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Israel’s future: What will actually change if Netanyahu loses?
Israel’s election on Tuesday could mark a dramatic turning point for a country battered by war, political turmoil and growing international isolation. If the opposition manages to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the consequences could extend far beyond a change of leadership. A new government could reverse the assault on democratic institutions, investigate the catastrophic failures of Oct. 7, end the extraordinary military exemptions enjoyed by the ultra-Orthodox, curb Jewish extremism in the West Bank and begin repairing Israel’s shattered relations with much of the world. For many Israelis, the stakes are nothing less than the country’s long-term survival.
The polls suggest that Netanyahu’s coalition will lose its parliamentary majority, but that may be the easy part. The opposition, led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, faces a potentially crippling contradiction: it seems like that it will be capable of commanding a majority in the 120-member Knesset only with the support of Arab parties, yet several of its leaders have promised not to rely on them. Unless they find a way around that commitment, Israel could emerge from the election with a clear majority opposed to Netanyahu but no alternative government capable of taking power.
For much of Israel’s secular, educated and economically productive population, the desperation to remove Netanyahu is palpable. Tens of thousands living abroad have been streaming home to vote, amid estimates that more than a quarter-million Israelis left during his current term. After Oct. 7, years of warfare, immense loss of life, democratic erosion and international isolation, another Netanyahu victory would convince many that Israel has crossed a point of no return. The spectacle of far-right figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich representing the country has compounded their humiliation.
The fear is of a monumental brain drain, the damage could be irreversible.
Talk of Israel’s survival is therefore not necessarily hysterical. A country weakened by emigration, threatened with European sanctions and declining American support could lose the technological and military superiority on which its security depends, inviting aggression. An Israel increasingly dominated by ultra-Orthodox communities that largely reject military service and modern secular education would face further difficulties. It is an astonishing predicament for a technological powerhouse whose GDP per capita exceeds that of France, Britain and Germany.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, has responded to unfavorable polls with apocalyptic warnings. On Sunday, he shared an AI-generated image of a nuclear explosion engulfing Tel Aviv, suggesting his defeat could expose Israel to a second Holocaust at Iran’s hands. Days earlier, he raised the prospect of international banking sanctions and proposed using cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology to circumvent them. The Bank of Israel rejected the idea as unworkable, while economists warned of potentially disastrous consequences.
In another reflection of Netanyahu’s apparent desperation, CNN reported that he tried to persuade President Trump to launch a joint attack on Iran before the election. Netanyahu’s government denies the report. But what is extraordinary is how readily the allegation is believed in Israel. The notion that a prime minister might deliberately trigger a war for political advantage should be staggering – and disqualifying. That so many Israelis consider it plausible speaks volumes about the almost unbearable tension gripping the country ahead of Tuesday’s vote.
What, then, would actually change if the opposition managed to take power and govern?
Democracy: Reversing the march toward autocracy
The central domestic issue is Netanyahu’s attempt to transform Israel from a liberal democracy, in which citizens enjoy guaranteed rights and the government faces institutional checks, into something resembling an elected autocracy. His coalition has pursued an extensive program to weaken the judiciary, undermine independent legal authorities and concentrate power in the government. Supporters describe this as a necessary correction to excessive judicial power; critics see a transparent power grab – and a plot to end Netanyahu’s corruption trials.
Some measures have been enacted, including legislation weakening the attorney general’s position. Others have been blocked by the Supreme Court, notably the attempt to eliminate the judicial doctrine of reasonableness, which allows courts to review certain government decisions. Still others have been delayed or disrupted by the Gaza war. The broader ambition has included giving politicians decisive control over judicial appointments and enabling the Knesset to override Supreme Court rulings by a simple majority, potentially leaving few meaningful constraints on government power.
An opposition victory would mean dismantling this project. That would not preclude judicial reform: Israel’s notoriously slow courts, lengthy trials and cumbersome judicial appointments require attention. But the distinction would be between improving the judiciary and subordinating it to politicians.
Oct. 7: The investigation that never happened
The Hamas-led invasion on Oct. 7, 2023, was the greatest security catastrophe in Israel’s history. Thousands of attackers breached the Gaza border, massacring some 1,200 people and taking hundreds hostage. Communities were overrun while the military response was disastrously delayed. Yet Netanyahu’s government has resisted establishing an independent state commission of inquiry into the failures that made the disaster possible. It has even been quietly promoting conspiracy theories that a “leftist” security establishment helped Hamas. And, of course, it has dared to actually run again.
All this has become politically radioactive. Critics accuse Netanyahu of trying to evade responsibility and prolong wars as a distraction, while hoping public anger will eventually dissipate. The issue is not simply accountability but national survival: understanding how the country’s defenses collapsed is essential to preventing another catastrophe. The opposition is committed to establishing such an inquiry promptly, with a mandate that could implicate military and intelligence leaders as well as the political leadership, including Netanyahu himself.
Netanyahu’s trial: Closing the loophole
Israel’s legal system contains a remarkable anomaly. Politicians facing serious criminal proceedings can be barred from ministerial and certain other public offices, yet an indicted politician can serve as prime minister. The Supreme Court allowed Netanyahu to form a government while standing trial, subject to conflict-of-interest restrictions – which he agreed to in an affidavit – to prevent his legal predicament from influencing his exercise of power.
His subsequent campaign to reshape the judiciary has made a mockery of that commitment. Opposition politicians intend to close the loophole through legislation restricting the ability of politicians under criminal indictment to serve as prime minister, preventing another situation in which a leader facing prosecution exercises authority over the institutions administering justice.
The ultra-Orthodox: Ending a system of exemptions
Perhaps the most consequential long-term domestic challenge involves Israel’s rapidly growing ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, population. The Haredim constitute roughly one-sixth of Israel’s population, with families averaging more than six children. Many boys receive little or no secular education in mathematics, English or science. Male workforce participation is relatively low, and many families depend heavily on public assistance. Given the community’s rapid demographic growth, the implications for Israel’s economy and society are enormous.
But the most politically explosive issue is military service. For decades, ultra-Orthodox men studying in religious seminaries have enjoyed sweeping draft exemptions or deferments, even as other Jewish Israelis face compulsory military service. The arrangement creates a perverse incentive: remaining in religious study is the path to avoid conscription, while leaving the seminary – and entering the labor market – exposes a young man to the draft. The result is a system that discourages employment and places an increasingly unequal military burden on the rest of society. Adding insult to injury, the Israeli taxpayer is forced to pay subsidies to the yeshiva students – rather than the students paying tuition as those in university do.
After Oct. 7 and the prolonged wars that followed, public tolerance for this arrangement has diminished sharply. Polls have repeatedly shown overwhelming support for ending the exemptions. Netanyahu seeks to formalize the arrangement for his Haredi coalition partners, while the principal opposition parties are committed to ending it. Broader changes to education, employment incentives and public subsidies are also needed, but ending the draft exemption system would be the immediate test.
The Palestinians: A change in methods, not an immediate peace process
Historically, Israel’s center-left has been more receptive to partitioning the land and establishing a demilitarized Palestinian state in much of the West Bank and Gaza than the right. Israeli governments made far-reaching proposals in 2000–2001 and again in 2008, without achieving a final agreement. Oct. 7, however, has profoundly changed the political atmosphere. Even many Israelis who once supported territorial compromise are unwilling to contemplate further withdrawals while Hamas remains an armed force capable of threatening Israel.
An opposition government would therefore be unlikely to launch an ambitious peace initiative in the near term. But significant changes could still follow.
An alternative government could be expected to crack down on violent Jewish extremists in the West Bank, curb the settlement expansion encouraged by Netanyahu’s far-right partners, and restore some credibility to the prospect of an eventual political settlement. It would also continue efforts to prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself as an armed force in Gaza or the West Bank.
The difference would be less about immediate territorial concessions than about abandoning the ideological extremism and permissiveness toward settler violence that have characterized the present government.
Iran and Hezbollah: Tough security policies, different diplomacy
A change of government would not necessarily mean a softer Israeli approach to Iran or Hezbollah. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons commands broad support across Israel’s political spectrum, as does the determination to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military threat along Israel’s northern border. Netanyahu’s military campaign against Hezbollah enjoyed substantial domestic support, including among his opponents (and, in fact, is aligned with the ultimate goals of the government of Lebanon). An opposition government would be expected to maintain pressure on the organization and insist on effective security arrangements in Lebanon.
The change would be in diplomatic style and strategic coordination. Rather than treating international criticism as a badge of honor, an opposition government would be more inclined to coordinate with partners, combining military resolve with greater diplomatic engagement.
The world: Repairing Israel’s shattered relationships
Netanyahu’s government has left Israel increasingly isolated internationally, particularly because of the Gaza war, settlement policies and the conduct of its far-right ministers. Relations with European governments have deteriorated amid growing pressure for sanctions. Netanyahu’s close identification with the American Republican right has damaged Israel’s traditional bipartisan standing in Washington. Many liberal American Jews have become deeply alienated by the government’s religious nationalism and the rhetoric of ministers such as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.
An opposition government would attempt a major diplomatic reset. That would not eliminate disagreements over the Palestinians or Israel’s military operations, but it would offer a government more interested in rebuilding alliances than antagonizing its critics, and more capable of making Israel’s case to democratic partners whose support remains strategically indispensable.
For Israel’s business and technology sectors, whose prosperity depends on access to international markets, investment and financial institutions, the restoration of normal relations with the world is an absolute economic necessity.
Coalition negotiations: Winning may be the easy part
None of these changes is guaranteed, even if Netanyahu loses his parliamentary majority. An Oct. 23 Maariv poll projected 48 seats for Netanyahu’s coalition, 58 for non-Arab parties outside it, and 14 for the Arab parties – and most other credible polls painted a similar picture. That would give Netanyahu’s opponents a commanding 72-seat majority in the 120-member Knesset, where a majority of 61 is needed to confirm a government — but only if the Arab parties are counted.
If the polls are right – and historically this has roughly been the case – the simplest route to an alternative government would be a coalition of Jewish opposition parties governing with outside parliamentary support from Arab parties.
Such an arrangement would not necessarily require Arab parties to hold ministries or participate in national security decisions. But Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman have rejected dependence on Arab parties, while other opposition figures have shown greater flexibility.
Other scenarios include persuading ultra-Orthodox parties to abandon Netanyahu, attracting defectors from Likud, or constructing a broader coalition of right-wing and centrist parties. Liberman and other leaders could use the uncertainty to demand powerful ministries, major policy concessions or even a rotation agreement for the premiership. Because an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is unlikely to be on the immediate agenda, cooperation between the center and parts of the nationalist right may prove easier than in previous eras. But judicial reform, the Haredi draft and Netanyahu’s legal future could become major stumbling blocks.
There is, though, a precedent. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor-Meretz bloc won only 56 seats, but the support of five Arab legislators gave the anti-Likud camp a majority. Rabin ultimately formed a coalition with the ultra-Orthodox Shas party rather than bringing Arab parties into government. Something similar could happen again. Alternatively, coalition deadlock could lead to another election — or leave Netanyahu in charge of a temporary “caretaker government” despite an electoral majority opposed to him.
That is the drama facing Israel. For millions of Israelis who believe their country’s future is at stake, there might be an extraordinary possibility of national recovery after years of trauma and division. But to accomplish any of it, the opposition’s leaders may first have to abandon their refusal to rely on the votes of Israel’s Arab citizens — roughly one-fifth of the population.
The promise was understandable. The opposition needs to attract former Netanyahu voters; they overwhelmingly do not trust the Arabs, and some are simply racists. But rarely have democratic politics produced a promise that more clearly needs to be broken.
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Sam Bankman-Fried was caught stealing billions — why did Netflix make it a crime of the heart?
Sam Bankman-Fried’s Jewfro preceded him.
Spun up like cotton candy, it made a silhouette that, along with his uniform of a t-shirt and cargo shorts, somehow won the trust of millions of people and the stewardship of billions of their dollars. Whether or not this presentation was affected — a messy, Einsteinian mien cultivated to prove his genius and Casual Monday-Friday dress to out-Zuck Zuckerberg — is much contested. In time this shambolic appearance would seem to give Bankman-Fried plausible deniability for an $8 billion financial scheme. (The jury wasn’t convinced; in 2023, he was quickly found guilty and is now serving 25 years in jail, where Diddy was briefly his cellmate.)
Did the founder of FTX, a major crypto trading platform, mean to defraud investors and customers? Was he simply sloppy? Or did he, for all his lofty promises to donate 99% of his company money to charity, not really care?
The new Netflix series The Altruists believes he began with the best of intentions, and gives him a co-conspirator, presenting a folie à deux between Bankman-Fried and his on-again-off-again girlfriend Caroline Ellison, a fellow math prodigy who he picked to run the first company he founded, Alameda Research.
Showrunners Graham Moore (an Oscar winning screenwriter for The Imitation Game) and Jacqueline Hoyt (The Leftovers), working off reporting from New York magazine, have made Bankman-Fried and Ellison’s love story the crux of their true crime. In these misfits were two souls who could only understand each other. The approach seems to go beyond the credulous, and, in its play for pathos, occasionally tips into the obscene.
As a dramatic device — toggling between Sam and Caroline’s courtship, early days in arbitraging “shitcoin,” the runaway growth of FTX and a mounting crisis when their malfeasance goes public — the romance only makes sense. It was, in the end, an inappropriate, overly-intimate relationship between FTX and Ellison’s crypto trading firm Alameda that led to the implosion of an enterprise valued at its peak at $32 billion.
While they started Alameda with an eye toward affecting change in line with Effective Altruism, a philosophy that believes in making obscene amounts of money and giving as much as possible away, by 2022, FTX, designed to “democratize” crypto, was covering Alameda’s losses with money from its own customers.
This, it goes without saying, is not an ethical business practice, and is all the more ironic given Bankman-Fried’s parents, a beloved tax law professor father (played by Paul Reiser) and an ethicist mother (Robin Weigart), both faculty at Stanford.
This background, and Bankman-Fried’s early penchant for strategic betrayal, developed in a board game called Diplomacy, are largely glossed over to present a more conventionally awkward portrait of our lovers.
Bankman-Fried and Ellison, played by the Irish actor Anthony Boyle (The Plot Against America and Say Nothing, sporting his version of the wunderkind’s unruly mop of curls) and Julia Garner (Ozark, Inventing Anna, here with crooked teeth and frizzed up hair), can be reduced to a litany of eccentricities.
Bankman-Fried would munch on frozen vegan meals, go shoeless and play video games during interviews and pitch meetings. Ellison maintained a confessional blog and likened her ideal of polyamory to a Chinese imperial harem. (Sam developed mathematical formulas on how to proceed with his romantic relationships, a quality that is transferred to Caroline in the series.)
But in a defiant commitment to, in the words of Moore, “show you things that by definition couldn’t have been filmed before,” the show’s creators have replaced these idiosyncrasies with cliches.
Sam rehearses small talk in a mirror; Ellison was a pity-invite to a friend’s bachelorette party, where she has a fateful encounter with Bloomberg reporter Hannah Miller (the fact Ellison was actually a bridesmaid, and had previously hosted the bride’s engagement party, is evidently inconvenient for the nerd tropes they’re aiming to deploy.).
In the early offing, the show suffers from what I’ll call a Big Bang Theorification of the startup-blowup genre that proliferates on streaming services. The word “noob” is used with abandon. Bankman-Fried is defined largely by his sexual inexperience — Caroline is his first, and his efforts to keep her in his life spell his doom.
“Both of us are clearly not normal people,” he tells her at one point, “so maybe we don’t have to do normal things that normal people do.”
Later he muses, “I’m not normal, so I can be special,” but laments that if he falls short, others may “see me for who I really am.” You see we have a flair for subtext.
The series finally hits its stride in episode six, which Moore wrote and directed. Anchored by a dynamic performance by Alex Lawther, playing erstwhile Alameda CEO Sam Trabucco, it gives us the first credible insight into what made Bankman-Fried crypto’s major player: a blind spot for consequences, dramatized in his sneaking liquid nitrogen into his frat house to make instant ice cream.

Previous accounts of Bankman-Fried’s rise and fall point to a bigger blind spot that challenges the core of the miniseries.
Bankman-Fried appears to have been an emotionally distant, at times indifferent partner to Ellison, who, despite her interest in polyamory, ultimately wanted a more conventional arrangement. In the show, the roles are often reversed, making Bankman-Fried more sympathetic and their eventual he-said-she-said in the court of the Southern District of New York all the more poignant. It would be less sad and romantic if it, even for a moment, considered the professional power imbalance between them or the list of pros and cons SBF drew up about the prospect of them dating. Moore and Hoyt claim their own sources on the duo’s dynamic, so perhaps there’s more to what’s been reported elsewhere.
Chroniclers of FTX’s demise are divided on whether Bankman-Fried was an arrogant upstart who was out-of-his-depth, or a maximalist utilitarian, who used EA philosophy as a permission structure to flout the rules and advance his own ambition.
The Altruists suggest something else entirely: He was a good person, who meant to do the most good possible, but out of a commitment to his lover, took his eye off the ball. This may ring familiar to those who may have come off a screening of the Elizabeth Holmes doc You Can See Everything, and for me the apologia is just as hollow.
That the showrunners still buy the hype about earn to give, when Bankman-Fried entered into a $135 million deal for stadium-naming rights (not shown — it was filmed before, after all), put up $210 million for an esports partnership and blew $30 million for a Super Bowl spot with Larry David months before declaring bankruptcy, is gobsmacking.
The doomed romance intermittently makes for good drama — despite ostentatious camerawork, including an extended sequence shot through vertical bars at a Margaritaville, because foreshadowing — but it feels fundamentally dishonest given so much of what emerged about the couple after the company went bust.
That Bankman-Fried, who has a documentary series coming out later this month, composed mostly of Zoom interviews from prison, is continuing to be reevaluated shows there’s room for ambiguity. Michael Lewis gives him some grace, and gets flack for it. But while buying the EA impetus, The Altruists falls victim to the very same solipsism of its main characters.
In the end, the tragedy it presents isn’t about the people who lost everything to Sam and Caroline’s hubris, it’s that the vagaries of business — and the law — got between their love.
That this is the focus makes it a new twist on a familiar story; whether The Altruists is effective, or ethical, is another matter.
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Italy passes antisemitism law amid flaring debate over criticizing Israel
(JTA) — Italy has passed a bill aimed at combating antisemitism, prompting backlash from opponents who say that it could restrict criticism of Israel.
The legislation, which enshrined a contentious definition of antisemitism, was approved on Tuesday in the Italian parliament’s lower house. It received 147 votes, with 93 lawmakers against it and five abstaining.
The measure incorporates a working definition of antisemitism from the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) into national law. This definition is supported by many mainstream Jewish organizations and has been adopted or endorsed by 48 countries, though many have not made it legally binding.
Opponents say the definition conflates antisemitism with some forms of Israel criticism. The IHRA framework lists contemporary examples of antisemitism that include denying Jewish people the right to self-determination, calling Israel a “racist endeavor” and comparing “contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”
While Italy’s new law codified this definition as a reference for combating antisemitism, it did not define new criminal offenses or penalties.
The legislation also established the role of a national coordinator for fighting antisemitism. This official will oversee a three-year strategy that spans monitoring antisemitic incidents, combating online hate and boosting education while strengthening the security of Jewish communities and promoting Jewish culture.
Italy’s Antisemitism Observatory, part of the Jewish Contemporary Documentation Center in Milan, recorded 963 antisemitic incidents in 2025 — about four times higher than in 2022.
Livia Ottolenghi, the president of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, said in a statement that she was “very satisfied” with the law, adding that it was “unfortunate that there wasn’t broader participation.”
Meanwhile, the measure was condemned by Erika Guevara Rosas, Amnesty International’s senior director for research, advocacy, policy and campaigns. She said Tuesday marked “a bleak day for freedom of expression” as the law “heightens the risk of far-reaching forms of censorship and self-censorship.”
Italy’s center-left opposition, a group that ranges from moderate to left-wing parties, was divided over the legislation. Their loose alliance wants to unseat Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing government in the country’s 2027 elections.
Laura Boldrini, a member of the center-left Democratic Party, backed an amendment to the law that would have replaced the IHRA definition with the Jerusalem Declaration, an alternate framework that she said did not conflate antisemitism with opposition to Israel’s actions. The Jerusalem Declaration devotes considerable space to defining what is not antisemitic in Israel discourse.
“The majority does not really want to fight antisemitism,” Boldrini said on X. “It wants to censor criticism of the Israeli government, which is committing genocide and war crimes and crimes against humanity.”
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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Australia announces new sanctions on West Bank settlers and organizations
(JTA) — Australia imposed new sanctions on those it maintains are involved with illegal settlement expansion and human rights abuses against Palestinians in the West Bank, the country’s foreign ministry said on Wednesday, a day after Britain enacted restrictions on Israeli settlement construction firms and an activist group.
Australians will be prohibited from trading with, funding or providing other support to three individuals and four organizations linked to West Bank settlement expansion, according to Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s office.
The measures build on existing sanctions on senior Israeli ministers, extremist settlers and settlements, and follow a September pledge to pursue further sanctions.
“We are taking these actions because the rapid expansion of settlements and settler violence are extinguishing the possibility of a two-state solution,” the statement continued, noting that Israeli West Bank settlements “are illegal under international law.”
In addition to banning trade with individuals and organizations linked to settlement expansion efforts, Wong’s office said that the new sanctions for the first time “are targeting a construction company involved in the building of settlements.”
“Australian businesses should not bid for construction tenders for illegal settlement developments,” the statement added.
Britain on Tuesday imposed sanctions on eight Israeli companies involved in West Bank settlement construction and the activist group Tzav 9, which has repeatedly blocked Gaza-bound humanitarian aid convoys.
The individuals cited in Australia’s updated Sanctions Consolidated List on Wednesday included Daniella Weiss, Eliav Libi and Itamar Yehuda Levi, while the organizations named were Amana, the Nachala Movement, Guardians of Judea and Samaria and the Eyal Judaean Mountains Company. The individuals also incurred travel bans to Australia.
The document asserted that Weiss, a veteran settler leader, is the person who “plans, directs and oversees” the Nachala Movement’s operations, adding that she “has publicly supported and advocated for its actions” to promote settlements and illegal West Bank outposts.
Responding to the news, the Nachala Movement described the sanctions on both the organization and its leader as “a badge of honor,” in a statement on X.
“No antisemitic decision can sever the eternal bond between the Jewish people and their heritage,” the statement said. “Powers far stronger than Australia have attempted to impose edicts” but these efforts have failed, the statement said.
“The People of Israel continue to build on their land,” the post added.
As for Libi, the sanctions list simply noted his role as a “settler and director of Libi Construction and Infrastructure Ltd.” The document named Levi as the owner of Eyal Judaean Mountains, a West Bank construction and demolition firm. He was also listed as the “older brother of Yinon Levi,” whom Australia sanctioned in July 2024.
The list accused the Amana organization of involvement “in illegal settlement and outpost development in the West Bank” and accused the Guardians of Judea and Samaria of recruiting volunteers to work at West Bank outposts.
In response to the sanctions, the Guardians, also known as Hashomer Yosh, released a short reel depicting settler farming and shepherding activities, saying in a caption that “this is how antisemitism looks in the year 2026.”
Penalties for Australians who violate the new rules include up to 10 years in prison and fines of up to 910,000 Australian dollars (US$612,000) or three times the value of a specific deal, Wong’s office warned. Businesses can incur fines up to US$2.4 million or three times the transaction value.
“Australia remains steadfast in its commitment to the two-state solution as the only pathway to enduring peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians,” her office added.
This article originally appeared on JTA.org.
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