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Eli Rosenbaum takes skills honed Nazi-hunting to investigating war crimes in Ukraine

WASHINGTON (JTA) –– During the 35 years Eli Rosenbaum spent hunting Nazis, he always looked up to his forebears in the profession. But it was only recently, as he ventured into Ukraine to track down Russian war criminals, that he felt a personal connection with the investigators who pursued Adolf Hitler’s henchmen in the years following World War II.

For the first time in his career, Rosenbaum was seeking evidence of crimes as soon as, or almost as soon as, they were committed.

“I’m accustomed to working on atrocity crimes when the conflict is over — World War II, Rwanda, Bosnia, Guatemala, et cetera,” he told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency recently. “But in this case, the atrocities are being committed every day.”

Rosenbaum said he has been working “if not 24/7, 20/7” since June, when Merrick Garland, the Jewish U.S. attorney-general, named him to lead the Justice Department’s War Crimes Accountability Team in Ukraine. Rosenbaum had previously spent the bulk of his career in the Justice Department’s Office of Special Investigations, which he directed from 1995 to 2010. The OSI tracked down and deported 70 Nazis hiding in the United States. In 2004, it expanded its purview to track down war criminals from other conflicts who had entered the United States.

Rosenbaum’s current team, he said in congressional testimony in September, “provides Ukrainian authorities with wide-ranging technical assistance, including operational assistance and advice regarding criminal prosecutions, evidence collection, forensics, and relevant legal analysis.”

Rosenbaum rattles off names and events in the evolution of war crimes prosecution in a way that sends a listener scrambling to a search engine. He’s been a war crimes geek since college, when he took a film course and a professor screened Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film, “Triumph of the Will.”

Rosenbaum told his parents about the movie. His father, Irving, a refugee from Nazi Germany who enlisted in the U.S. Army, had been tapped to interrogate Nazis and their enablers after the war because he spoke German.

“I mentioned to my dad that I was taking this course and we had just seen this film. And my father said, ‘Oh, Leni Riefenstahl. I questioned her after the war.’ I [said], ‘Oh, my God. Really?’”

Rosenbaum recalls his father responding, “Yeah, and I have the report on it. Might your professor want to see it?”

As a student at Harvard Law School, Rosenbaum interned in 1979 for the then-just-established OSI, where he spent the next three decades. Garland, in naming Rosenbaum, said that made him a natural fit for the Ukraine job, noting at the time Rosenbaum’s experience in coordinating among different U.S. government departments.

Describing his work to JTA, Rosenbaum repeatedly circled back to the pioneers of war crimes prosecution, among them, Aron Trainin, the Soviet Jewish scholar, and Robert Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court justice who established the framework for prosecuting Nazis for the “crime of aggression” at the Nuremberg trials, a concept unknown until then.

The relevance of their theories persists, he said, because Russia is not a signatory to the agreement that established the International Criminal Court, making it difficult to prosecute Russians in that body. Instead, Ukraine wants to set up a special tribunal to try Russians, modeling it on the proceedings at Nuremberg.

“We look to Nuremberg routinely, it is the mother of all trials for international crimes,” Rosenbaum said. “It’s in many ways the origin of international criminal law.”

Rosenbaum feels the “crime of aggression” is particularly relevant in the Ukraine case because Russia’s invasion was unprovoked. He described how the “crime of aggression” became, with President Harry Truman’s blessing, part of the canon in international law enshrined in the principles framing the Nuremberg trial, and then in the United Nations charter.

Rosenbaum is awed by Jackson and his intellectual journey.

“There’s an amazing letter that he wrote to Harry Truman, which I just reread the other day, in the course of my Ukraine work, in which he explains to the president why …  there’s no precedent for prosecuting aggression.  In the old days, this was how nations behaved. They attacked one another and, under international law, they were considered to have equal standing,” Rosenbaum said. “So [Jackson] said that had to end, and he persuaded President Truman, and now we have that crime in international law.”

Rosenbaum says Ukraine proves Jackson’s prescience. He quoted Jackson’s opening statement at the Nuremberg trials: “What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies have returned to dust.”

Rosenbaum, like Jackson before him, is appealing to the U.S. government to expand its capacity to prosecute war crimes. In his congressional testimony, Rosenbaum described one area of frustration: Unlike crimes of genocide, war crimes must have a U.S. party (as perpetrator or victim) to be prosecutable in a U.S. court.

Eli Rosenbaum, director of the Human Rights Enforcement Strategy and Policy and counselor for War Crimes Accountability at the US Department of Justice, testifies about the war in Ukraine during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on “From Nuremberg to Ukraine: Accountability for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity,” Sept. 28, 2022. (Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)

“This means that if a war criminal from the current conflict in Ukraine were, for example, to come to the United States today and were subsequently identified, our war crimes statute would not apply, thus potentially allowing that war criminal and others to walk the streets of our country without fear of prosecution,” Rosenbaum said in his congressional testimony.

Another parallel with World War II that has surprised Rosenbaum is that he is getting reports from survivors of Russian atrocities who are gathering evidence in real time. He mentioned two men he admires: Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, Slovak Jews who fled Auschwitz and were the first to describe, in a detailed report, the mechanics of the Nazi genocide to the outside world.

“I got to meet Rudolf Vrba, who was a witness for [the OSI] in our very first case that was going to trial — eventually it didn’t go to trial, the defendant gave up — but it was an Auschwitz case in Chicago, and Rudolf came out there,” Rosenbaum said. “It’s just amazing that we have his analogs in people who are gathering evidence, people are escaping from Russian captivity.”

Another pair of Nuremberg trials-era researchers that Rosenbaum names as relevant again are Budd and Stuart Schulberg, Jewish brothers who worked for the OSS, the predecessor to the CIA under legendary Hollywood director John Ford. The brothers tracked down films of atrocities that the Nazis themselves had produced, which the Schulbergs then compiled for presentation at the trials. (Budd Schulberg went on to be a celebrated novelist and screenwriter.)

Rosenbaum is a contributing expert to a just-released hour-long documentary on the brothers, titled “Filmmakers for the Prosecution.”

“The Schulberg brothers really pioneered something that’s extremely important in the history of law enforcement and accountability in courts, [which] is something we take for granted here in the 21st century, and that is the presentation of full-motion film [and] video evidence in courts of law,” he said.

Such evidence-gathering is happening today in Ukraine as well, Rosenbaum said.

“The Ukrainian authorities with which we work very closely have a website onto which the public or to which the public can upload their own videos,” he said. “And now that everybody who has a cell phone, has a video camera…so much evidence of the aftermath of atrocities and even the perpetration of atrocities has been captured via moving images.,”

He says he has been rattled at times by researching war crimes as they happen, especially during his visits to Ukraine.

“It was an unforgettably moving experience to meet our colleagues in the middle of a war in Ukraine,” he said. “One of the senior prosecutors was actually in his military fatigues, because he had taken off briefly from his unit for this meeting, and then he went right back.”


The post Eli Rosenbaum takes skills honed Nazi-hunting to investigating war crimes in Ukraine appeared first on Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

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US Involvement in Gaza Is Not a Threat — It’s a Strategic Opportunity

Then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi meets with then-US Central Command (CENTCOM) chief Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie at CENTCOM headquarters on June 22, 2021. Photo: CENTCOM Public Affairs / Tom Gagnier

In recent weeks, voices in Israel have argued that the country has “lost control” over the situation in Gaza and ceded it to the United States.

While there is a grain of truth to the claim — insofar as the US has indeed become a central actor in Gaza’s operational, humanitarian, and political arenas — this view misses the broader strategic transformation that has taken place. What appears to be growing American dominance in Gaza is in fact the latest expression of a deeper structural shift that began in 2022, a shift whose significance most Israelis are only now beginning to understand.

To grasp the change, one must start with how the US military is structured.

The United States operates six global geographic Combatant Commands, each responsible for an enormous region: Europe, Africa, South America, the Indo-Pacific, North America, and the Middle East. Each is headed by a four-star general who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. These commands are not mere administrative divisions, but strategic frameworks through which the US organizes alliances, coordinates multinational training, conducts combined operations, and integrates intelligence on a global scale.

Geographically, Israel naturally belongs under the Central Command, CENTCOM, which oversees the Middle East. Yet for decades, Israel was placed under the European Command, EUCOM. The reason was political rather than military: Arab states that opposed normalization with Israel refused to be grouped with it under the same command. Allocating Israel to EUCOM allowed Washington to maintain deep military cooperation with Israel without jeopardizing its relations with key Arab allies.

The Abraham Accords fundamentally altered this arrangement.

Once the UAE, Bahrain, and later Morocco agreed to open security and diplomatic cooperation with Israel, the longstanding Arab veto effectively collapsed. The US announced Israel’s move to CENTCOM in 2021, and by 2022, it was fully implemented. Israel thus became an official component of the regional security architecture that the United States had been building for years — an emerging multinational framework designed to counter Iran through shared intelligence, integrated air defense, maritime cooperation, and coordinated operational planning.

This new reality was quickly reflected in joint exercises that had been impossible up to that point. Israel took part in IMX-22, a massive naval drill led by the US Fifth Fleet, in which Arab and Israeli naval forces operated openly under the same command structure for the first time. A year later came Juniper Oak 2023, the largest US-Israeli military exercise ever conducted, involving strategic bombers, fighter jets, naval forces, special operations units, and advanced intelligence platforms. Operationally, it marked the institutionalization of deep, routine, high-tempo military cooperation.

Still, it was not until Hamas’ October 7 attack that the full meaning of Israel’s integration into CENTCOM became clear. The brutality of the massacre underscored to Washington that the Israeli-Palestinian arena is inseparable from the broader regional struggle against Iran. The US responded with a rapid, large-scale deployment: aircraft carriers, missile defense ships, electronic warfare aircraft, and enhanced intelligence assets. In effect, the US provided Israel with a strategic umbrella that reduced the likelihood of a northern escalation and signaled unmistakable deterrence toward Iran and Hezbollah.

The most dramatic developments, however, took place in the context of Iran’s large-scale missile and drone attacks on Israel in 2023 and 2024. These were among the most extensive long-range strikes Iran had ever launched. For the first time, the emerging regional defensive network was activated. US aircraft intercepted dozens of drones over Iraq and the Red Sea; American, British, and French ships shot down cruise missiles; Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE provided air corridors and shared tactical intelligence; Israel synchronized its Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems with US command elements. The result was an unprecedented multinational defensive effort that successfully neutralized what could have been devastating strikes. What had long been discussed as a concept became a functioning regional defense mechanism with Israel at its core.

After a temporary ceasefire was established following the Trump plan in Gaza, the US and Israel set up a joint command center in Kiryat Gat. The goal of the joint headquarters is primarily to ensure that the Trump plan is implemented on the ground. This should not be understood as an American takeover of operational decision-making, but as a mechanism to deepen coordination. The joint headquarters facilitates real-time intelligence sharing, access to American reconnaissance capabilities, humanitarian coordination with international actors, and continuous operational deconfliction in a highly complex arena. The physical presence of American officers alongside Israeli commanders has also heightened US understanding of Hamas’ methods — its use of human shields, for example, and diversion of humanitarian aid — and the impossibility of managing the Gaza arena without intense and constant intelligence work.

Israeli critics tend to focus on potential drawbacks: US political leaders may attempt to leverage rapid progress for domestic purposes; they may choose to overlook Hamas’ refusal to disarm, and American expectations may not align with Israel’s interests regarding the end state in Gaza. These risks are not imaginary. However, Israeli defense officials repeatedly emphasize that the current level of cooperation with the US is unprecedented, and no attempt has been made thus far to impose decisions contrary to Israel’s security interests.

For decades, Israel has grappled with the question of whether it should pursue a formal defense treaty with the United States. The idea resurfaced repeatedly at moments of strategic uncertainty after the Lebanon wars, during periods of Iranian nuclear acceleration, and amid discussions about long-term deterrence. A formal treaty promised clear advantages: it would codify America’s commitment to Israel’s security, bolster deterrence against regional adversaries, and guarantee large-scale military assistance in times of crisis. Yet successive Israeli governments hesitated. The central concern was a potential loss of autonomy: a treaty would restrict Israel’s freedom of action, require American approval for sensitive military operations, and bind Israel’s hands precisely in situations where speed and unilateral initiative are essential.

The current arrangement, while not a formal defense pact, effectively delivers many of the benefits associated with one without the drawbacks. It offers deep operational coordination, shared real-time intelligence, integrated regional air defense, and the ability to conduct joint action when necessary. Crucially, it does all this without formally limiting Israel’s sovereignty or imposing rigid treaty obligations. In practice, it creates a “hybrid model” in which Israel enjoys the strategic advantages of quasi-alliance integration while retaining independent decision-making.

The broader strategic reality has changed. For years, Israel feared that the United States was withdrawing from the Middle East. Today the opposite is true: the US is re-engaging, strengthening allies, escalating pressure on Iran, and signaling a renewed commitment to the regional balance of power. This shift naturally raises concerns in Israel about over-dependence, yet in practice, it represents a dramatic enhancement of Israel’s strategic position. For the first time in decades, Israel finds itself embedded within a regional defense architecture that magnifies its strengths and compensates for its vulnerabilities.

Israel has not “lost control.” It would be more accurate to say that Israel has entered a fundamentally new framework, one in which it operates shoulder to shoulder with the United States and, increasingly, with key Arab partners. This emerging de facto regional alliance provides Israel with strategic depth, intelligence and logistical support, operational coordination, and a dramatically improved international posture. In the long term, the advantages of this integration far outweigh its limitations.

Prof. Eitan Shamir serves as the head of the BESA Center and as a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. His latest book is The Art of Military Innovation: Lessons from the IDF, Harvard University Press, 2023 (with Edward Luttwak). This article appeared at the BESA Center, and in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune in December 2025.

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European-Funded NGO on Palestinian TV: The World Has ‘Gotten Over’ Antisemitism

A woman keeps a candle next to flowers laid as a tribute at Bondi Beach to honor the victims of a mass shooting that targeted a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on Sunday, in Sydney, Australia, Dec. 16, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Flavio Brancaleone

The world has “gotten over” Israel’s “claims of antisemitism,” said the head of an EU-funded NGO on official Palestinian Authority (PA) television just a month before the Bondi Beach Hanukkah massacre of Jews.

According to Omar Rahal, director of the SHAMS Human Rights and Democracy Media Center, complaints about antisemitism were all false “claims” by “Netanyahu and his extremist government,” whereas Palestinians are the ones who are the victims of Israel’s attacks:

Click to play

The Palestinian discourse has gained dominance, and the claims of antisemitism and violent discourse — the world has now gotten over them and there have been direct responses from presidents and state leaders to [Israeli Prime Minister] Netanyahu and the pillars of his extremist government. In other words, go find another topic [to talk about]. They [Israel] are the ones who attacked us.” [emphasis added]

[Official PA TV, Palestine This Morning, Nov. 16, 2025]

Rahal is absolutely correct on one point, however.

Palestinian hate speech, which calls for “Palestine to be free from the river to the sea” and for the globalization of the “Intifada,” has indeed gained dominance.

When that is combined with a world that has “gotten over” claims of antisemitism, attacks on Jews in Israel and around the world inevitably become commonplace. When antisemitism is denied as real, when violence against Jews is erased as a distinct phenomenon, and when Jews are collectively portrayed as aggressors who deserve blame everywhere, then the cost is paid in Jewish lives.

It is also unsurprising that such an outrageous statement would be featured on official PA TV. Considering how PA TV routinely denies the Holocaust, one would be hard-pressed to expect better.

The question here, though, should be: where is the condemnation of the EU and UN for Rahal’s public statements?

Rahal’s SHAMS organization is supported by the EU and proudly advertises its partnership with the UN Economic and Social Council. It incredibly also lists the International Organization for Tolerance as one of its many partners.

Palestinian Media Watch calls on the EU, the UN, and all international donors to examine not the slogans of their funded NGOs, but their actual messages.

Ephraim D. Tepler is a contributor to Palestinian Media Watch (PMW). Itamar Marcus is the Founder and Director of PMW, where a version of this article first appeared.

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Israel Says It Will Respond to Hamas ‘Violation’ of Gaza Truce, Terror Group Denies Responsibility

A drone view shows Palestinians walking past the rubble, following Israeli forces’ withdrawal from the area, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, in Gaza City, Oct. 11, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Dawoud Abu Alkas

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Wednesday that Israel would retaliate after a military officer was wounded by a blast in Gaza, while the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas denied responsibility, suggesting the explosive device had been left over from the conflict.

In a speech at a graduation ceremony for Air Force pilots, Netanyahu mentioned the incident in Rafah, part of Gaza where Israeli forces still operate, and said Hamas had made clear it had no plan to disarm as foreseen under the October truce deal.

Israel will respond accordingly,” he said.

The Israeli military earlier said that an explosive device had detonated against a military vehicle in the Rafah area and that one officer had been lightly injured.

Hamas said the incident had taken place in an area where the Israeli military was in full control and that it had warned that explosives remained in the area and elsewhere since the war, reiterating its commitment to the October 10 ceasefire.

Hamas official Mahmoud Merdawi said in an earlier post on X that mediators had been informed about the issue.

ISRAELI DELEGATION MEETING OFFICIALS IN CAIRO

A 20-point plan issued by US President Donald Trump in September calls for an initial truce followed by steps toward a wider peace. So far, only the first phase has taken effect, including a ceasefire, release of hostages and prisoners, and a partial Israeli withdrawal.

An Israeli delegation met officials from mediating countries in Cairo on Wednesday to discuss efforts to return the remains of the last Israeli hostage, police officer Ran Gvili, from Gaza, Netanyahu’s office said later on Wednesday.

The delegation included officials from the Israeli military, the Shin Bet domestic intelligence service, and the Mossad intelligence service.

Trump’s plan ultimately calls for Hamas to disarm and have no governing role in Gaza, and for Israel to pull out. Hamas has said it will hand over arms only once a Palestinian state is established, which Israel says it will never allow.

Violence has subsided but not stopped since the Gaza truce took effect, with the sides regularly accusing each other of violations. The Hamas-controlled Gazan Health Ministry, which according to analysts has falsified casualty figures, says Israel has killed more than 400 people in the territory while Israel says three soldiers have been killed in terrorist attacks.

Hamas “openly declares it has no intention of disarming, in complete contradiction to President Trump’s 20-point plan,” Netanyahu said.

NETANYAHU ALSO WARNS LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH

Netanyahu said Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Israel severely weakened in strikes last year that also ended in a US-brokered truce, also had no intention to disarm “and we are addressing that as well.”

Israel still needs to settle accounts with Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen as well as Iran itself, he added.

“As these old threats change form, new threats arise morning and evening. We do not seek confrontations, but our eyes are open to every possible danger,” Netanyahu said.

Netanyahu is set to meet with Trump next week, mainly to discuss the next phase of the US president’s Gaza plan.

Hamas said in a statement later on Wednesday that a delegation led by its chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya had discussed Gaza with Turkey’s foreign minister in Ankara.

Al-Hayya warned against what he described as the continuation of Israeli violations of the ceasefire, saying they were aimed at hindering the move to the next phase of the ceasefire deal.

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