By HENRY SREBRNIK Syria’s 13-year civil war ended abruptly in December, when rebels belonging to the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) swept south from their bastions in the northwest of the country, precipitating the fall of the government of President Bashar al-Assad. In a matter of weeks, a regime that had lasted decades came to an end.

One group of Syrians was particularly worried. Since 2014, Washington has backed a de facto autonomous government in northeastern Syria formed principally, but not exclusively, of ethnic Kurdish factions. This coalition, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), took advantage of the chaos unleashed by Syria’s civil war to carve out an enclave along the border with Turkey. 

Much of northeastern Syria has been controlled by Kurds, who call it Rojava, meaning western Kurdistan. The SDF fought off a host of enemies: Assad’s troops, Turkey and Turkish-backed militias, al-Qaeda-linked groups, and the Islamic State (ISIS). U.S. forces worked closely with the SDF in chasing ISIS from its last redoubts in Syria. The United States still maintains around 2,000 troops as well as contractors in roughly a dozen operating posts and small bases in eastern Syria.

But six years after the SDF captured the last ISIS stronghold in Syria, ISIS fighters still operate in central and eastern Syria. The SDF’s actions also bred resentment among local Arab communities. Tightly controlled by the People’s Defense Units, a Kurdish militia known as the YPG, the SDF committed extrajudicial killings and conducted extrajudicial arrests of Arab civilians; extorted Arabs who were trying to get information about or secure the release of detained relatives; press ganged young Arabs into its ranks; twisted the education system to accord with the political agenda of the YPG; and recruited many non-Syrian Kurdish fighters. 

To be sure, these excesses pale in comparison with those of the Assad regime, but they caused substantial friction with Arab communities, especially in Arab-majority cities like Raqqa. Particularly in areas where the YPG led SDF forces, many in the region were therefore  calling for reintegration with the rest of Syria

The SDF was also hampered by ongoing hostility between Turkey and the YPG. Turkey viewed the YPG is a terrorist group. But in late February, a key Kurdish leader in Turkey called for a cease-fire with Ankara. Abdallah Ocalan, the head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known as the PKK — a Kurdish militant group affiliated with the YPG that has long fought the Turkish state — told fighters loyal to him to lay down their weapons and stop waging war against Turkey. This allowed for a rapprochement between the SDF and the new government in Damascus.

Syria made the announcement on March 10 and released images of a signing ceremony featuring the Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the head of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi. The deal will integrate SDF institutions into the new government, handing over control of border checkpoints as well as the region’s oil and gas fields to the central government.

The safety and prosperity of Kurdish communities depends not on foreign powers but on the Syrian government respecting their rights and those of all Syrian citizens. For Christians and Alawites, the situation is more worrisome. Unlike the Kurds, many of them face Sunni Arab violence; they are seen as collaborators of the late regime. For years, the vast majority of Syrians have suffered humiliation and degradation at the hands of an Alawite ruling minority, whose dominance under Assad has left an indelible mark of resentment. Gruesome videos of executions of Alawites have begun to emerge, alongside reports of attacks on Christian neighborhoods. 

Meanwhile, Syria’s new interim constitution makes no mention of specific ethnosectarian groups or divisions. The new government claims they didn’t want a quota system, because of how they’d seen these play out in Iraq and Lebanon. The idea behind consociationalist or confessionalist systems, as they are called, is to give each ethnic and religious group a voice in government to ensure their needs are covered. But this has led to problems in the longer term, with different groups competing for privileges. Religious or sectarian priorities are always part of politics.

“The best day after a bad Emperor is the first,” wrote the Roman historian Tacitus. The hard work will now have to follow. It remains unclear how genuinely willing the new Syrian government is to establish an inclusive democracy. But it appears that right now Syrians living under its control generally enjoy more political and personal rights than they have had since the Assads took power in 1970.

Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.

It could also be just what the Middle East needs
After a century of Palestinian leaders rejecting a two-state-solution, Trump’s proposal could be a wakeup call that peace is the only solution

By DAOUD KUTTAB (February 21, 2025) This story was originally published in the Forward (https://forward.com/opinion/698785/gaza-palestine-israel-trump/). Click here to get the Forward’s free email newsletters delivered to your inbox.
One of the biggest obstacles to finding a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been an overwhelming imbalance in direct international support. Armed with extensive international resources, especially from the United States, Israel has long been able to reject logical solutions while presenting the minimum justifications to placate international sponsors. Over time, this has led to resistance from Palestinians, which has produced an even more radical Israeli position, leading, after the horrific Oct. 7 attack, to the devastating violence of Israel’s war in Gaza.
Now, President Donald Trump’s administration has been called to help Israel out of the jam it finds itself in. Trump has, in classic fashion, delivered bombastic promises of peace and prosperity, much to the delight of Israelis, who have largely embraced his proposals for a mass relocation of Palestinians in Gaza and a U.S. takeover of the embattled strip.
But as the saying goes, be careful what you wish for. Once Washington finds itself more involved in the day-to-day management of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Trump might find that the result that will guarantee peace and tranquility is not necessarily that which Israelis — and certainly the Israeli right — are expecting.
That’s because Trump, who has a history of making grand promises and not fulfilling them, may find that it is easier to create a buffer between Israelis and Palestinians than to organize the displacement of an entire population and redevelopment of an area destroyed to rubble. And that kind of buffer, between a powerful militaristic occupier and a weak but resilient occupied, is exactly what the region needs.
And the U.S. is the ideal party to create that buffer, for two reasons.

First, it can provide what no other state in the world is able to: the security assurances that Israel and the Israeli people badly need. And second, whenever Israelis engage with Palestinians, they use their superior military and political power to insist on exaggerated demands. But when the U.S. is in the room — represented by officials not afraid to deploy their power — a more logical conversation takes place.
Security guarantees from the U.S. could go a long way in removing a major obstacle Israel has continuously presented in justifying its hesitancy about finding a long-term strategy to create a permanent peace solution and a Palestinian state. Past peace ideas have failed because the balance of power was always on the Israeli side, and despite its claims to want peace, Israel has never truly been willing to pay the price of that outcome — land — using security as an excuse. Providing Israelis with an iron-clad guarantee of security, possible with the deployment of U.S. or NATO forces, could finally shift the balance.
Successive U.S. presidents have failed to help Palestinians and Israelis reach peace, because they have refused to take the bold steps needed to act as honest brokers, and rejected the idea of acting as a temporary buffer and an insurer between the occupier and the occupied.
Trump has shown that an excess of restraint will not be his administration’s problem. When months of indirect negotiations between Israel and Hamas, with the engagement of former President Joe Biden’s administration, repeatedly failed to produce a ceasefire, the intervention of Trump’s incoming administration brought the deal to fruition. I do not doubt that continued U.S. engagement will also produce agreement on the critical second and third phases of the ceasefire deal, which will involve the release of all remaining hostages in Gaza — dead and alive — and end the 15-month war.
Yes, Trump has proclaimed a vision for the future of the region that is notably free of a Palestinian presence, let alone leadership. But once the leader of the U.S. and his aides roll up their sleeves and begin the nitty gritty process of trying to achieve peace in the Middle East, they will run into a truth that all others who have tried the same have faced, which is that to get anything done in the region, one must apply tough love policies to all sides — not just one.
For Palestinians, like me, inviting this intervention means making a bet: That Trump, once on the ground, will find it more expedient to scale back his plans. The president’s history of bluster — and of making big threats, but strategically accepting much smaller gains — makes that bet worthwhile.
Palestinians have seen in the Israeli settlement enterprise the best proof that Israel is not willing to relinquish land for peace — just the opposite. A shake-up is needed. And Palestinians have previously hoped that an international presence could provide that adjustment: As part of previous peace negotiations, some past Palestinian leaders, including President Mahmoud Abbas, have suggested stationing NATO troops in a future Palestinian state to reassure Israel. But those proposals, like so many others in this process, stalled.
If Trump is willing to genuinely engage, in a way that his predecessors were not, it might mean a major breakthrough that will change our region. The Trump administration can end this occupation and can bring peace through security if it wishes, and the world will applaud them if they do.
Daoud Kuttab is an award-winning Palestinian journalist and former Ferris Professor of journalism at Princeton University. His twitter handle is @daoudkuttab

The views and opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Forward. Discover more perspectives in Opinion. To contact Opinion authors, email opinion@forward.com.

By HENRY SREBRNIK Donald Trump’s return to the White House marks the beginning of a new era on the global stage and is expected to bring significant changes to the international balance of power. 

Trump capitalized on a sense of discontent that had been building since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s and was galvanized by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Many of his advisers are part of a foreign policy movement on the Republican Party right who call themselves “restrainers” and are against what they consider America’s 21^st century involvement in “forever wars.” For them, the neoconservative interventionists have overextended the country’s commitment abroad.

President Trump’s policy in his second term will continue to concentrate on distinct American interests. His America First emphasis means Trump is likely to reduce involvement in international institutions, while demanding that NATO and other allies take greater responsibility for their own defence.

The Middle East today features dangers and opportunities that were not present when he first took office eight years ago. The greatest danger remains Iran’s advances toward acquiring nuclear weapons. The best opportunities have emerged from Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah and Hamas, its successful attacks on Iran, and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

A year and a half ago, Iran’s foreign policy could possibly have been considered enormously successful. But since then, Israel has turned the tables. Hamas will not again pose a serious military threat to Israel. The Israelis have wiped out Hezbollah’s leadership and given Lebanon a chance to reclaim its sovereignty. And Assad’s regime is gone. 

Weakening Iran will be a priority. Trump is expected to intensify the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, including imposing additional severe sanctions and making a concentrated effort to ensure their enforcement. To stop Tehran’s nuclear ambitions may also require the credible threat of military action. He is likely to seek to strengthen the regional front against Iran, including close cooperation with Israel and the Gulf states.

Trump’s proposal that the United States “take over” and rebuild Gaza while its residents live elsewhere is far-fetched. But it might better be seen as a reflection of the fact that no realistic plan for Gaza exists. Since 2005, when the Israelis withdrew from Gaza, Washington has tried to buy off Hamas – and this culminated in the 2023 attacks. While the administration may continue to oppose Israel’s annexation of the West Bank, any future participation of Hamas in Palestinian self-government is unacceptable.

Trump will continue efforts to stabilize Lebanon, particularly following the election of Washington’s preferred candidate, Joseph Aoun, as its president. The U.S. will demand that the Lebanese armed forces prevent a renewed Hezbollah presence in the south and guard Lebanon’s borders to stop Iranian arms supplies from entering.

As for Turkey, relations may continue to be contentious, particularly regarding Ankara’s antagonism to the Kurds in northern Syria, its hostility toward Israel and support for Hamas, and growing closeness to Russia and China. Washington might try to influence the new Syrian regime, which, after all, seeks to consolidate its power and present itself as striving for a more Western-oriented approach. It will also be U.S. policy to maintain Washington’s partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces until the militia’s status and future safety are secured.

Finally, Trump’s policies will involve expanding the Abraham Accords, a highlight of his first term, by having Israel focus on advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia. Trump has also again designated the Houthis in Yemen as a foreign terrorist organization, which President Biden had revoked.

The confrontation with China will remain a central focus of Trump’s global policy, particularly in economic and technological aspects. Trump has sought to confront China over what he says is a number of economic abuses: intellectual property theft, currency manipulation, export and other subsidies, and economic espionage. He says aggressive action is required to protect American workers and to reduce the United States’ large bilateral trade deficit. 

Tensions over Taiwan will continue to threaten regional stability in East Asia. It is likely that Trump does not want to be perceived as abandoning Taiwan and U.S. commitments to the island, but at the same time, he does not want Taiwan to drag the United States into a military conflict. He has observed that “Taiwan is 9,500 miles away” from the United States, while it’s “68 miles away from China.” 

Trump has long been critical of American support for Kyiv and has moved to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. His statements suggest that he is not necessarily committed to preserving Ukrainian sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders and may be open to a deal that allows Russia to maintain its presence in occupied Ukrainian territories as well as legitimizing its possession of Crimea. He has told Europe that it cannot depend indefinitely on the United States and must do more to aid Ukraine.

He also wants Ukraine to supply the United States with rare earth minerals as a form of payment for financially assisting the country’s war efforts against Russia.

The world will be a very different place over the next four years. After all, as one newspaper put it, Trump was elected to “be a wrecking ball to the Beltway elites.”

Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.