commitment, Israel could emerge from the election with a clear majority opposed to Netanyahu but no alternative government capable of taking power.
For much of Israel’s secular, educated and economically productive population, the desperation to remove Netanyahu is palpable. Tens of thousands living abroad have been streaming home to vote, amid estimates that more than a quarter-million Israelis left during his current term. After Oct. 7, years of warfare, immense loss of life, democratic erosion and international isolation, another Netanyahu victory would convince many that Israel has crossed a point of no return. The spectacle of far-right figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich representing the country has compounded their humiliation.
The fear is of a monumental brain drain, the damage could be irreversible.
Talk of Israel’s survival is therefore not necessarily hysterical. A country weakened by emigration, threatened with European sanctions and declining American support could lose the technological and military superiority on which its security depends, inviting aggression. An Israel increasingly dominated by ultra-Orthodox communities that largely reject military service and modern secular education would face further difficulties. It is an astonishing predicament for a technological powerhouse whose GDP per capita exceeds that of France, Britain and Germany.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, has responded to unfavorable polls with apocalyptic warnings. On Sunday, he shared an AI-generated image of a nuclear explosion engulfing Tel Aviv, suggesting his defeat could expose Israel to a second Holocaust at Iran’s hands. Days earlier, he raised the prospect of international banking sanctions and proposed using cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology to circumvent them. The Bank of Israel rejected the idea as unworkable, while economists warned of potentially disastrous consequences.
In another reflection of Netanyahu’s apparent desperation, CNN reported that he tried to persuade President Trump to launch a joint attack on Iran before the election. Netanyahu’s government denies the report. But what is extraordinary is how readily the allegation is believed in Israel. The notion that a prime minister might deliberately trigger a war for political advantage should be staggering – and disqualifying. That so many Israelis consider it plausible speaks volumes about the almost unbearable tension gripping the country ahead of Tuesday’s vote.
What, then, would actually change if the opposition managed to take power and govern?
Democracy: Reversing the march toward autocracy
The central domestic issue is Netanyahu’s attempt to transform Israel from a liberal democracy, in which citizens enjoy guaranteed rights and the government faces institutional checks, into something resembling an elected autocracy. His coalition has pursued an extensive program to weaken the judiciary, undermine independent legal authorities and concentrate power in the government. Supporters describe this as a necessary correction to excessive judicial power; critics see a transparent power grab – and a plot to end Netanyahu’s corruption trials.
Some measures have been enacted, including legislation weakening the attorney general’s position. Others have been blocked by the Supreme Court, notably the attempt to eliminate the judicial doctrine of reasonableness, which allows courts to review certain government decisions. Still others have been delayed or disrupted by the Gaza war. The broader ambition has included giving politicians decisive control over judicial appointments and enabling the Knesset to override Supreme Court rulings by a simple majority, potentially leaving few meaningful constraints on government power.
An opposition victory would mean dismantling this project. That would not preclude judicial reform: Israel’s notoriously slow courts, lengthy trials and cumbersome judicial appointments require attention. But the distinction would be between improving the judiciary and subordinating it to politicians.
Oct. 7: The investigation that never happened
The Hamas-led invasion on Oct. 7, 2023, was the greatest security catastrophe in Israel’s history. Thousands of attackers breached the Gaza border, massacring some 1,200 people and taking hundreds hostage. Communities were overrun while the military response was disastrously delayed. Yet Netanyahu’s government has resisted establishing an independent state commission of inquiry into the failures that made the disaster possible. It has even been quietly promoting conspiracy theories that a “leftist” security establishment helped Hamas. And, of course, it has dared to actually run again.
All this has become politically radioactive. Critics accuse Netanyahu of trying to evade responsibility and prolong wars as a distraction, while hoping public anger will eventually dissipate. The issue is not simply accountability but national survival: understanding how the country’s defenses collapsed is essential to preventing another catastrophe. The opposition is committed to establishing such an inquiry promptly, with a mandate that could implicate military and intelligence leaders as well as the political leadership, including Netanyahu himself.
Netanyahu’s trial: Closing the loophole
Israel’s legal system contains a remarkable anomaly. Politicians facing serious criminal proceedings can be barred from ministerial and certain other public offices, yet an indicted politician can serve as prime minister. The Supreme Court allowed Netanyahu to form a government while standing trial, subject to conflict-of-interest restrictions – which he agreed to in an affidavit – to prevent his legal predicament from influencing his exercise of power.
His subsequent campaign to reshape the judiciary has made a mockery of that commitment. Opposition politicians intend to close the loophole through legislation restricting the ability of politicians under criminal indictment to serve as prime minister, preventing another situation in which a leader facing prosecution exercises authority over the institutions administering justice.
The ultra-Orthodox: Ending a system of exemptions
Perhaps the most consequential long-term domestic challenge involves Israel’s rapidly growing ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, population. The Haredim constitute roughly one-sixth of Israel’s population, with families averaging more than six children. Many boys receive little or no secular education in mathematics, English or science. Male workforce participation is relatively low, and many families depend heavily on public assistance. Given the community’s rapid demographic growth, the implications for Israel’s economy and society are enormous.
But the most politically explosive issue is military service. For decades, ultra-Orthodox men studying in religious seminaries have enjoyed sweeping draft exemptions or deferments, even as other Jewish Israelis face compulsory military service. The arrangement creates a perverse incentive: remaining in religious study is the path to avoid conscription, while leaving the seminary – and entering the labor market – exposes a young man to the draft. The result is a system that discourages employment and places an increasingly unequal military burden on the rest of society. Adding insult to injury, the Israeli taxpayer is forced to pay subsidies to the yeshiva students – rather than the students paying tuition as those in university do.
After Oct. 7 and the prolonged wars that followed, public tolerance for this arrangement has diminished sharply. Polls have repeatedly shown overwhelming support for ending the exemptions. Netanyahu seeks to formalize the arrangement for his Haredi coalition partners, while the principal opposition parties are committed to ending it. Broader changes to education, employment incentives and public subsidies are also needed, but ending the draft exemption system would be the immediate test.
The Palestinians: A change in methods, not an immediate peace process
Historically, Israel’s center-left has been more receptive to partitioning the land and establishing a demilitarized Palestinian state in much of the West Bank and Gaza than the right. Israeli governments made far-reaching proposals in 2000–2001 and again in 2008, without achieving a final agreement. Oct. 7, however, has profoundly changed the political atmosphere. Even many Israelis who once supported territorial compromise are unwilling to contemplate further withdrawals while Hamas remains an armed force capable of threatening Israel.
An opposition government would therefore be unlikely to launch an ambitious peace initiative in the near term. But significant changes could still follow.
An alternative government could be expected to crack down on violent Jewish extremists in the West Bank, curb the settlement expansion encouraged by Netanyahu’s far-right partners, and restore some credibility to the prospect of an eventual political settlement. It would also continue efforts to prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself as an armed force in Gaza or the West Bank.
The difference would be less about immediate territorial concessions than about abandoning the ideological extremism and permissiveness toward settler violence that have characterized the present government.
Iran and Hezbollah: Tough security policies, different diplomacy
A change of government would not necessarily mean a softer Israeli approach to Iran or Hezbollah. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons commands broad support across Israel’s political spectrum, as does the determination to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military threat along Israel’s northern border. Netanyahu’s military campaign against Hezbollah enjoyed substantial domestic support, including among his opponents (and, in fact, is aligned with the ultimate goals of the government of Lebanon). An opposition government would be expected to maintain pressure on the organization and insist on effective security arrangements in Lebanon.
The change would be in diplomatic style and strategic coordination. Rather than treating international criticism as a badge of honor, an opposition government would be more inclined to coordinate with partners, combining military resolve with greater diplomatic engagement.
The world: Repairing Israel’s shattered relationships
Netanyahu’s government has left Israel increasingly isolated internationally, particularly because of the Gaza war, settlement policies and the conduct of its far-right ministers. Relations with European governments have deteriorated amid growing pressure for sanctions. Netanyahu’s close identification with the American Republican right has damaged Israel’s traditional bipartisan standing in Washington. Many liberal American Jews have become deeply alienated by the government’s religious nationalism and the rhetoric of ministers such as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.
An opposition government would attempt a major diplomatic reset. That would not eliminate disagreements over the Palestinians or Israel’s military operations, but it would offer a government more interested in rebuilding alliances than antagonizing its critics, and more capable of making Israel’s case to democratic partners whose support remains strategically indispensable.
For Israel’s business and technology sectors, whose prosperity depends on access to international markets, investment and financial institutions, the restoration of normal relations with the world is an absolute economic necessity.
Coalition negotiations: Winning may be the easy part
None of these changes is guaranteed, even if Netanyahu loses his parliamentary majority. An Oct. 23 Maariv poll projected 48 seats for Netanyahu’s coalition, 58 for non-Arab parties outside it, and 14 for the Arab parties – and most other credible polls painted a similar picture. That would give Netanyahu’s opponents a commanding 72-seat majority in the 120-member Knesset, where a majority of 61 is needed to confirm a government — but only if the Arab parties are counted.
If the polls are right – and historically this has roughly been the case – the simplest route to an alternative government would be a coalition of Jewish opposition parties governing with outside parliamentary support from Arab parties.
Such an arrangement would not necessarily require Arab parties to hold ministries or participate in national security decisions. But Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman have rejected dependence on Arab parties, while other opposition figures have shown greater flexibility.
Other scenarios include persuading ultra-Orthodox parties to abandon Netanyahu, attracting defectors from Likud, or constructing a broader coalition of right-wing and centrist parties. Liberman and other leaders could use the uncertainty to demand powerful ministries, major policy concessions or even a rotation agreement for the premiership. Because an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is unlikely to be on the immediate agenda, cooperation between the center and parts of the nationalist right may prove easier than in previous eras. But judicial reform, the Haredi draft and Netanyahu’s legal future could become major stumbling blocks.
There is, though, a precedent. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor-Meretz bloc won only 56 seats, but the support of five Arab legislators gave the anti-Likud camp a majority. Rabin ultimately formed a coalition with the ultra-Orthodox Shas party rather than bringing Arab parties into government. Something similar could happen again. Alternatively, coalition deadlock could lead to another election — or leave Netanyahu in charge of a temporary “caretaker government” despite an electoral majority opposed to him.
That is the drama facing Israel. For millions of Israelis who believe their country’s future is at stake, there might be an extraordinary possibility of national recovery after years of trauma and division. But to accomplish any of it, the opposition’s leaders may first have to abandon their refusal to rely on the votes of Israel’s Arab citizens — roughly one-fifth of the population.
The promise was understandable. The opposition needs to attract former Netanyahu voters; they overwhelmingly do not trust the Arabs, and some are simply racists. But rarely have democratic politics produced a promise that more clearly needs to be broken.
The post Israel’s future: What will actually change if Netanyahu loses? appeared first on The Forward.
