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An Israel analyst’s best- and worst-case scenarios for the new right-wing government
(JTA) — The recent Israeli elections, the fifth in less than four years, returned Benjamin Netanyahu to the driver’s seat for the third time.
The twice and future prime minister appears able to cobble together a coalition that has been called the most right-wing in Israeli history. It will include three far-right and two haredi Orthodox parties, and his partners include the far-right Religious Zionism party and its leader Bezalel Smotrich, who has sucessfully pushed for a heavier hand in controlling Israeli policies in the West Bank; Itamar Ben-Gvir, head of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, who is due to head a new National Security Ministry that will be given authority over Border Police in the West Bank; and far-right Knesset member Avi Maoz, whose Noam party campaigned on a homophobic and anti-pluralistic platform.
These developments have cheered the American Jewish right, which has long called for Israel to consolidate its power in — if not outright annex — the disputed territories of the West Bank that are home to 480,000 Israeli settlers and 2.7 million Palestinians, of whom 220,000 live in East Jerusalem.
For Jews on the center and left, however, the results have prompted anxiety. If the two-state solution has long looked out of reach, many were at least hoping Israel would stay on a centrist path and maintain the status quo until Israelis and Palestinians seem ready for their long-delayed divorce. American Jewish leaders are worried — privately and in public — that Jewish support for Israel will erode further than it has if Jews become convinced Israel doesn’t share their democratic and pluralistic values.
I spoke this past week about these issues and more with Michael Koplow, the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. The IPF supports a viable two-state solution, and Koplow acknowledges that he agrees with “almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government.” But he remains one of the most articulate analysts I know of the high stakes on all sides.
Our conversation was presented as a Zoom event sponsored by Congregation Beth Sholom, my own synagogue in Teaneck, New Jersey. The transcript below has been edited for length and clarity
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: What are the far right’s big asks, and what might we expect to see going forward?
Michael Koplow: There are a few issues that are really coming to the fore. The first is judicial reform. There’s a longstanding complaint among the Israeli right that the Israeli Supreme Court is perceived to be left-leaning — the mirror image of what we have here in the United States. Secondly, the Supreme Court is perceived by many Israelis to be an undemocratic institution, because it is an appointed body. In Israel, you have a selection committee for the Supreme Court that is actually composed mostly of sitting Supreme Court justices and members of the Israeli Bar Association. A common complaint is that the Knesset is a democratic body selected by the people and it’s hampered by this undemocratic body that gets to dictate to the Knesset what is legal and what is not.
And so for a long time on the Israeli right there has been a call to have a bill passed that would allow the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions. At the moment, there’s no recourse. The ultra-Orthodox parties in Israel have long sought exemptions for haredi Israelis to serve in the IDF and the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that ultra-Orthodox members of Israeli society can’t get a blanket exemption. A Supreme Court override bill would allow the Knesset to exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the IDF. For the more right-wing nationalist parties, particularly Religious Zionism, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled on multiple occasions that settlements cannot be established on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. Their main interest in a Supreme Court override is so that they can pass laws that will effectively allow settlements anywhere in [the West Bank’s Israeli-controlled] Area C, whether it’s state land or private Palestinian land.
Is Netanyahu interested for these same reasons?
Netanyahu is to a lesser extent interested in these things, but right now he’s on trial for three different counts, all for fraud and breach of trust, which is the crime that Israeli politicians get charged with in matters of corruption. He’s also in trouble for bribery. One of the things that he wants to do is to pass something called the “French law,” which would bar sitting Israeli prime ministers from being investigated and indicted. And in order to do that, he almost certainly will have to get around the Supreme Court.
The second thing that I think we can expect to see from this prospective coalition has to do with the West Bank. In late 2019 and early 2020, there was a lot of talk in the Israeli political sphere about either applying sovereignty to the West Bank or annexing the West Bank. This happened also in conjunction with the release of the Trump plan in January 2020, which envisioned upfront 30% of the West Bank being annexed to Israel.
This all got shelved in the summer of 2020, with the Abraham Accords, when the Emirati ambassador to the United States wrote an op-ed where he said to Israelis, “You can have normalization with the UAE or you can have annexation, but you can’t have both.” Israelis overwhelmingly wanted normalization versus West Bank annexation. Between 10% and 15% of Israeli Jews want annexation, so this annexation plan was dropped. In the new coalition, annexation is back, but it’s back in a different way. Bezalel Smotrich is a particularly smart and savvy politician, and understands that if you talk about annexation or application of sovereignty on day one, he’d likely run into some of the same problems — from the United States and potentially from other countries in the region. And so the way they’re going about it now is by instituting a piecemeal plan that will add up to what is effectively annexation.
How would that work?
For starters, there is a plan to legalize illegal Israeli settlements, and when I say illegal, I mean illegal under Israeli law. There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that are legal under Israeli law, because they had been built on what is called state land inside of the West Bank, and because they’ve gone through the planning and permitting process. In addition, there are about 205 illegal Israeli outposts and illegal Israeli farms, containing somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 Israelis. And what makes them illegal under Israeli law is that they were all built without any type of Israeli government approval. In many of these cases, they’re also built on private Palestinian land.
The first part of this plan is to legalize retroactively these illegal outposts. The coalition agreement that has already been signed between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich’s party, calls for, within 60 days of the formation of the government, the state paying for water and electricity to these illegal outposts. I should note there already is water and electricity to these illegal outposts, but it’s paid for by the regional settlement councils. This would have water and electricity paid for by the Israeli government, and then within a year to retroactively legalize all of them. That’s step number one.
Step number two has to do with the legal settlements inside the West Bank. There is a body called the Civil Administration, which is the body that is in charge of all construction for both Israelis and Palestinians in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank that is controlled entirely by Israel. As part of the agreement between Likud and Religious Zionism, Smotrich is going to be finance minister, but also appointed as a junior minister in the Defense Ministry, and he will control the Civil Administration and will be in charge of all settlement construction in the West Bank. He will also have the power to decide whether Palestinians can build in Area C and whether Palestinian structures in Area C that were built without a permit can be demolished. And so this will almost certainly be increasing at a very rapid rate. The Supreme Planning Committee that plans West Bank settlement construction normally would meet about four times a year, and under the [current] Bennett/Lapid government it only met twice, but Smotrich said in the past that he would like to convene it every single month. So the pace of settlement construction is almost certainly going to grow at a pretty rapid pace.
What will Itamar Ben-Gvir, an acolyte of Meir Kahane, the American rabbi barred from Israel’s parliament in the 1980s because of his racism, gain in the government?
Itamar Ben-Gvir is the head of Otzma Yehudit, the Jewish supremacist party that now has six seats in the Knesset. As part of his negotiations with Netanyahu, he is going to be appointed to a new position known as the “national security minister,” which is currently called the public security minister, but they’ve increased its powers and renamed it. They’ve also given this new ministry control over the West Bank border police, who operate in the West Bank. And they’re also giving this minister power over the police that normally belongs to the police commissioner. And so Ben-Gvir, who I should note has seven criminal convictions on his record, including one for support of a terrorist organization and incitement to racism, is going to be the minister who’s in charge of the police — not only inside of Israel, but he’ll be in charge of the police who operate in the West Bank and who operate on the Temple Mount.
Michael Koplow is the chief policy officer of the Israel Policy Forum and a senior research fellow of the Kogod Research Center at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America. (Courtesy IPF)
And this is important because Ben-Gvir is one of the figures in Israel who has talked a lot about changing the status quo on the Temple Mount, probably the most sensitive spot in the entire world, and certainly the most sensitive spot anywhere between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Which is why Israeli governments, including very right-wing governments, have not changed the status quo [allowing Jews to enter the Muslim-administered mount, but pray there], certainly not formally. He’s also talked about increasing his own visits to the Temple Mount.
And he’s also talked about changing the rules of engagement for Israeli police, whereby they would be allowed to shoot anybody on sight, for instance, who’s holding a stone or holding a Molotov cocktail. Right now the current rules of engagement are that people like that can only be shot if they present an imminent and serious threat to a soldier or police. Changing that is certainly going to have an effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians and likely lead to the types of clashes we’ve seen in Jerusalem over the past few years.
This is all very good news for folks who want to solidify Israeli control in the West Bank. It’s not such good news for people who support more autonomy for the Palestinians and certainly support the two-state solution — and I think I can include the Israel Policy Forum in the latter camp. I want to hear your thoughts on what you’ve called the best-case scenarios and the worst-case scenarios, and on where Netanyahu fits in.
When I say best-case scenario, I mean in terms of preserving the status quo, because a best-case scenario where you’d actually have an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians is nowhere. It’s not in any conceivable future.
I think the best-case scenario would be that Netanyahu understands Israel’s place in the international system and he understands how issues inside the West Bank impact Israel’s foreign relations. This is somebody who has served as Israeli prime minister longer than anybody else. He was prime minister when the Abraham Accords came into being, and that accomplishment is rightfully his. Netanyahu understands these factors and has a long history of being very cautious as prime minister. He’s not a prime minister that uses force. He’s not a prime minister under whom Israel has undertaken any major military operations outside of Gaza. I think that it’s not unreasonable to think that his history of relative caution isn’t just going to go away. And that means doing things to make sure that the fundamental situation in the West Bank doesn’t get overturned.
Netanyahu is operating in a political context in which his voters and voters for the other parties in his coalition do expect some real radical changes. Interestingly, however, part of this agreement with Religious Zionism is that everything has to be approved by [Netanyahu], and so there will be a mechanism for Netanyahu to slow some things down. I think that there is a situation in which he lets things proceed at an increased pace, but doesn’t do anything to really fundamentally alter the status of the West Bank.
I also think that voters voted for Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit not because they’re looking for big, massive changes in the West Bank or an explosion in settlement construction, but because they were voting on law and order issues. Many Israelis are still very shell-shocked, literally and figuratively, by the events of May 2021, particularly the riots that broke out in mixed Israeli cities. And despite the fact that Itamar Ben-Gvir was blamed by the police commissioner at the time for instigating some of the violence in mixed cities, he ran a very effective campaign where he said, “Vote for me and effectively I will restore order.”
That leads to the reasonable best-case scenario of plenty of things happening that will cause friction with the United States and plenty of things that will cause friction with the Palestinians, but nothing that can necessarily be undone by a different government down the road.
And the worst-case scenario, from your perspective?
The worst-case scenario is all of these things that Smotrich, in particular, wants to carry out leads to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Based on my own experience in the West Bank in recent months, the Palestinian Authority has fundamentally lost control of much of the northern West Bank. In many places they have chosen not to engage in many ways. They effectively operate in and around Ramallah, and have a token presence in other spots, but don’t really have the power to enforce law and order. They’re under enormous political strain.
As a very quick refresher, the West Bank is divided into three areas, A, B and C. In theory, Area A is supposed to be entirely under the PA control and where you have between 1.3 and 1.5 million Palestinians. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, that means that Israel must go in and literally be the day to day governor and mayor of Area A and all its cities, providing services to 1.3 million Palestinians. It means acting as traffic cops, dealing with all sorts of housing and construction and literally everything that municipal governments do that Israel has not done in Area A in almost 30 years.
Does Israel even have that capability?
The standard is that 55% of all active-duty IDF soldiers are currently stationed in the West Bank. If the Palestinian Authority collapses it’s not hyperbole to say that every single active-duty IDF soldier will have to be stationed in the West Bank just to run things, just to maintain basic law and order. That means not having IDF soldiers on the border with Egypt, on the borders with Syria and Lebanon. It will effectively have turned into nothing but a full-time occupation force. And that’s Option A.
Option B is that Israel elects not to do that. And then Hamas or Islamic Jihad steps into the vacuum, and they become the new government in the West Bank. And at that point, everything that you have in Gaza, you have in the West Bank, except for the fact that the West Bank is a much larger territory. It cannot be sealed off completely. This is literally the nightmare scenario not only for Israeli security officials, but for Israeli civilians. And that’s even before we talk about the impact that will have on terrorism and violence inside of Israeli cities inside the green line, let alone what happens in the West Bank.
The United States and the European Union, and the U.N., presumably, won’t stand idly by through a lot of these changes. What leverage do they have and can they use to maintain the status quo?
The U.S. and E.U. are going to have some pretty clear, very well-defined red lines. I think it’s reasonable to expect that the Biden administration and many members of Congress will put the formal declaration of annexation as a red line. The same goes for European countries. But certainly the Biden administration doesn’t want to be in a position where they are getting into constant fights with the Israeli government. The administration rightly views Israel as an ally and an important partner and wants to maintain military and security and intelligence cooperation with Israel in the region. All those things benefit U.S. foreign policy. This is not an administration and certainly there isn’t support in Congress for things like conditioning security assistance to Israel or placing new usage restrictions on the type of weapons that we sell to Israel. And so there isn’t a huge amount of leverage in that department.
But I do think we’re going to see more diplomatic and political-type measures. People remember the controversy that ensued in December 2016 at the United Nations when the Obama administration abstained from a Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements. I think that if some of these measures go ahead, on the Israeli side, there’s a good chance that we will see the United States once again abstain from some measures in the Security Council. At the moment, the Israeli government has been working very hard to get the United States to help with [thwarting] investigations into Israeli activity in the West Bank in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. I think that those sorts of things become a lot harder if Israel has fundamentally changed the status of the situation in the West Bank.
There are probably all sorts of trade relationships with the European Union that may be at risk. One big factor here is the other states in the region, the Abraham Accords states. There’s reason to think that they may act as a check on the Israeli government, given the popularity of normalization among Israelis, and given the fact that the UAE was the party that really stepped in and prevented annexation from taking place in the summer of 2020. In a country like Saudi Arabia, where you have a population of between 25 and 30 million, or Iraq or Kuwait, [the far right’s agenda] makes normalizing relations with those countries very, very difficult, if not impossible, and it’s possible that Netanyahu will use that also as a way to try and appeal to some of his coalition partners.
Another outside partner is Diaspora Jewry. A vocal minority of American Jewry supports the right-wing government, but a majority would support a two-state solution. They connect to Israel with what they see as a shared sense of democracy and liberal values. Does Netanyahu and his coalition partners think at all about them and their concerns? Do those Diaspora Jews have any leverage at all in terms of moderating any of these trends?
The short answer is not really. The parties in a prospective coalition are not ones that historically have cared very much about the relationship with the Diaspora. Haredi parties are not concerned about the erosion of liberal values inside of Israel or the situation in the West Bank for the most part. And parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit really don’t care what American Jewry thinks about much of anything. We’ve already seen demands in some of these coalition agreements to amend the Law of Return, where right now, anybody who has one Jewish grandparent is eligible to be an Israeli citizen. These parties have been requesting that it be amended so that you are only eligible if you are halachically Jewish, meaning you have a Jewish mother [or have converted formally].
North American Jewry is a real asset to the State of Israel given its role traditionally in supporting the state economically and politically. And yet over the past decade and a half there have been repeated comments [among Israeli politicians, including Netanyahu’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer] that it’s more important to be making inroads with evangelical Christians than with North American Jews, given the politics of evangelical Christians and given their size.
Many American Jews, particularly from the Reform and Conservative denominations, have already been angry that Israel doesn’t fully recognize the authenticity of non-Orthodox Judaism, and that an agreement to create a permanent egalitarian prayer space at the Western Wall has been repeatedly shelved under pressure from Israel’s religious right.
We are in for a tough time in terms of Diaspora-Israel relations. You know, it’s not just about the issues that have been on the table over the past few years that have been disappointing to Diaspora Jewry, whether it be the Western Wall arrangement, whether it be recognition of Conservative and Reform Judaism inside of Israel, whether it be things like the Law of Return, which now seems to be under threat. In general, this question of values, which has been a big deal, is going to be even more front and center. Many American Jews have looked at Israel and thought of it as a place that shares liberal values with the United States. To some extent, that’s been historically accurate. But that picture, whether it’s accurate or not, is going to be under incredible strain.
What about within Israel? Are there any countervailing powers that might moderate the far right — professional military leadership, major business leaders, other opinion-makers outside the political process?
Thankfully, there is no history of IDF leadership interfering in the political decisions of elected civilian leaders in Israel. I hope that will continue. The way the security establishment has generally dealt with these sorts of things is by presenting a united front when they speak to the political leadership and give their opinions and advice and warnings about what might happen. They tend to be very savvy at leaking those opinions to the media. I’m certain that that sort of thing will continue. We already saw some discord over the past week between IDF leadership and some of the members of the prospective new coalition over disciplinary measures that were taken against soldiers who were serving in Hebron, one of whom punched a [Palestinian] protester, another who verbally assaulted a protester. And that can be a moderating influence, but I actually do not expect to see the military leadership stepping in any way in preventing something that the government may want to do.
The biggest check will be Israelis themselves. There was something else interesting that happened [last] week: Avi Maoz, who was the single member of Knesset from Noam, which is one of these three very, very radical right-wing parties, was appointed as a deputy minister in the prime minister’s office, and he was given control over effectively everything in education that is not part of the core curriculum and Israeli schools — like culture and Jewish identity issues. And that led to a revolt from Israeli mayors. You’ve had over 100 mayors of over 100 municipalities signing a letter saying that they are not going to be bound by Maoz’s dictates on curriculum. And this includes right-wing cities. I think that the most effective check is going to be government overreach, which leads to a backlash like this among Israeli citizens and among Israeli politicians who are not members of Knesset.
We’ve covered a lot of ground. Is there something we haven’t touched upon?
It’s really important that people don’t look at what’s taking place in Israel, throw up their hands and say, “You know, there’s nothing we can do to change this and Israelis are increasingly uninterested in what we think and so we’re going to disengage.” To my mind, the relationship that American Jews have to Israel is too important to just throw up our hands and say it doesn’t matter.
If we take American Jewish identity seriously, and we take the American Jewish project seriously, we have to think about two things. First, how we build an American Jewish identity that’s uniquely American. But second, how we preserve some sort of relationship with Israel, even when we see things coming from Israel that don’t speak to our Jewish values. We’re living in a time where we have an independent Jewish state with Jewish sovereignty in the Jewish homeland. This is a historical anomaly. If we turn our backs on that, despite all of the difficulties, it really would be a tragedy and catastrophic for American Jewish identity.
If you don’t like what you see going on in Israel, try to figure out what your relationship with Israel will look like and how to have a productive one. And that doesn’t have to mean supporting everything the Israeli government does. I consider myself you know, somebody who is a strong Zionist, strongly pro-Israel. It’s a place that I love. I agree with almost nothing that I’m going to see from this Israeli government. But I’m still able to have a strong, meaningful relationship with the State of Israel, and I hope that people are able to do the same, irrespective of the day-to-day of Israeli politics.
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Eisenkot outlines 3 paths to Israeli government, signaling urgency and openness to Arab-party backing
(JTA) — Gadi Eisenkot outlined three tracks he is pursuing to build a coalition, including a minority government that would need the outside support of Arab-led parties, saying that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was putting Israel “in a very dangerous place” with his anti-Arab rhetoric.
Each option Eisenkot presented Friday in a lengthy post on X could involve breaking a promise that at least one of the parties in the “change” bloc Eisenkot leads had made: not to rely on the Arab parties; not to join with Netanyahu; or not to work with the haredi Orthodox parties as long as they refuse to compromise on military service.
One of his partners, Avigdor Liberman, who leads the Yisrael Beytenu party, said the option of joining with the haredim was the likeliest.
Eisenkot, who leads the Yashar party, described an urgency to form a coalition spurred in part by Netanyahu’s relentless rhetoric targeting the Arab parties, which Eisenkot said was placing the Arab Israeli population at risk of attack. Forming a coalition under the conditions Eisenkot lays out would remove Netanyahu from his role as prime minister, depriving him of a powerful pulpit.
“We are in a very dangerous place. A place where the outgoing prime minister is acting in ways we have never seen before,” he said.
“Israeli society, our democracy, and our standing and position on the international stage are all approaching a point of no return,” he said. “The path from a violent campaign of delegitimization against 21% of the population and labeling them ‘supporters of terrorism’ to actual violence could also be short. The writing is on the wall.”
President Isaac Herzog last week gave Eisenkot the mandate to form a government within 28 days, after 67 members of the parliament, or Knesset – including the “change” bloc and the 19 Knesset members belonging to Arab-led parties – gave their nod to the former Israel Defense Forces. Netanyahu got the approval of 46 lawmakers, and seven abstained. If Eisenkot does not get a government together by Dec. 6, he can ask Herzog for a 14-day extension.
The first option Eisenkot raised was forming a government with the support of the ultra-Orthodox, or haredi, parties. Such a move would have been almost unthinkable until recently, given the longstanding and close alliance between Netanyahu and the haredi parties, as well as the central campaign promises of the anti-Netanyahu bloc to bring about fundamental changes to the state’s relationship with the ultra-Orthodox community, including mandatory military service – a position the haredi parties strongly oppose.
“Serious discussions are underway with the ultra-Orthodox parties, aimed at finding solutions and formulas that will strengthen the IDF, address security needs and preserve the status of those who study Torah, as we promised during the election campaign,” Eisenkot wrote in his post.
He stressed that the negotiations did not amount to “backing down on the issue of military service,” but rather involved formulating an arrangement based on the principles of his party’s “Service for All” framework, which would codify non-military service as an option for some sectors. All four parties in the change bloc ran on a platform of ending the vast exemptions from military service haredi Jews have enjoyed for decades.
The negotiations appear to have led one of the two ultra-Orthodox parties, United Torah Judaism, to refrain from recommending Netanyahu to the president as the candidate to form the next government. The other haredi party, Shas, which is considered more right-wing and closer to Netanyahu, has so far given no indication that it intends to cross political lines and join the anti-Netanyahu bloc. Without Shas, the bloc would have to settle for a minority government.
Liberman said in an interview with Channel 12 News on Friday evening, hours after Eisenkot’s post, that forming a government with the support of the ultra-Orthodox parties was “the only practical option.” He said he was convinced that a government supported by both haredi parties could be formed. According to Liberman, the bloc should be willing to “sacrifice” its pledge not to cooperate with the ultra-Orthodox and to fundamentally change the state’s relationship with their community in pursuit of its primary goal: “an end to Bibi’s rule.”
The second path outlined by Eisenkot was a unity government with Likud. Negotiating teams from the two parties met earlier this week. “As for the contacts with Likud, we are making sincere and genuine efforts on our part. Unfortunately, however, there is a wide gap between the Likud’s rhetoric and their action and actual willingness to move forward,” Eisenkot said. He nevertheless made clear that “I intend to give this track another chance.”
Eisenkot did not name the “gap,” but reports have said talks have foundered on Netanyahu’s role in a unity government. Netanyahu reportedly is insisting on serving as prime minister in the first part of a “rotation” agreement that would see the premiership rotated among bloc leaders.
Liberman ruled out sitting in a government with Netanyahu under any circumstances, including a rotation agreement in which Netanyahu would serve as prime minister second after Eisenkot. Another leader of the opposition bloc, Naftali Bennett of the B’Yachad party, held lengthy talks with Netanyahu in the Knesset this week, triggering a wave of speculation that he was advancing the possibility of a unity government. But Bennett would still need to convince the other parties in his bloc to join him in doing so, as his party isn’t large enough to secure a parliamentary majority with Netanyahu on his own.
The third option Eisenkot raised at the end of his post was the formation of a “national emergency government.” He clarified that he would pursue this track only if “the necessary conditions for the formation of a broad government through the channels I am leading do not materialize.”
Although he did not explicitly say so in his post, Eisenkot appears to be referring to the possibility of a minority government that would rely on the votes of the Arab-led parties to secure the parliamentary majority needed to form a government without actually including Arab ministers in the government itself.
But the proposal faces significant opposition within Eisenkot’s own bloc, potentially jeopardizing the entire initiative. Liberman stressed that he would “categorically” vote against a narrow government relying on the support of the Arab-led parties. Channel 12 News also reported that Bennett had told leaders of the opposition bloc that he opposed forming a government dependent on Arab-led parties.
One of the two parties, Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, served in a coalition under Bennett from 2021-2022. Bennett has praised Abbas as a worthy partner but has also argued that including Arab-led parties in the government after the deadly Hamas-led attacks of Oct. 7, 2023 is untenable. Netanyahu has seized on the radical statements of some members of the other Arab-led party, the Joint List, to depict both parties as supporting terrorism.
Liberman and Bennett both argued that relying on the Arab-led parties would give Netanyahu a massive boost ahead of future elections.
Eisenkot, however, signaled that he was prepared to put that opposition to the test. In his post, he stressed that “all members of Knesset will have to follow their conscience and decide whether a new government will be formed, or whether they are willing to drag the State of Israel into another election while Netanyahu remains prime minister of a transitional government.
“It would be foolish to think that we have the luxury of delaying and losing the window of opportunity that has opened up, a window that may never open again. What is at stake is Israel’s future,” Eisenkot said.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post Eisenkot outlines 3 paths to Israeli government, signaling urgency and openness to Arab-party backing appeared first on The Forward.
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After devastating midterms, Jewish right-wingers lick wounds – and plan for 2028
(JTA) — NEW YORK – Anti-Israel rhetoric, “radical Islam” and the voting habits of young Jews were among the many concerns voiced this week at two of the first major events for Jewish conservatives held since Democrats’ sweeping victories in the midterm elections.
Speakers and attendees at both the Tikvah Fund’s Jewish Leadership Conference and the Zionist Organization of America’s annual gala, each held on Sunday in Manhattan, railed against the growing contingent of Democratic Socialists of America members entering Congress.
As they reeled from that “difficult Tuesday night,” as ZOA emcee Shabbos Kestenbaum referred to it, some advocated for a boost in Jewish education in hopes that young Jews would prioritize pro-Israel candidates. Others said the pendulum could swing back to a GOP victory in 2028 — but also expressed antipathy toward Vice President JD Vance, seen as the favorite to lead the party’s ticket.
ZOA president Mort Klein urged attendees at the Ziegfeld Ballroom in midtown Manhattan to fight against the “dangerous policies” of the DSA, the group that has endorsed a contingent of left-wing, Israel-critical candidates in Congress, bringing their number in the Democratic caucus to eight when the next session starts in January. He denounced growing accusations of Israeli apartheid and genocide, likening them to antisemitic propaganda used in Nazi Germany and other historical periods.
In an interview after the event, Klein said the ZOA is urging President Donald Trump “to make a major address on antisemitism — an address purely on Jew hatred and Israel hatred, not general hatred.” The ZOA, he said, is also “urging, even demanding” members of Congress to make similar speeches, noting that he could only recall Florida Rep. Randy Fine and Texas Sen. Ted Cruz as having done so to his satisfaction. He added that he is pushing for Jewish leaders and rabbis to do the same and to speak about “the dangers of radical Islam.”
It is not a new strategy for the ZOA, but Klein said the group is doubling down because “whatever strategy is in place, it’s not being fulfilled in any way, shape or form.”
A number of speakers at the ZOA event denounced young Jewish voters and the efforts of the liberal Jewish Middle East advocacy group J Street. J Street bills itself as pro-Israel and pro-peace; speakers at the ZOA gala accused it of turning young Jews against Israel.
Alan Dershowitz, the prominent pro-Israel attorney whose clients have included Trump, O.J. Simpson and Jeffrey Epstein, called J Street “the most dangerous organization to Zionism, to Israel and I believe to the Jewish future in the United States.”
“It has fraudulently convinced many young people that they are pro-Israel and has given cover, has given a hechsher [kosher certification], to anti-Israel, anti-Zionist and, in more and more respects, anti-Jewish attitudes than any other organization,” Dershowitz said.
The problem, Dershowitz continued, is exemplified by the number of Jews who “tragically voted for [New York City Mayor Zohran] Mamdani, how many Jews voted for [Michigan Sen.-elect Abdul] El-Sayed.”
J Street did not endorse either candidate. The group did not return a request for comment.
Josh Katzen, publisher of the Jerusalem News Syndicate, blasted the “new generation” as he received an award from the ZOA for Middle East journalism.
“Not only do they not have an emotional attachment to Israel, they don’t have an emotional attachment to the United States. They don’t have any idea who are the good guys, and who are the bad guys,” Katzen said. “They don’t understand that Israel is America’s front-line defense in supporting Western civilization against the attack of Islam.”
Attendees at the ZOA event had misgivings about Jews who voted for left-wing Democratic candidates, and about Muslim candidates.
Hy Drusin, a board member of the West Side Republican Club, told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that he’d coined the term “JINOs” — “Jews in Name Only” — for Jews who voted for “these Muslim socialists.”
According to Upper East Side resident Nathaniel Gravonsky, “The problem in New York City is too many Jews read The New York Times as their Torah.”
Rabbi Yehuda Kaploun, Trump’s special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, said in a speech that expanded Jewish education and stronger encouragement of young Jews to embrace their Jewish identity would set them on the right path, as opposed to voting for candidates like El-Sayed.
“For years, the Jewish community has followed the same playbook: more conferences, more photo ops and more nongovernmental organizations. It is a proven recipe, now, for failure,” Kaploun said.
Drusin opined to JTA that Jewish education would indeed “better the chances that [students] will remain Jewish or Jewish identified.” But, he added, “What Rabbi Kaploun urged has been urged for decades, centuries. Is it happening? Is it working? Spreading? Or is it declining? There are arguments and statistical evidence on both sides.”
Drusin said it was “disturbing” to see exit polls that had half of Jewish Michigan voters voting for El-Sayed, and that it would be tough to buck Jews’ “long tradition of knee-jerk affiliation with the Democrat Party.”
Earlier on Sunday, at the Jewish Leadership Conference, Cruz offered hope that the pendulum could very well swing back to the Republicans in 2028. He pointed to the election of then-Vice President George H.W. Bush in 1988, which came two years after Democrats — similar to this year’s results — won the midterms in commanding fashion and took control of the House and Senate.
But hopes of a 2028 Republican victory were accompanied by doubts about the current vice president, who is seen as Trump’s likeliest successor to lead the GOP. Vance has drawn the ire of Jewish conservatives over his reprimanding of Israeli officials, indulgence of anti-Israel conspiracy theories and his silence on his friend Tucker Carlson, a prominent media personality who promotes such narratives.
Most recently, Vance outraged a number of pro-Israel Republicans when he blamed the party’s midterm losses in part on the current U.S.-Israel relationship, and listed “change our relationship to Israel” among four strategies to bring back voters.
“I’m disgusted with it,” Drusin said about Vance’s post. “That’s why I support [Secretary of State Marco] Rubio.”
Gravonsky, too, said he is “always going to pick Marco Rubio over JD Vance” in a hypothetical primary battle between the two, echoing a number of Jewish Republican voters and donors who say Rubio is their preferred 2028 candidate.
Cruz, speaking at the Tikvah Fund’s event, said he disagreed with Vance’s assessment that Israel was a major factor in the recent GOP losses.
Mike Huckabee, Trump’s ambassador to Israel, spoke at both events about the need for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship, though he did not address Vance’s comments head on. He did so in a subsequent interview with The Press Service of Israel, however, saying that “Israel was not the reason the midterm elections yielded disappointing results for the Republicans.”
Neil Cooper, a Republican Jewish Coalition member who attended the Jewish Leadership Conference on Sunday, called the vice president’s post a “political suicide note” that would alienate voters.
Should Vance emerge as the nominee, however, Cooper said he believes Jewish conservatives would “likely hold our noses and vote for Vance on the theory that, despite his flaws, he would nevertheless be preferable to a Democrat from a policy standpoint.”
But Cooper also predicted that any rightward realignment of American Jews — a demographic whose typical allegiance to the Democratic Party has been under a microscope amid shifting sentiment on Israel — would be dampened by Vance becoming the nominee.
If Jewish voters find Vance “repugnant,” Cooper said, it becomes “that much easier to revert to their default position and vote for the Democratic candidate.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post After devastating midterms, Jewish right-wingers lick wounds – and plan for 2028 appeared first on The Forward.
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Can Palestinian Christians undermine Christian Zionism?
Americans tend to associate Palestinians with Islam. And studies show that most Americans view Islam in a negative light; a Pew study found that this has actually gotten worse since 9/11 — more than 50% of Americans surveyed in 2026 agreed with the statement that Islam encouraged violence, double the 25% who agreed with that statement in 2002.
Since Oct. 7, some Christian groups and influencers in the U.S. have been trying to change this association, drawing the attention of their fellow American Christians to the plight of — and the existence of — Palestinian Christians in the hopes of activating their empathy toward Palestinians.
American Christians have historically advocated strongly for their fellow Christians abroad. In 1998, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act in response to the civil war in Sudan that saw an Islamist government oppressing Christian citizens. Earlier this year, Congress passed a resolution expressing concern for Coptic Christians in Egypt. And another Pew study found that the vast majority of groups advocating for religious freedoms abroad are Christian.
In short, the U.S. is a Christian country, and many of its citizens feel connected to Christians in trouble abroad.
But this has been somewhat less true when it comes to Israel where American Christian views over the past several decades have been shaped by Christian Zionism. Evangelicals hold immense political sway through lobbying groups and voting power, and most adhere to a theology that demands support for Israel, and for Jews to return to the biblical land, in order to bring about the End Times and the return of Jesus. There is such a strong moral alignment between Israel and God — their Christian God — that some American evangelicals seem to be shocked when they learn that Israel did not distinguish between Palestinian Christians and Palestinian Muslims in Gaza. Instead, they associated Palestinians with the violence they connect to Islam — a narrative that gels easily with Israel’s justifications for its crackdown in Gaza to eliminate Hamas.
Church collapse shifts the church
However, in 2025, Israel struck the only Catholic church in Gaza, killing three people and injuring nine others, in addition to destroying an ancient Christian historical site. The IDF claimed it was accidental, but the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierbattista Pizzaballa, harshly criticized the destruction, and claimed that Israel had been “targeting innocent civilians.”
With this strike, American evangelicals began to take note of the plight of Palestinian Christians. Mike Huckabee, the U.S. ambassador, wrote a harsh letter to Israel’s minister of the interior about its hostility to Christians, threatening visa restrictions. Trump called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to complain. Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, a staunch Republican but also a devout Christian, voted with Democrats to deny funding to Israel.
“Israel bombed the Catholic Church in Gaza, and that entire population is being wiped out as they continue their aggressive war in Gaza,” Greene said, to explain why she crossed party lines.
Since then, Christian influencers have drawn attention to Palestinian Christians’ treatment in Israel. Sometimes, these efforts are humanitarian and informational, such as those of the Palestinian Christian Alliance for Peace, an organization that grew out of the progressive mainline Protestant United Methodist Church’s movement to divest from Israel.
Other influencers, like Tucker Carlson, have taken more of a shockjock approach. Carlson has regularly interviewed Palestinian clergy, including Bethlehem-based Lutheran priest Munther Isaac; Mother Agapia, an American Greek Orthodox nun who immigrated to the Holy Land; and Hosan Naoum, an Anglican archbishop in Jerusalem. All of them emphasize a direct throughline from Jesus to Palestinian Christians, depicting them as upholding the most original form of Christianity.
When Carlson speaks on the subject, he often omits that the people in question are Palestinian, referring to them simply as Christians in astonished tones, playing the audience he imagines, then trying to walk his viewers step by step away from their prior assumptions
“So Christian churches in the United States send more money to Jewish settlements in the West Bank than they do to Christians in Jesus’ own town of Nazareth?” Carlson asked Naoum, in tones of total befuddlement. “When people in the American media say Palestinian, it means someone who is an Islamist, basically — but you’re saying a lot of those Palestinian refugees were Christians!”
Palestinians, both Christian and Muslim, are being attacked and oppressed by Israeli settlers and soldiers; this much has been established, including by many Jewish groups. But many of these Christian influencers, including Carlson, who are now advocating for Palestinians, have a history of antisemitism, which frames their exposés on Israeli violence — Jews, they believe, killed Jesus. Now, they highlight Jews destroying the Christian-owned olive groves in Taybeh or Bethlehem, bombing a church in Gaza, or spitting on a priest. The implication is clear.
An increasing number of viral videos featuring Israelis opposing Christianity in some way are now being shared virally: Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem’s Old City spitting on Christians, an IDF soldier taking an axe to a statue of Jesus in southern Lebanon. Even the Christian Broadcasting Network, an evangelical channel that has historically been extremely Zionist, aired a number of clips about Jewish attacks on Christians and Christian holy sites.
But the sympathy only holds among the Christian influencers if the victims are Christian; though they may criticize violence against Palestinians at large, the argument is clearly weaker. As Candace Owens, a devout Catholic and outspoken antisemite put it, “The biggest issue that I have, by the way, with Israel, and talking about them being above reproach, is the fact that they are supplying the arms to murder Christians.”
Yet many of these videos rely on separating Palestinian Christians from Palestinians more generally for greater emotional impact in the U.S. And the reality is that Palestinian Christians are still Palestinians, first and foremost, a tougher sell to the American Christian populace, which is still largely rooted in Zionism.
To address this, two Christian conferences —Not In Christ’s Name last week in D.C. and the Crossroads Conference in Atlanta earlier this month — invited Palestinian priests Issa Thaljieh and Munther Isaac, both from Bethlehem, to speak. Their testimony was meant to describe the experience of Palestinian Christians, to address Christian Zionism and to be “an invitation to American evangelicals to meet Palestinian Christians, and to reckon with the ways their theology harms Palestinians on the ground.”
But because of Trump’s blanket ban on Palestinian Authority passport holders, neither of them could get a visa — even though they’re priests.
The post Can Palestinian Christians undermine Christian Zionism? appeared first on The Forward.

