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Casualty Statistics Driving a False ‘Settler Violence’ Narrative in the West Bank
Militants stand during the funeral of two Palestinian Islamic Jihad gunmen who were killed in an Israeli raid, in Jenin refugee camp, in the West Bank on May 10, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Raneen Sawafta
Nearly every day, newspapers globally report on the number of Palestinians reportedly killed in the West Bank by the IDF or by Israelis living in the West Bank. Taking the numbers from the UN, outlets including The New York Times, The Guardian, ABC Australia, and the BBC have all referenced Palestinians killed by both “Israeli forces and settlers.”
While the IDF is known to take precautions during its operations in the West Bank to minimize harm to civilians, many of those killed are not ordinary Palestinian civilians at all, but rather terrorists with affiliations to terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, or lone actors committing attacks against Israelis and the IDF.
However, the media are not reporting on these incidents accurately, with outlets consistently crafting stories in which it is suggested that Palestinian civilians are being routinely attacked and murdered by Israelis living in the West Bank.
Casualties Reported
According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 1,000 Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank from October 7, 2023, until December 2025.
B’Tselem, a fringe Israeli “human rights group,” that has previously accused Israel of committing genocide, has also kept data of the Palestinians killed in the West Bank, including the name, location, date of death, and type of injury.
From October 7, 2023, through October 31, 2025 — the latest date of available data — B’Tselem lists 963 Palestinian deaths by Israeli forces in the West Bank and Israel. Just under 50 percent of those killed are recorded as having known terror-group affiliations, not including lone-wolf attackers who attempted or carried out assaults on Israeli civilians or security forces.
In the same period, B’Tselem recorded an additional 24 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians and 13 killed by unidentified parties. These figures include individuals affiliated with terror organizations such as Hamas or Islamic Jihad, as well as unaffiliated attackers who carried out terror assaults. In total, B’Tselem reported approximately 1,000 deaths over the two-year period.
The OCHA lists 1,020 Palestinian casualties in the West Bank and Israel for the same period (October 7, 2023, until October 31, 2025). This includes 23 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians or off-duty soldiers. It does not provide the name and type of injury for each individual. The casualties in this list include Palestinians who died in direct “confrontations” with Israelis, meaning it also includes terrorists that were killed during or after committing a terror attack.
When comparing OCHA and B’Tselem’s data, several patterns emerge. While the datasets differ somewhat in methodology, categorization, and total counts, their overall trends remain consistent.
Data by District
Graph based on B’Tselem data of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces from October 7, 2023, to October 31, 2025.
Notably, B’Tselem’s data indicates a correlation between districts with the highest number of fatalities and a high concentration of terrorist activity and affiliations.
The areas most frequently referred to in newspapers as being the “deadliest” are often the same areas where terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad maintain a strong operational presence. This is especially true for Jenin, which both B’Tselem and the OCHA cite as having the highest rates of Palestinian deaths. Other cities with high death rates include Tulkarm, Nablus, and Tubas, all of which the IDF has operated in to thwart terrorism threats.
B’Tselem’s own data show that more than half of the deaths in Jenin since October 7, 2023, have been those with affiliations to terrorist organizations. Yet, the media has continued to memorialize the city for being the “martyrs’ capital.”
Reminder to @WSJ: Jenin wasn’t a “center of militant resistance”—it IS a terror hub that fuels suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. Its terrorists have recently murdered Israelis in Tel Aviv, Elad, and Jerusalem.
Get it right. pic.twitter.com/Kz3PmHdMhb
— HonestReporting (@HonestReporting) February 4, 2025
Casualty figures divorced from the security reality of these cities risk misleading readers by implying indiscriminate violence against Palestinian civilians — often portrayed as occurring at the hands of Israeli civilians — rather than the reality of Israeli counterterror operations targeting organized terror networks in the West Bank.
Terrorists Killed by Israelis
Although the OCHA data does not break down each person by name and background, cross-referencing its own data shows that terrorists are included in the data on casualty figures.
A terror shooting attack in a gas station in the Jewish community of Eli in the West Bank on February 29, 2024, left two Israelis murdered. An off-duty, reservist soldier neutralized the terrorist. This data also appears on the OCHA data on casualties list, where the Israeli who neutralized the terrorist is listed as an “Israeli civilian settler.” Because the Israeli was an off-duty soldier, B’Tselem included the Palestinian terrorist in the list of those killed by Israeli forces.
Data from the OCHA “Data on casualties” database displaying a Palestinian casualty on February 29, 2024.
In B’Tselem’s list of Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians are individuals who carried out terrorist attacks, such as Hareth Khaled ‘Abdallah Jbarah, who, on November 6, 2024, drove his car into a bus stop near the Jewish community of Shilo in the West Bank. He then exited his car with a knife, attempting to stab Israelis, before an Israeli civilian fatally shot him. He is also counted as a Palestinian casualty from that day on the OCHA website, with the person who stopped his attack described as an “Israeli civilian settler.”
More recently, in the Humanitarian Situation Update #343, OCHA noted that “two Palestinians attempted to run over a crowd of Israelis” in the Gush Etzion area on November 18, 2025, before “Israeli forces opened fire and killed both Palestinian men.” This data also appears in OCHA’s casualty data.
This reveals a consistent pattern in which Palestinians killed while actively carrying out a terrorist attack are recorded as “Palestinian casualties.” At the same time, Israelis who neutralize them are framed as the perpetrators of violence.
Data from the OCHA “Data on casualties” database displaying Israeli casualties from October 7, 2023-October 31, 2025.
Interestingly enough, the OCHA data on Israeli fatalities differentiates between a “settler” and an “Israeli civilian,” implying there is a difference between the two — a distinction that is not applied when reporting Palestinian fatalities.
This all points to a larger problem in West Bank reporting. UN casualty data becomes misleading when it groups terrorists together with civilians tragically caught in the crossfire — and the media’s uncritical use of these figures (without distinction, verification, or context), further amplifies a distorted picture of events on the ground.
By citing aggregate casualty figures while omitting how, where, and why deaths occurred, media outlets flatten complex counterterror operations into simplistic narratives of one-sided violence. The result is coverage that obscures responsibility, erases the role of terror organizations, and leaves audiences with a fundamentally false understanding of what is happening in the West Bank.
The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.
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Hezbollah rejects US-brokered ceasefire deal struck by Lebanon and Israel
(JTA) — Hezbollah appears to have rejected a ceasefire that the United States brokered between Israel and Lebanon, where the Iranian proxy is based.
The deal reportedly would have allowed Israel to remain in southern Lebanon, where it has established a buffer zone, but not permit any attacks in Beirut unless Hezbollah attacked Israel within its own borders. It would also have required Hezbollah fighters to leave the buffer zone.
A top Hezbollah leader said accepting a demand to leave southern Lebanon would amount to “surrender” for the group.
“What we are concerned about is an end to the aggression, ceasefire and Israel’s withdrawal,” Secretary-General Naim Qassem said in a televised statement on Thursday, the Associated Press reported. “We did not make any commitment to any party to stop resisting as long as there is occupation.”
Dozens of Israeli soldiers have died in the fighting, which Hezbollah is increasingly prosecuting with the use of drones.
The rejection comes as the U.S. House of Representatives voted to rebuke President Donald Trump and his war on Iran on Wednesday, narrowly passing a resolution that limits Trump’s power to continue the war without congressional approval.
Four Republicans voted with Democrats on the bill, in a sign of how opposition to the war, which Trump launched jointly with Israel in February, is crossing party lines ahead of high-stakes midterm elections in the United States.
The bill would not require presidential signoff but is seen as unlikely to substantively change Trump’s handling of the war, which he has insisted does not require congressional approval.
Trump called the vote “meaningless” in a post on Truth Social on Thursday morning.
“Yesterday, in a meaningless vote, the House voted, 4 bad Republicans and all of the Dumocrats, to limit my War Powers, right in the middle of my final negotiations to end the War with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he wrote. “Who would do such an unpatriotic thing.”
The bill now goes to the Senate, where a similar measure has advanced in recent weeks, also with support from a handful of Republicans. It comes at a delicate time, as an uncertain ceasefire struck in early April has now stretched on without a resolution for longer than active hostilities unfolded. Trump has failed to achieve the terms for a deal to permanently end the war that he said he wanted, and this week said he thought the constant negotiations had grown “very boring.” Hezbollah’s apparent rejection of a ceasefire deal is another setback.
Iran has continued to battle during its ceasefire with the United States, though not against Israel: On Wednesday, it struck Kuwait’s main airport, killing one and injuring 60.
Also on Wednesday, Trump confirmed reports that he had called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “f—ing crazy” during a call on Monday in which Trump pressed Netanyahu to strike a ceasefire with Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon. Trump told a New York Post podcast that he was “a little perturbed at his constantly fighting with Lebanon” but that he liked Netanyahu and worked well with him.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
The post Hezbollah rejects US-brokered ceasefire deal struck by Lebanon and Israel appeared first on The Forward.
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A Yiddish favorite is among the top baby names in New York
Each year around this time, the Social Security Administration releases a list of the most popular baby names for the past year. This year, New York state’s list includes the Yiddish name Gitty, as well as five other traditional Ashkenazi names: Chana, Chaya, Rivka, Chaim and Moshe.
According to this interactive list in the Times Union, 43 of every million babies in the U.S. were given the name Gitty in the past six years.
The vast majority of these babies were apparently born in either Yiddish-speaking Hasidic families or in non-Yiddish speaking Haredi families (often referred to as “Yeshivish”) who maintain the tradition of giving their children Biblical and other traditional Jewish names, often after a deceased relative.
Although some people may be surprised to hear a Yiddish name like Gitty making the list, it lines up with the most recent statistics on language use. According to this study, in households with children aged 5 and under, Yiddish ranks as the third most common home language in New York (spoken by roughly 3% of young children), trailing only English and Spanish.
It also makes sense in light of the most recent demographic breakdown of Jewish families in the New York area. According to this 2023 UJA study, Orthodox families represent about 19% of Jewish households (approx. 430,000 individuals, including children) — a group that’s growing rapidly due to higher birth rates and younger average ages, with about two-thirds identifying as Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) and the rest as Modern Orthodox.
The name Gitty is a variant of the name Gitl, which means “good” in Yiddish. Why then are these babies called Gitty instead of Gitl? This is part of a trend that began years ago, when Haredi children’s names adopted a “y” at the end, apparently mimicking the old American tradition of ending children’s names with a “y” (think Tommy instead of Thomas). As a result, Rivka became Rivky; Moshe (or Moishe) became Moishy and Gitl became Gitty.
The post A Yiddish favorite is among the top baby names in New York appeared first on The Forward.
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Trump’s humiliation of Netanyahu marks a sea change in the US-Israel relationship
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s carefully cultivated image as a master of geopolitics is on life support after reports that President Donald Trump on Monday cursed and mocked him in a phone call, calling him “f- – – ing crazy” and ordering him to stand down in Lebanon.
In response, Netanyahu’s opponents and even some of his former allies are accusing him of mortgaging Israel’s sovereignty and reducing the country to strategic dependence on Washington. They’re right. Trump is treating Netanyahu less like the leader of a sovereign ally and more like a subordinate expected to obey instructions.
As a result, Israel suddenly looks less like an independent regional power and more like an American client state.
A rupture long in the making
The roots of this humiliation stretch back months, to the beginning of the Iran war itself. In early March, Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that the United States entered the war because Israel was preparing to strike Iran and the White House feared that Tehran would retaliate against American forces afterward.
Ever since, American officials, including Trump himself, have disseminated the narrative of the war as a preventive intervention designed partly to manage the consequences of expected Israeli escalation. But as the war has dragged on, becoming exactly the kind of open-ended Middle Eastern entanglement Trump once promised to avoid, the public narrative has instead increasingly become that Netanyahu had talked Trump into a war that backfired, making Trump look foolish.
This week came the payback.
On Monday, Netanyahu publicly threatened major strikes on the Shiite neighborhoods of Beirut if Hezbollah attacks continued. Iran responded by suspending ceasefire talks, apparently gambling that Trump wanted an exit ramp badly enough to restrain Israel rather than risk a wider regional explosion. The gamble worked.
In the Monday call, Trump reportedly ordered Israel to cease fire immediately, demanding to know “what the f – – -” Netanyahu was doing, accusing Israel of causing escalation, and declaring — incorrectly — that he had “kept Netanyahu out of jail,” a reference to his efforts to persuade President Isaac Herzog to pardon Netanyahu in his ongoing corruption trial.
Intentional humiliation
American presidents have pressured Israeli leaders before. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion withdrew from the Sinai peninsula in 1957 under heavy pressure from then-President Dwight Eisenhower after the Suez Crisis. Washington pressured Israel to stop military operations during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and again during the 1982 Lebanon War.
Yet previous confrontations unfolded differently. American presidents pressured Israeli leaders privately while preserving the appearance of mutual respect between allies. Even when Washington prevailed, both governments generally tried to avoid publicly humiliating each other.
This time the humiliation was part of the strategy — a change that bodes ill for Israel’s standing as an independent regional power.
Trump wants Tehran, Beirut, Riyadh, Doha, Cairo, and every other Middle Eastern capital to understand that he controls the pace of escalation, and that Netanyahu obeyed when ordered to stand down.
That public spectacle explains the intensity of the Israeli backlash.
“There has never been an Israeli prime minister who accepted such a humiliating demand,” former military chief and current prime ministerial candidate Gadi Eisenkot wrote on social media. Former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, whose coalition poses a major threat to Netanyahu’s control in upcoming elections, effectively slammed Netanyahu as allowing the U.S. to dictate Israeli military policy, with Bennett accusing Netanyahu of running “a government that has lost control of Israeli sovereignty.”
Even the conservative Jerusalem Post sounded the alarm. Israel had “found itself in the humiliating position of having to seek American approval to defend its own citizens,” the paper argued in an editorial. “The United States is now actively restraining Israel from taking decisive military action.”
Netanyahu’s image in tatters
For years, Netanyahu cultivated an image of himself as uniquely capable of managing Israel’s relationship with the U.S. while preserving Israeli strategic independence. His supporters portrayed him as a geopolitical virtuoso who understood American politics better than any rival and who could navigate complex power dynamics while defending Israeli interests.
Now that image lies in ruins.
Over the last decade, Netanyahu systematically alienated nearly every pillar of Israel’s traditional support structure aside from the American right.
He offended European governments through relentless settlement expansion, confrontations with the European Union, and contempt in response to liberal Western criticism. Europe remains Israel’s largest trading partner, yet Israel now faces the growing possibility of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and even challenges to its associated nation status with the European Union.
Then came the rupture with the American Democrats.
In 2015, Netanyahu traveled to Washington to campaign openly against then-President Barack Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran before a joint session of Congress. Strategically, that marked a turning point. Netanyahu transformed support for Israel from a matter of bipartisan American consensus into an increasingly polarized issue.
Afterward, he tied himself even more tightly to the Republican right, and especially Trump. He cultivated the impression that he exercised unusual influence over Trump himself, encouraging supporters to believe that he had effectively turned the White House into an extension of his own political operation.
That illusion has now collapsed spectacularly.
The final and perhaps most reckless step came when reports emerged that Netanyahu sought Trump’s intervention regarding his corruption trial. Even without confirming those reports’ accuracy, the perception that an Israeli prime minister already dependent on Washington for military and diplomatic backing was now personally dependent on an American president for political survival was devastating.
This week confirmed that dependence now defines the U.S.-Israel relationship. Netanyahu, the supposed master statesman, has maneuvered himself — and Israel — into a strategic cul-de-sac. Now the question is: Is there any way out?
The post Trump’s humiliation of Netanyahu marks a sea change in the US-Israel relationship appeared first on The Forward.

