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Why a liberal Zionist rabbi isn’t taking to the streets over Israel’s judicial reform plan
(JTA) — Israel’s 75th anniversary was supposed to be a blowout birthday party for its supporters, but that was before the country was convulsed by street protests over the right-wing government’s proposal to overhaul its judiciary. Critics call it an unprecedented threat to Israel’s democracy, and supporters of Israel found themselves conflicted. In synagogues across North America, rabbis found themselves giving “yes, but” sermons: Yes, Israel’s existence is a miracle, but its democracy is fragile and in danger.
One of those sermons was given a week ago Saturday by Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch of Manhattan’s Stephen Wise Free Synagogue, expressing his “dismay” over the government’s actions. Hirsch is the former head of ARZA, the Reform movement’s Zionist organization, and the founder of a new organization, Amplify Israel, meant to promote Zionism among Reform Jews. He is often quoted as an example of a mainstream non-Orthodox rabbi who not only criticizes anti-Zionism on the far left but who insists that his liberal colleagues are not doing enough to defend the Jewish state from its critics.
Many on the Jewish left, meanwhile, say Jewish establishment figures, even liberals like Hirsch, have been too reluctant to call out Israel on, for example, its treatment of the Palestinians — thereby enabling the country’s extremists.
In March, however, he warned that the “Israeli government is tearing Israeli society apart and bringing world Jewry along for the dangerous ride.” That is uncharacteristically strong language from a rabbi whose forthcoming book, “The Lilac Tree: A Rabbi’s Reflections on Love, Courage, and History,” includes a number of essays on the limits of criticizing Israel. When does such criticism give “comfort to left-wing hatred of Israel,” as he writes in his book, and when does failure to criticize Israel appear to condone extremism?
Although the book includes essays on God, Torah, history and antisemitism, in a recent interview we focused on the Israel-Diaspora divide, the role of Israel in the lives of Diaspora Jews and why the synagogue remains the “central Jewish institution.”
The interview was edited for length and clarity.
Jewish Telegraphic Agency: You gave a sermon earlier this month about the 75th anniversary of Israel’s founding, which is usually a time of celebration in American synagogues, but you also said you were “dismayed” by the “political extremism” and “religious fundamentalism” of the current government. Was that difficult as a pulpit rabbi?
Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch: The approach is more difficult now with the election of the new government than it has been in all the years of the past. Because we can’t sanitize supremacism, elitism, extremism, fundamentalism, and we’re not going to. Israel is in what’s probably the most serious domestic crisis in the 75-year history of the state. And what happens in Israel affects American Jewry directly. It’s Israeli citizens who elect their representatives, but that’s not the end of the discussion neither for Israelis or for American Jews. At the insistence of both parties, both parties say the relationship is fundamental and critical and it not only entitles but requires Israelis and world Jews to be involved in each other’s affairs.
For American Jewry, in its relationship with Israel, our broadest objective is to sustain that relationship, deepen that relationship, and encourage people to be involved in the affairs in Israel and to go to Israel, spend time in Israel and so forth, and that’s a difficult thing to do and at the same time be critical.
American Jews have been demonstrating here in solidarity with the Israelis who have been protesting the recent judicial overhaul proposals in Israel. Is that a place for liberal American Jews to make their voices heard on what happens in Israel?
I would like to believe that if I were living in Israel, I would be at every single one of those demonstrations on Saturday night, but I don’t participate in demonstrations here because the context of our world and how we operate is different from in Israel when an Israeli citizen goes out and marches on Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv. It’s presumed that they’re Zionists and they’re speaking to their own government. I’m not critical of other people who reach a different perspective in the United States, but for me, our context is different. Even if we say the identical words in Tel Aviv or on West 68th Street, they’re perceived in a different way and they operate in a different context.
What then is the appropriate way for American Jews to express themselves if they are critical of an action by the Israeli government?
My strongest guidance is don’t disengage, don’t turn your back, double down, be more supportive of those who support your worldview and are fighting for it in Israel. Polls seem to suggest that the large majority of Israelis are opposed to these reforms being proposed. Double down on those who are supportive of our worldview.
You lament in your book that the connections to Israel are weakening among world Jewry, especially among Jewish liberals.
The liberal part of the Jewish world is where I am and where the people I serve are by and large, and where at least 80% of American Jewry resides. It’s a difficult process because we’re operating here in a context of weakening relationship: a rapidly increasing emphasis on universal values, what we sometimes call tikkun olam [social justice], and not as a reflection of Jewish particularism, but often at the expense of Jewish particularism.
There is a counter-argument, however, which you describe in your book: “some left-wing Jewish activists contend that alienation from Israel, especially among the younger generations, is a result of the failures of the American Jewish establishment” — that is, by not doing more to express their concerns about the dangers of Jewish settlement in the West Bank, for example, the establishment alienated young liberal Jews. You’re skeptical of that argument. Tell me why.
Fundamentally I believe that identification with Israel is a reflection of identity. If you have a strong Jewish identity, the tendency is to have a strong connection with the state of Israel and to believe that the Jewish state is an important component of your Jewish identity. I think that surveys bear that out. No doubt the Palestinian question will have an impact on the relationship between American Jews in Israel as long as it’s not resolved, it will be an outstanding irritant because it raises moral dilemmas that should disturb every thinking and caring Jew. And I’ve been active in trying to oppose ultra-Orthodox coercion in Israel. But fundamentally, while these certainly are components putting pressure on the relationship between Israel and Diaspora Jewry, in particular among the elites of the American Jewish leadership, for the majority of American Jews, the relationship with Israel is a reflection of their relationship with Judaism. And if that relationship is weak and weakening, as day follows night, the relationship with Israel will weaken as well.
But what about the criticism that has come from, let’s say, deep within the tent? I am thinking of the American rabbinical students who in 2021 issued a public letter accusing Israel of apartheid and calling on American Jewish communities to hold Israel accountable for the “violent suppression of human rights.” They were certainly engaged Jews, and they might say that they were warning the establishment about the kinds of right-wing tendencies in Israel that you and others in the establishment are criticizing now.
Almost every time I speak about Israel and those who are critical of Israel, I hold that the concept of criticism is central to Jewish tradition. Judaism unfolds through an ongoing process of disputation, disagreement, argumentation, and debate. I’m a pluralist, both politically as well as intellectually.
In response to your question, I would say two things. First of all, I distinguish between those who are Zionist, pro-Israel, active Jews with a strong Jewish identity who criticize this or that policy of the Israeli government, and between those who are anti-Zionists, because anti-Zionism asserts that the Jewish people has no right to a Jewish state, at least in that part of the world. And that inevitably leads to anti-Jewish feelings and very often to antisemitism.
When it came to the students, I didn’t respond at all because I was a student once too, and there are views that I hold today that I didn’t hold when I was a student. Their original article was published in the Forward, if I’m not mistaken, and it generated some debate in all the liberal seminaries. I didn’t respond at all until it became a huge, multi-thousand word piece in The New York Times. Once it left the internal Jewish scene, it seemed to me that I had an obligation to respond. Not that I believe that they’re anti-Zionist — I do not. I didn’t put them in the BDS camp [of those who support the boycott of Israel]. I just simply criticized them.
Hundreds of Jews protest the proposed Israeli court reform outside the Israeli consulate in New York City on Feb. 21, 2023. (Gili Getz)
You signed a letter with other rabbis noting that the students’ petition came during Israel’s war with Hamas that May, writing that “those who aspire to be future leaders of the Jewish people must possess and model empathy for their brothers and sisters in Israel, especially when they are attacked by a terrorist organization whose stated goal is to kill Jews and destroy the Jewish State.”
My main point was that the essence of the Jewish condition is that all Jews feel responsible one for the another — Kol yisrael arevim zeh bazeh. And that relationship starts with emotions. It starts with a feeling of belongingness to the Jewish people, and a feeling of concern for our people who are attacked in the Jewish state. My criticism was based, in the middle of a war, on expressing compassion, support for our people who are under indiscriminate and terrorist assault. I uphold that and even especially in retrospect two years later, why anyone would consider that to be offensive in any way is still beyond me.
You were executive director of ARZA, the Reform Zionist organization, and you write in your book that Israel “is the primary source of our people’s collective energy — the engine for the recreation and restoration of the national home and the national spirit of the Jewish people.” A number of your essays put Israel at the center of the present-day Jewish story. You are a rabbi in New York City. So what’s the role or function of the Diaspora?
Our existence in the Diaspora needs no justification. For practically all of the last 2,000 years, Jewish life has existed in the Diaspora. It’s only for the last 75 years and if you count the beginning of the Zionist movement, the last 125 years or so that Jews have begun en masse to live in the land of Israel. Much of the values of what we call now Judaism was developed in the Diaspora. Moreover, the American Jewish community is the strongest, most influential, most glorious of all the Jewish Diasporas in Jewish history.
And yet, the only place in the Jewish world where the Jewish community is growing is in Israel. More Jewish children now live in Israel than all the other places in the world combined. The central value that powers the sustainability, viability and continuity of the Jewish people is peoplehood. It’s not the values that have sustained the Jewish people in the Diaspora and over the last 2,000 years, which was Torah or God, what we would call religion. I’m a rabbi. I believe in the centrality of God, Torah and religion to sustain Jewish identity. But in the 21st century, Israel is the most eloquent concept of the value of Jewish peoplehood. And therefore, I do not believe that there is enough energy, enough power, enough sustainability in the classical concept of Judaism to sustain continuity in the Diaspora. The concept of Jewish peoplehood is the most powerful way that we can sustain Jewish continuity in the 21st century.
But doesn’t that negate the importance of American Jewry?
In my view, it augments the sustainability of American Jewry. If American Jews disengage from Israel, and from the concept of Jewish peoplehood, and also don’t consider religion to be at the center of their existence, then what’s left? Now there’s a lot of activity, for example, on tikkun olam, which is a part of Jewish tradition. But tikkun olam in Judaism always was a blend between Jewish particularism and universalism — concern for humanity at large but rooted in the concept of Jewish peoplehood. But very often now, tikkun olam in the Diaspora is practiced not as a part of the concept of Jewish particularism but, as I said before, at the expense of Jewish particularism. That will not be enough to sustain Jewish communities going into the 21st century.
I want to ask about the health of the American synagogue as an institution. Considering your concern about the waning centrality of Torah and God in people’s lives — especially among the non-Orthodox — do you feel optimistic about it as an institution? Does it have to change?
I’ve believed since the beginning of my career that there’s no substitute in the Diaspora for the synagogue as the central Jewish institution. We harm ourselves when we underemphasize the central role of the synagogue. Any issue that is being done by one of the hundreds of Jewish agencies that we’ve created rests on our ability as a community to produce Jews into the next generation. And what are those institutions that produce that are most responsible for the production of Jewish continuity? Synagogues, day schools and summer camps, and of the three synagogues are by far the most important for the following reasons: First, we’re the only institution that defines ourselves as and whose purpose is what we call cradle to grave. Second, for most American Jews, if they end up in any institution at all it will be a synagogue. Far fewer American Jews will receive a day school education and or go to Jewish summer camps. That should have ramifications across the board for American Jewish policy, including how we budget Jewish institutions. We should be focusing many, many more resources on these three institutions, and at the core of that is the institution of the synagogue.
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‘A Bushy Beard and Easy Smile’: Western Media’s Grotesque Framing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Death
A woman holds a poster with the picture of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as people gather after Khamenei was killed in Israeli and U.S. strikes on Saturday, in Tehran, Iran, March 1, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was only the second Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He assumed power in 1989 following the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and ruled for decades as the ultimate authority over a regime defined by repression, regional destabilization, and violent ideological extremism.
His tenure was marked by:
- The systematic crushing of political dissent
- The imprisonment, torture, and execution of dissidents
- The violent suppression of nationwide protest movements
- The arming and financing of proxy militias across the Middle East
- The institutionalization of chants of “Death to America” and repeated threats to destroy Israel
Under his leadership, Iran’s security forces opened fire on protesters during successive waves of unrest in 2009, 2019, and during the nationwide demonstrations that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. In January of this year, fresh nationwide protests were again met with force.
Independent analysts estimate that at least 30,000 people were killed in the crackdown, a figure the regime has never credibly refuted. Across these cycles of repression, human rights organizations have documented thousands more deaths and tens of thousands detained.
Yet when Iranian state media confirmed Khamenei’s death nearly 24 hours after US and Israeli airstrikes struck his compound in Tehran, segments of Western media coverage adopted a tone that bordered on reverential.
The most notable example appeared in The Washington Post, which described Khamenei as known for his “bushy white beard and easy smile,” noting that he cut a “more avuncular figure in public” than his predecessor. The obituary highlighted his fondness for Persian poetry and classic Western novels, including Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables.
The New York Times summarized him as a “hardline cleric” who had made “Iran a regional power” while maintaining hostility toward the United States and Israel.
Sky News labeled him the “arch foe” of President Donald Trump, framing the moment as a personal rivalry.
The Wall Street Journal observed that he “nurtured the country’s global ambitions but struggled at home with a withering economy.” Reuters referred to his “fiery ambitions” toward Israel and the United States. The BBC aired images of mourners drawn from regime-controlled broadcasts with little scrutiny of their staging.
Across outlets, the pattern was consistent.
The man who presided over decades of repression was reframed through aesthetic detail and political positioning. His beard. His smile. His literary tastes. His “ambitions.”
His victims were secondary.

This is not about demanding polemics from obituary writers. It is about proportion.
When authoritarian rulers die, the moral weight of their record should not be softened by lifestyle detail or neutralized by euphemism. Calling a regime ideologue a “hardliner” obscures the reality that he headed a theocratic state apparatus that jailed journalists, executed political prisoners, funded Hezbollah and Hamas, and ordered violent crackdowns against his own people.
Headlines shape historical memory. The first paragraph matters more than the 12th. In death, reputations are distilled and authoritarian rulers should not be granted the luxury of dilution.
So while newspapers fawned over what they chose to highlight, from his wry smile to his love of literature and carefully cultivated image, the rest of us should remember him for what he was: a brutal dictator who deserved the fiery end he met.
The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.
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Hezbollah Opens a Second Front and Israel Gets the Blame
Smoke billows after an Israeli strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, Lebanon, March 2, 2026. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
While the question of whether or when war between Israel and Iran would break out, so too was the question of whether Iran’s proxy Hezbollah would join the fight and act as a layer of protection for the Iranian regime.
Since Hezbollah and Israel agreed to a ceasefire in November 2024, the terrorist organization has worked to rebuild its infrastructure and regain its status as Iran’s strongest terrorist proxy in the Middle East. In doing so, it has consistently and relentlessly broken the ceasefire, committing at least 1,925 violations up to near the end of 2025.
The threat posed by Hezbollah has been greatly diminished after the year-long war, as Israel destroyed much of its infrastructure and forces, thus stripping the terrorist organization of its ability to conduct large-scale operations it was once capable of. But the danger persists.
Hezbollah still maintains considerable political influence inside Lebanon, which results in direct leverage over policies and daily life in Lebanese society. It has effectively been recognized as a state within a state, threatening the very existence of the Lebanese state itself. For this reason, Lebanon has failed to fully disarm Hezbollah, despite the Lebanese Army’s claim that the first stage in the process was completed.
Since its inception, Iran has funded Hezbollah, making the organization the most prominent proxy in Iran’s regional power structure. In fact, Hassan Nasrallah, the late leader who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in September 2024, had referred to himself as a “soldier” in the Iranian regime’s army. Thus, Israeli and US intentions to collapse the Iranian regime are a direct threat to the very foundation on which Hezbollah is built.
Despite repeated warnings by Israel not to join the fight (as well as the pleas from Lebanon’s fragile government), in the early hours of Monday morning, Hezbollah fired rockets towards Israel. This marked the first time since the full-scale war with Hezbollah that the terrorist organization fired rockets into Israeli territory.
Similar to Hezbollah’s reaction of launching what it called a “solidarity” front for Hamas following the attacks of October 7, 2023, Hezbollah claimed that the firing of rockets into Israel was “revenge for the blood of the Supreme Leader of the Muslims, Ali Khamenei,” who was killed in an Israeli airstrike on the first day of the war.
Despite even Hezbollah acknowledging it was the party to fire first, the narrative in the media reversed the order of events, referring to Israel’s “attack” on Lebanon as the cause for the widening conflict.
Yet the timeline of events remains abundantly clear: Hezbollah opened a second front in the war — breaking the ceasefire to do so — by firing at least six rockets and two drones.
Immediately after Hezbollah joined the war by attacking Israel, the IDF responded with a series of strikes on Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including targeting senior leadership. While Israel has responded to previous ceasefire violations, the firing of rockets into Israeli territory crossed a clearly defined red line set by the IDF. As a result, Israel initiated direct kinetic action aimed at further degrading Hezbollah’s operational capabilities and deterring escalation.
Shifting the attention away from Hezbollah’s initiating actions and instead framing Israel’s response as the catalyst for escalation obscures the reality of the war Israel is now fighting on two fronts.
Although the dangers posed by the Iranian regime have been the primary target of the war, Israel’s commitment to deterring and removing the threat of any terrorist actor remains steadfast. When media coverage downplays Hezbollah’s responsibility, Israel’s defensive measures risk being perceived as unprovoked aggression. This reframing not only distorts the sequence of events but also seeks to undermine Israel’s ability to maintain deterrence.
In this war, accurate reporting of terrorist organizations and the sequence of events is not optional — it is essential to understanding the realities shaping the conflict and the decisions that follow.
The author is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.
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In Gaza, Palestinians and Hamas Now Face a Moment of Choosing
With Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei now dead, all eyes are naturally on what comes next for the Iranian people, as the Iranian regime veers between desperation and collapse.
The war in Iran is also stoking unease among the Islamic Republic’s proxies, as terror groups like Hamas figure out how to proceed without Iranian support.
Hamas still refuses to disarm — but its situation is growing more perilous.
Prior to Khamenei’s killing, Israel had already struck an unprecedented blow to Hamas’ military infrastructure. Now stripped of its sponsor, Hamas’s weakening posture should leave Palestinians questioning if Hamas really has their best interests at heart.
The strategic and economic opportunities for building a healthy society for its citizens have never been greater.
Less than two weeks before the US military and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began striking Iran, US President Donald Trump convened the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace, as member states from nearly 48 nations gathered to discuss the future of Gaza.
Chaired by President Trump, the newly established international body is tasked with overseeing Gaza’s reconstruction and transitional governance.
Trump announced at the summit that the United States would donate $10 billion to the Board, with other countries participating in the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip contributing an additional $7 billion combined.
In an interview on Fox News’s My View with Lara Trump, Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff reaffirmed the government’s commitment to “jump-starting” construction in Gaza and plans for a “renaissance” in the seaside area.
After launching the deadliest attack against Jews since the Holocaust, members of the international community are still willing to give Gazans a chance to forge a future rooted in prosperity and dignity.
By dispensing with failed frameworks and outdated Oslo-esque accords, the current US administration is not only creating the conditions for a freer Iran, but it is also unshackling Palestinians from Hamas rule and creating economic enticements to liberate Gazans from their terrorist trappings.
The responsibility now rests with Palestinians to embark on an earnest campaign of deradicalization and abandon their armed struggle against Israel.
It’s worth noting that, to date, much of the history of the region has been driven by an embrace of radicalism and violence.
Following Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza and the eviction of 9,000 Israelis from their homes, billions of dollars in foreign financing flowed from international entities to the Gaza Strip.
The money meant to bolster the lives of Gazans was instead used to foment terror against Israelis.
The latest poll released by People’s Company for Polls and Survey Research (PCPSR) is similarly discouraging and illustrates that “support for Hamas’s decision to launch the [Oct. 7] offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50 percent, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank.”
The goodwill shown to Palestinians by Israelis living in the Gaza envelope — which included numerous peace initiatives and work opportunities — was repaid in blood on October 7, as familiarity and friendship were used as fuel to achieve maniacal aims.
As Palestinians watch what is happening to Iran — a state that trafficked exclusively in terrorism — the Palestinians are now seeing they have their own choice — to choose peace over terrorism, encouraged by economic incentives by the US and the international community.
What happens to Palestinians in Gaza going forward largely depends on their motivation to confront and eliminate their fixation on eradicating Israel, and for their leaders to reorient their energies around building better lives for their citizens.
The Trump administration’s refreshing and untested approach to accelerate Gaza’s recovery is not packaged in empty two-state platitudes but rather wrapped in historic strategic changes and tangible economic benefits to Palestinian society.
Palestinians in Gaza now have the daunting duty of proving their readiness for reform.
For regional stability to be achieved, let’s hope that Palestinians in Gaza renounce their prior path of demonization and terror, and are indeed ready for rational governance that will ultimately yield long-term success for their people.
Irit Tratt is a writer residing in New York. Follow her on X @Irit_Tratt

