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For Many Palestinians, the ‘Day After’ Should Look Just Like the ‘Day Before’

A Palestinian boy wearing the headband of Hamas’ armed wing The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza City on May 15, 2022. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem

JNS.orgMore than nine months after the Israel-Hamas war began, many Palestinians are convinced that the “day after” in the Gaza Strip will be a return to the pre-Oct. 7 era, in which the Iran-backed terrorist group still has control of the coastal enclave. For them, the “day after” means going back to the day before the Hamas-led attack on Israel.

Today, Palestinians fall into two groups: those who hate Hamas but think that under the current circumstances it is impossible to remove it from power, and those who want Hamas to stay in power because they embrace it and its extremist ideology.

Opponents of Hamas contend that until the terrorist organization is totally destroyed, neither the Palestinian Authority nor any Arab state will be prepared to rule the Gaza Strip. And they do not see that objective being met more than nine months after the start of the war.

Recently, Abu Obaida, the spokesperson for Hamas’s military wing, claimed that his group has been successful in bringing thousands of new “fighters” into its ranks to replace those killed since the start of the war.

Even if Abu Obaida’s claim is exaggerated, its purpose is to demonstrate to Palestinians, Arabs and the international community that Hamas is not going anywhere. This is a form of warning to any party that would consider playing a role in the Gaza Strip the “day after.”

Over the past few months, Hamas has killed clan leaders and kidnapped and tortured political opponents to thwart the establishment of a new government.

In response to Hamas’s campaign of terror and intimidation, several clans in the Gaza Strip have released statements declaring their support for the terrorist group and denouncing any “conspiracy” to foster the rise of new leaders there.

That, however, does not mean that Hamas will prevent the Palestinian Authority or any other party from providing financial and humanitarian assistance to the residents of the Gaza Strip.

Furthermore, it does not imply that Hamas will impede any initiative to reconstruct Gaza. As long as these actions do not compromise Hamas’s authority, the organization will permit them to take place.

Where does the Palestinian Authority stand?

Not hiding their dissatisfaction in private, some P.A. officials are disappointed that Hamas still controls the Gaza Strip more than nine months after the war began.

“We thought it would only take a few weeks to remove Hamas from power,” stated one official. “However, several months later, Hamas remains in place and continues to have complete authority over civilian affairs. In addition, Hamas still has many fighters.”

Another P.A. official said that he had anticipated a fall in Hamas’s popularity among Palestinians as the war drags on and more Palestinians lose their lives.

“We see that the opposite has happened,” the official stated. “According to polls conducted after Oct. 7, Hamas’s popularity is rising. This is due to the widespread belief that Hamas is winning the battle. If you watched [the Qatari-owned network] Al-Jazeera, you would also come to the same conclusion—that Israel has been defeated,” he said.

The most recent public opinion poll, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, showed that many Palestinians support Hamas and believe that the terrorist group will continue to rule the Gaza Strip after the war.

When asked who the public would prefer to control the Gaza Strip after the war, 61% (71% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) answered Hamas. Only 16% chose a new P.A. with an elected president, parliament and government, while another 6% chose the current P.A. but without its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

When asked to speculate about the party that will control the Gaza Strip after the war, a majority of respondents (56%) answered that it would be Hamas.

It is also interesting to see that an overwhelming majority of Palestinians (75%) oppose the deployment of an Arab security force in the Gaza Strip. In this regard, these Palestinians have actually endorsed Hamas’s stance, which opposes the deployment of non-Palestinian security forces in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas officials have gone as far as warning that such a force would be dealt with as an “occupying” party—implying that terrorists would target the troops. Egypt, Jordan and other Arab countries do not seem to be enthusiastic about dispatching troops to the Gaza Strip.

Similarly, the P.A., too, does not appear to be excited about returning to the Gaza Strip. That’s because it does not want to be accused of entering the Gaza Strip “atop an Israeli tank.” The P.A., in addition, is also afraid that it will be left alone to bear the burden of rebuilding Gaza because most Arab countries have consistently failed to fulfill their promises to help the Palestinians.

Despite the devastation, most Palestinians support Oct. 7

According to the latest poll, a vast majority of Palestinians (68%) said the terrorist group’s decision to launch the war on Israel was “correct.” Previous polls conducted by the same center have shown that more than 70% of Palestinians support the Hamas-led Oct. 7 attack.

There is virtually no debate among the Palestinians about the “day after” in the Gaza Strip, even though some in Israel and the United States appear to be obsessed with the idea. This is due to the widespread Palestinian belief that Hamas will somehow maintain its hold on power in the Gaza Strip after the war.

The Palestinians are probably the only ones who could force Hamas to relinquish control of the Gaza Strip. It remains to be seen whether or not the Palestinians who lost their homes and loved ones will rise against Hamas after the war or if a large number of them will take to the streets to express their support for the terrorist groups, either out of fear or genuine sympathy.

Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

The post For Many Palestinians, the ‘Day After’ Should Look Just Like the ‘Day Before’ first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

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Trump’s plan to enlist Elon Musk began at Lubavitcher Rebbe’s grave

Trump wth Howard Luttnick at the Lubavitcher Rebbe's grave on October 7, 2024

In podcast interview, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick recalled the visit, which occurred on the anniversary of the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel

By Jacob Kornbluh “This story was originally published in the Forward (Click here to get the Forward’s free email newsletters delivered to your inbox.”)


President Donald Trump first discussed the idea to enlist Elon Musk to lead the Department of Government Efficiency, also known as DOGE, after a visit to the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s grave on Oct. 7, 2024, the anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel.
Trump drove to and from the New York City gravesite, known as the Ohel, with Howard Lutnick, the eventual pick for commerce secretary. During the car ride, the two discussed ways to balance the U.S. budget. “I’m going to go recruit Elon,” Lutnick told Trump. “I don’t know Elon, but he’s perfect for this.”
A week later, Lutnick flew to Texas, where he met with Musk for two hours. Musk told Lutnick he wanted to cut 80% of the federal workforce, similar to what he had done at Twitter when he acquired the social media platform.
We’re going to name it DOGE,” said Lutnick, who said he already registered the name. Lutnick recalled the story on a recent episode of the All-In podcast.
Musk told Fox News last week that he intends to cut $1 trillion from the U.S. deficit and wrap up his work with DOGE by the end of May.

Pretty cool’ way to get Orthodox votes
In the interview, Lutnick also said that Trump believed he’d secure tens of thousands of Orthodox votes in New York by visiting the gravesite.
“You know, the people who wear black hats think he’s the Messiah,” Lutnick said, referring to a movement that believes Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, who died in 1994, is the messiah. The Chabad-Lubavitch leadership has long rejected such claims.
“They have a crypt for him where you write a note and you put a note in,” Lutnick said. “And so we agreed we’d go out to that grave site, and we would probably win 60,000 of those kinds of voters, which is pretty cool.”
Post-election polls showed Trump and Republican candidates increased their support in New York’s key swing districts with sizable Jewish populations. In Crown Heights, the worldwide headquarters of Chabad-Lubavitch, Trump received 65% of the vote.
The gravesite in Queens has become a popular pilgrimage point for followers of the Chabad-Lubavitch movement and the broader Jewish community, as well as politicians from all sides of the political spectrum.
Wearing a yarmulke and standing beside the grave alongside Chabad representatives, relatives of American hostages and Lutnick, Trump recited a chapter of Psalms, placed a note on the grave and laid a small stone on the headstone. He also lit a memorial candle to honor the Oct. 7 victims.
In 2016, Trump’s daughter Ivanka and her husband, Jared Kushner, prayed at the Ohel on the weekend before the election.

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New report from Pew Research Center provides interesting information about high number of Jews who still identify as Jewish

By BERNIE BELLAN A recent report from the Pew Research Center offers some interesting information about adult Jews in Israel and the United States. According to the report, 80% of the world’s Jews live in those two countries – which explains why there is no reporting about Jews in other countries.


Similar to the situation we reported on with respect to the Census of Canada in 2021, the Pew Report notes that “people may identify as Jewish in a multitude of ways, including ethnically, culturally, religiously or by family background. In this report, we use the term “Jewish” to mean only religious identity, because the survey questions used in the analyses ask about a person’s current religion and what religious group they were raised in (their childhood religion).”
It should be noted that the Canadian census allowed respondents to identify as Jewish both by religion and by ethnic identity. As a result, there were great disparities in the numbers who responded they were Jewish in both categories.


In a December 2023 article we noted that “Of all Winnipeg respondents only 6,700 reported that both their ethnic origin and their religion was Jewish. Yet, 10,700 people in total reported that at least one of their ethnic origins was Jewish, while 11,170 reported their religion was Jewish.”
As a result, after we did a cross-comparison of figures for both categories, we arrived at the conclusion that, at a maximum, the total possible number of individuals who identified as Jewish – either by religion or ethnicity, was 14,270. (But, when you consider, for instance, that of the 10,700 respondents in the census who reported their ethnic origin as Jewish, 1,080 reported their religion as Christian, it gives you some idea how amorphous Jewish identity is.)

The Pew Report, as noted, concentrated only on determining how many Jews in Israel and the United States reported their religion as “Jewish.”
Some of the findings of the report were:
• Most people who were raised Jewish in Israel and the U.S. still identify this way today, resulting in high Jewish retention rates in both countries – though it’s higher in Israel than in the U.S.

Leaving Judaism
• In the U.S., about a quarter of adults who were raised Jewish no longer identify as Jewish.• In Israel, fewer than 1% of adults who were raised Jewish no longer identify as such.

• Most adults who have left Judaism in both countries now are unaffiliated (i.e., they identify religiously as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”).

Entering Judaism
• Most Jewish adults in Israel and the U.S. were raised Jewish, meaning the “accession” (or entrance) rates into Judaism are fairly low in both places.
• But of the two countries, the U.S. has the higher accession rate, with 14% of Jewish Americans saying they were raised outside of Judaism, compared with just 1% of Israeli Jewish adults.

The report delved further into the question of the affiliation of individuals who said their religion was Jewish, but who no longer identify as Jewish.
• In Israel, only 1% of individuals who were raised Jewish said they are now not religiously affiliated. (The number who said they now had another religion was so low that the Pew Report gave the figure as 0. I wonder though, how “Jews for Jesus” – which has a considerable following both in Israel and the U.S. would be taken into account in reports about the number of Jews in the world? Are “Jews for Jesus” still Jewish – even if they consider themselves Jewish? It’s questions like this that make me wonder about the reliability of surveys that claim to provide credible information about how many Jews there are in the world.)
• In the U.S., however, the Pew Report noted that “17% of adults who were raised Jewish now identify as unaffiliated, while 2% now identify as Christian and 1% now identify as Muslim.”

In an earlier study, conducted in 2021 also by the Pew Research Centre, Jews were asked what were the most important aspects of their identifying as Jewish. I’ve written about that report before because I found the answers so fascinating. (I’ve noted that having a good sense of humour was considered an essential part of being Jewish by 33% of respondents, as opposed to only 3% who said that observing Jewish law was an essential part of being Jewish. But don’t tell that to the Winnipeg Council of Rabbis, who insist that the Simkin Centre serving kosher food – even when almost half its residents aren’t even Jewish, is essential to the Simkin Centre.)
Here, again, are the results of that survey:

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How Will Kurds Fare in a New Syria?

By HENRY SREBRNIK Syria’s 13-year civil war ended abruptly in December, when rebels belonging to the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) swept south from their bastions in the northwest of the country, precipitating the fall of the government of President Bashar al-Assad. In a matter of weeks, a regime that had lasted decades came to an end.

One group of Syrians was particularly worried. Since 2014, Washington has backed a de facto autonomous government in northeastern Syria formed principally, but not exclusively, of ethnic Kurdish factions. This coalition, under the banner of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), took advantage of the chaos unleashed by Syria’s civil war to carve out an enclave along the border with Turkey. 

Much of northeastern Syria has been controlled by Kurds, who call it Rojava, meaning western Kurdistan. The SDF fought off a host of enemies: Assad’s troops, Turkey and Turkish-backed militias, al-Qaeda-linked groups, and the Islamic State (ISIS). U.S. forces worked closely with the SDF in chasing ISIS from its last redoubts in Syria. The United States still maintains around 2,000 troops as well as contractors in roughly a dozen operating posts and small bases in eastern Syria.

But six years after the SDF captured the last ISIS stronghold in Syria, ISIS fighters still operate in central and eastern Syria. The SDF’s actions also bred resentment among local Arab communities. Tightly controlled by the People’s Defense Units, a Kurdish militia known as the YPG, the SDF committed extrajudicial killings and conducted extrajudicial arrests of Arab civilians; extorted Arabs who were trying to get information about or secure the release of detained relatives; press ganged young Arabs into its ranks; twisted the education system to accord with the political agenda of the YPG; and recruited many non-Syrian Kurdish fighters. 

To be sure, these excesses pale in comparison with those of the Assad regime, but they caused substantial friction with Arab communities, especially in Arab-majority cities like Raqqa. Particularly in areas where the YPG led SDF forces, many in the region were therefore  calling for reintegration with the rest of Syria

The SDF was also hampered by ongoing hostility between Turkey and the YPG. Turkey viewed the YPG is a terrorist group. But in late February, a key Kurdish leader in Turkey called for a cease-fire with Ankara. Abdallah Ocalan, the head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known as the PKK — a Kurdish militant group affiliated with the YPG that has long fought the Turkish state — told fighters loyal to him to lay down their weapons and stop waging war against Turkey. This allowed for a rapprochement between the SDF and the new government in Damascus.

Syria made the announcement on March 10 and released images of a signing ceremony featuring the Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the head of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi. The deal will integrate SDF institutions into the new government, handing over control of border checkpoints as well as the region’s oil and gas fields to the central government.

The safety and prosperity of Kurdish communities depends not on foreign powers but on the Syrian government respecting their rights and those of all Syrian citizens. For Christians and Alawites, the situation is more worrisome. Unlike the Kurds, many of them face Sunni Arab violence; they are seen as collaborators of the late regime. For years, the vast majority of Syrians have suffered humiliation and degradation at the hands of an Alawite ruling minority, whose dominance under Assad has left an indelible mark of resentment. Gruesome videos of executions of Alawites have begun to emerge, alongside reports of attacks on Christian neighborhoods. 

Meanwhile, Syria’s new interim constitution makes no mention of specific ethnosectarian groups or divisions. The new government claims they didn’t want a quota system, because of how they’d seen these play out in Iraq and Lebanon. The idea behind consociationalist or confessionalist systems, as they are called, is to give each ethnic and religious group a voice in government to ensure their needs are covered. But this has led to problems in the longer term, with different groups competing for privileges. Religious or sectarian priorities are always part of politics.

“The best day after a bad Emperor is the first,” wrote the Roman historian Tacitus. The hard work will now have to follow. It remains unclear how genuinely willing the new Syrian government is to establish an inclusive democracy. But it appears that right now Syrians living under its control generally enjoy more political and personal rights than they have had since the Assads took power in 1970.

Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.

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