Features
As the U.S. General Election Looms, How Will American Jews Vote?
By HENRY SREBRNIK May 5, 2024 First of all, before I go any further, we should get something straight: this whole so-called debate about anti-Zionism vs antisemitism is nonsense on stilts.
Sure, especially before the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, many Jews were dubious about or even ideologically or theologically opposed to the Zionist project of recreating a Jewish state in the land of Israel. These groups ranged from various socialists on the left, such as the supporters of the Jewish Labour Bund, to haredim like the Satmar Hasidim. The latter still are, but no one thinks of them as “antisemites.”
All of this has virtually nothing to do with today’s so-called “anti-Zionists,” almost all of whom are non-Jewish antisemites making use of a word to confuse people about their desire to destroy a modern sovereign Jewish state, now more than 75 years old. (Yes, there are some misguided Jewish students involved, and the media loves them, but this is mainly a matter of ignorance and “Stockholm Syndrome.”)
Do you remember, not so long ago, that when right-wing Republicans and/or supporters of Donald Trump, made even mild criticisms of one or another Jewish politician or Jewish organization, leftwingers immediately said these were “dog whistles,” implying that this was code for antisemitism.
Now, though, when protestors parade around proudly with placards reading “F—k Zionism,” or ask Jewish students whether they are “Zionists,” this has nothing to do with wondering whether they are a member of a Zionist organization or a person who subscribes to the Jewish nationalist ideology centered on the Land of Israel. They are asking whether these people are Jewish, pure and simple.
“Zionist” has simply become a derogatory slur or abusive term for “Jew,” used by Jew-haters as a synonym, and not all that different from earlier, now archaic, versions such as “kike,” “sheeny,” or “Yid.” The animus is also directed at Hillels, synagogues, and other institutions which are Jewish, not technically “Zionist” as such. Is this really that hard to understand? And we Jews should not play their games by arguing the point.
After all, the word “antisemitism” is itself a euphemism, coined by a German Jew-hater in the 19th century, so as to appear a more “scientific” word for hating Jews. It’s not even accurate – as we know, Arabs and other peoples are also Semites, and no one who hates Jews has them in mind. Judeophobia would be a more accurate term, and we should make more use of it.
Anyhow, we also must stop trying to be “even handed” by trying to equate old-style Jew-hatred on the right with today’s versions, which are coming overwhelmingly from the left, under the rubric of “anti-Zionism.” Remember, anti-Israel demonstrations began the very next days after the Oct.7 massacres, and almost three weeks before Israel even launched its counterattack.
All this is by way of a segue to a very important matter coming our way this November: For whom will American Jews turn out in the forthcoming presidential election? We all know the statistics: For almost a century, a large majority of Jews have voted for the Democratic candidate, beginning with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932. No Republican, including those who were victorious, came even close to capturing a majority of Jewish voters. Over the past several decades, according to data from the Pew Research Center, an average of 70 per cent of Jewish Americans consistently voted for the Democratic Party.
But October 7 has been a genuine zeitgeist shift. Even Jews blinded by an almost-religious loyalty to the party understand that it is being quite quickly captured by its far-left wing. Joe Biden may even be the last “pro-Israel” Democratic president (and he hasn’t exactly shone in that regard of late). The president himself has been unable to really condemn unequivocally and without moral relativism the outrages taking place on campuses.
I have for a long time thought that Israel shouldn’t have put all its defence needs in the U.S. basket. America is changing, demographically and ideologically, in a manner detrimental to Israel. The Democratic Party post-Biden will sooner or later be in the hands of the left-wing Congressional representatives known as the “Squad.” The protesters on the American university campuses should be called “Young Squadniks!”
The Hamas onslaught has left a mark on how Diaspora Jews look at their identity, especially in the United States. A recent survey conducted by the American Jewish Committee found that 78 per cent feel less safe since Hamas attacked Israel. “We are seeing an awakening, a heightened sense of consciousness among Jewish Americans,” asserted Steven Windmueller, professor emeritus of Jewish Communal Studies at the Hebrew Union College in Los Angeles.
They now have seen how elite university campuses like Harvard, Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania, many of which are heavily funded by Jewish donors, have been breeding and spreading a climate of antisemitic hate.
As apparently some 100 university campuses across the United States are aflame with anti-Israel and “anti-Zionist” fervor, and Jew-hatred has now become mainstream in Democratic politics, Jews are reconsidering many of their basic assumptions about their position in America generally and the Democratic Party specifically.
Many liberal Jewish Americans also feel betrayed by some of their alleged allies, those whose causes they had supported throughout the years, from the Civil Rights movement to Black Lives Matter activists. The left doesn’t care about antisemitism if they deem it inconvenient to their cause. They just call it “anti-Zionism” and carry on.
A few weeks ago, a sermon by Reform Rabbi Ammiel Hirsch, the senior rabbi at the Steven Wise Free Synagogue in New York delivered a stern warning to the Democrats. “Do not take American Jews for granted.”
Hirsch explained, “I have spoken to many American Jews in the past few months who have surprised me with their anxiety about developments in the Democratic Party, and their perception that it is becoming increasingly hostile to Israel, and tolerant of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in its own ranks.”
Jewish Democratic voters who never considered voting for Republicans have been announcing that they are voting for Trump, or will stay home or vote for independent candidate Robert Kennedy Jr., but will never vote for Biden.
It is true that New York and California have the largest Jewish communities, and they remain firmly in the Democratic column, even if not a single Jew were to vote for them. The Jewish vote for Biden will decrease, and in the very blue states where Jews live, like California and New York, it doesn’t really matter. But four swing states –Pennsylvania, Georgia, Nevada and Arizona — may well be decided by their large Jewish communities. Nowhere is that more apparent than in Pennsylvania, the swing state with the largest Jewish population – about 300,000 voting-age Jews — in a state President Joe Biden won by roughly 80,000 votes in 2020. (We are U.S. citizens who vote absentee ballot in Pennsylvania.)
I’m guessing that many Jews will sit it out. Of those voting, it will be hard for a lot of them to vote for Trump, constantly vilified day after day, but it may still reach 40 per cent. Still others who do vote may just leave the presidential line blank, and vote for Republicans for House and Senate seats.
I think there will be an almost perfect correlation between Jews who feel a deep attachment to the Jewish people — be it religiously, culturally, ethnically, or whatever –and voting Republican this year. For those who are Jewish mainly by “biology and genealogy” and for whom being Jewish is relatively unimportant, they are far more concerned with universal matters that now come under the rubric of terms like social justice, liberalism, diversity, inclusion, and so forth. They will come in at about 85 per cent for the Democrats. But as we don’t know the relative percentages of these two groups of Jews, predicting the overall Jewish vote for each of the two parties is difficult.
Addendum (added May 9):
Since writing this article, there have been two important developments. President Biden has said that he will in effect impose a partial arms embargo on Israel should the IDF complete the defeat of Hamas by capturing Rafah. Secondly, a number of American websites report that they have found evidence that many of the campus protests currently underway in the United States have been funded by foundations and non-profits whose money comes from wealthy donors who are supporters of Biden and numerous Democratic campaigns.
Given this, I’d revise my estimates of Jewish votes in November to predict that the overall vote for Republican candidates might exceed, for the first time in a century, 50 per cent. Even liberal Jews, typically reliable Democrats, will break at only about 75-25 per cent for Biden.
Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
Features
In recent years, we have been looking for something more than a house in Israel – we have been looking for a home
For many Jewish families in the diaspora, Israel has always been more than a destination. It is the land of tefillah, memory, family history and belonging. But in recent years, many families have begun asking a practical question too: should Israel also become a place where we have a home?
Not necessarily immediate aliyah. Sometimes it begins with a future option, something good to have just in case, or simply roots with a stronger connection to Eretz Yisroel.
But what does it mean?
A Jewish home is shaped not only by what is inside the front door, but by what surrounds it: neighbours, synagogues, schools, parks, local services, safe streets and the rhythm of Jewish life. For observant families, these are not small details. They are the things that turn a house into a place of belonging.
This is not a new idea. It is a need that has helped shape Jewish communities in Israel before. The Savyonim idea is rooted in the story of Savyon, the Israeli community established in the 1950s by South African Jews who wanted to create a green, safe and community-minded environment in Israel. It was a diaspora dream translated into life in the Jewish homeland.
That idea feels relevant again today. Many Jewish families abroad are now making plans around where they can feel connected in the years ahead.
Recent figures point in the same direction. Reports based on Israel’s Ministry of Finance data showed that foreign residents bought around 1,900 homes in Israel in 2024, about 50% more than the previous year, with Jerusalem emerging as the most popular place to buy. In January 2026, foreign residents still purchased 146 homes, broadly similar to January 2025, even as the wider housing market remained cautious.
For Lior David, International Sales & Marketing Manager at Africa Israel Residences, part of the continued interest may lie in the fact that today’s residential projects are increasingly built around the wider needs of Jewish families abroad: not only buying a property in Israel, but finding a setting that can support community, continuity and everyday Jewish life. That idea is reflected in Savyonim, the company’s residential concept, which places the surrounding environment at the heart of choosing a home.
This can be seen in Savyoney Givat Shmuel, where the surrounding environment includes synagogues, parks, educational institutions, local commerce, playgrounds and transport links, and in Savyoney Ramat Sharet in Jerusalem, located in one of the city’s established green neighbourhoods.
For families abroad, these things matter. Jerusalem and Givat Shmuel are never just another location. They are home to strong Jewish communities, established religious life and surroundings that allow a family to imagine not only buying property, but building a Jewish home in Israel.
Together, these projects reflect a broader understanding: that for many Jews in the diaspora, the decision to create a home in Israel is not only practical, but rooted in identity, continuity and community. The Savyonim story began with a Zionist community from abroad that succeeded in building a real home in Israel; today, that same vision continues in a contemporary form.
Features
When a Personal Loan Can Be a Smarter Option Than Carrying Credit Card Debt
A lot of people keep credit card debt longer than they planned because the monthly minimum looks manageable, but that is the trap. The payment feels small enough to live with, but much of it goes to interest when the balance is high. That means the debt can drag on for years, even if you keep paying on time.
A personal loan can be a smarter option when you already know the debt will not be gone quickly. Instead of carrying a revolving balance with a high rate and no firm payoff date, you move the debt into a fixed loan with regular payments and a clear endpoint. That does not solve every debt problem, but in the right situation, it can reduce interest costs and make repayment more realistic.
The Core Difference Between These Two Types of Debt
Credit cards are flexible, so you can borrow, repay, and borrow again without applying every time. That flexibility is useful for day-to-day spending, emergencies, and short-term borrowing. It becomes expensive when a large balance sits there month after month.
A personal loan is structured. You borrow one amount upfront, then repay it over a set term, often between one and five years. The payment usually stays the same each month. That structure matters because it forces steady progress.
When a Personal Loan Usually Makes More Sense
A personal loan tends to be the better choice when the debt is already turning into a medium-term problem rather than a short-term one. That often means you are no longer using the card for convenience. You are using it as borrowed money and paying a high price for that access.
It can be a smart move in cases like these:
- You are carrying a balance for several months and do not see a realistic way to clear it soon
- Your card interest rate is much higher than the loan rate you qualify for
- You have debt across two or three cards and want one payment instead of several
- You need a fixed monthly amount so you can build a proper budget
- You want a firm payoff date instead of open-ended repayment
The Biggest Practical Advantage Is Predictability
If your monthly budget is already tight, uncertainty makes everything harder. Credit card minimum payments can rise as rates change or balances grow. Multiple cards also mean multiple due dates, different limits, and a higher chance of missing one payment.
A personal loan can make life simpler. You know the payment amount, the term, and the month the debt should be gone. That makes it easier to plan around rent, groceries, utilities, childcare, and other fixed costs. For many households, that predictability is just as valuable as the interest savings.
When you are comparing offers, a reputable financial institution like, for example, Innovation Federal Credit Union can explain the full cost of borrowing, not just the headline rate. That matters because the real question is not whether the payment looks fine today. The real question is whether the loan will make your debt cheaper, easier to manage, and less likely to come back.
Where People Make Mistakes
Paying off a card with a loan helps only if the card balance stays low afterwards. If the card fills up again, you end up with both the loan and new revolving debt. That is usually worse than the original problem.
Another mistake is focusing only on the monthly payment. A longer loan term can make the payment feel easier, but it may also increase the total amount of interest paid over time. A smaller payment is not automatically a better deal.
Before signing anything, check these points carefully:
- The loan interest rate
- Any origination or administration fees
- The total amount you will repay over the full term
- Whether you can make extra payments without penalty
- Whether the monthly payment truly fits your budget
- What you will do with the credit cards after the balance is paid off
When a Personal Loan Is Not the Better Option
If your credit is weak, the loan rate may not be much better than your card rate. In that case, the savings may be too small to justify the switch. If fees are high, the benefit can shrink even more.
It also may not help if the real issue is cash flow. If your income is not covering regular monthly bills, replacing card debt with a loan does not solve the shortage. The payment may look neater, but the pressure remains. In that case, the better step may be a hard review of spending, extra income, or professional debt advice.
A credit card can still be a better tool when you can pay off purchases quickly and in full. Used that way, a card can be convenient and cost nothing in interest. The problem starts when short-term borrowing quietly becomes long-term debt.
How to Decide
Pull together the numbers for every card you carry. Write down the balance, the interest rate, the minimum payment, and how much you usually pay each month. Then compare that with the full cost of a personal loan offer.
Look at these questions:
- How much interest will I pay if I keep the debt on my cards
- How much interest and fees will I pay with the loan
- How long will each option take to clear
- Can I manage the loan payment even in a tight month
- Am I ready to stop using the paid-off cards for routine spending
If the loan gives you a lower total cost, a clear payoff schedule, and a payment you can genuinely handle, it may be the smarter move.
A Good Loan Strategy Includes a Behaviour Plan
If you use a personal loan to clear card balances, decide in advance what happens next. Some people keep one card open for emergencies and put the others away. Others lower their limits or remove saved card details from shopping apps. Small changes like that can prevent the old pattern from restarting.
Set up automatic payments if possible. Put the loan due date just after payday. Build even a small emergency fund alongside repayment so an unexpected car repair or vet bill does not go straight back on the card. Those steps may sound basic, but they often make the difference between lasting progress and another round of debt.
To Sum Up
A personal loan can be a smarter option than carrying credit card debt when the debt is already lingering, the loan rate is meaningfully lower, and the monthly payment fits your budget without strain. The real advantage is not only lower interest. It is structure, clarity, and a realistic path to being done with the debt.
That said, a loan works best when it is paired with changed habits. If the card balance returns after the transfer, the loan will not have solved much.
Features
The United Arab Emirates are Moving Away from Saudi Arabia
By HENRY SREBRNIK The United Arab Emirates, the world’s third-largest oil producer, quit the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the end of April. And that’s a very big deal.
Apart from its effect on the cartel’s ability to control oil prices, the move reflects a widening confrontation with Saudi Arabia and a fundamental realignment of alliances as a result of the current Middle East war over Iran, as well as the ongoing civil war in Yemen.
The Saudi-Emirati fracture is not new, but it crossed a qualitative threshold in late 2025. On December 29, Saudi Arabian air strikes targeted an Emirati weapons convoy at the port of Mukalla in Yemen, an act without precedent between two nominal allies. Riyadh then publicly demanded the withdrawal of all UAE forces from Yemeni territory and in early 2026, that call was answered with the dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Abu Dhabi’s principal proxy in the country.
The Saudi foreign ministry accused the UAE of pressuring the STC to conduct military operations along the kingdom’s southern borders, describing the move as a direct threat to Saudi national security and a “red line” for Riyadh that it would not hesitate to confront.
These developments also point to a significant Emirati miscalculation. By backing the STC’s advance into eastern Yemen along the coast, Abu Dhabi has sought to build leverage over Saudi Arabia and Oman while consolidating its influence across the Arabian Sea and the Horn of Africa.
The Emiratis, however, underestimated both Riyadh’s willingness to assert itself directly in its immediate neighborhood and its enduring leverage over Yemen’s political and military actors. The episode emphasizes a central reality of the conflict: While the UAE has built deep influence through local partners, Saudi Arabia remains the decisive external actor in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia seeks to preserve the territorial integrity of Arab states and to position itself as a regional stabilising power. The UAE, on the other hand, has built, since 2015, a doctrine founded on force projection through non-state actors in Libya, Sudan, Somalia and Yemen.
The UAE has backed the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the Sudanese civil war that began in April 2023, while Riyadh supports the latter. In Somalia, breaking ranks with other Arab nations, the UAE became the first Arab and Muslim country to recognise the breakaway region of Somaliland.
“The Saudis want obedience, or at least alignment with their regional policies,” according to Jonny Gannon, a former senior CIA officer with decades of experience in the Middle East. “The Emiratis don’t want to be obedient. They want optionality.”
Most important, in 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf country and only the third Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords facilitated by the first Trump administration. That paved the way for other Arab countries, such as Bahrain and Morocco, to normalize ties with Israel.
The Saudis have attacked the UAE as “Israel’s Trojan Horse” and denounced the Abraham Accords, as “a political military alliance dressed in the garb of religion.” Emirati officials believe the Saudis are waging a deliberate incitement campaign centered on the UAE’s relationship with Israel. After Saudi Arabia bombed the UAE’s partner forces in Yemen last December, Saudi posts criticizing Israel spiked dramatically, with 77 per cent of the comments attacking the UAE as “Israel’s proxy executing Zionist plans to divide Arab states.”
The accords helped deepen economic, cultural, trade, investment, and intelligence cooperation between the UAE and Israel, which extended to defence as well. This is perhaps why Iran made the UAE its biggest target in the current war. Iran has launched roughly 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and over 2,200 drones specifically at the Emirates. For years, the UAE had pursued a strategy of “omni-alignment,” attempting to maintain deep security ties with Washington and economic ties with Beijing, while fostering a détente with Tehran to protect its status as a safe haven for global capital.
The Iranian bombardment violently disproved this thesis. It proved that economic integration and diplomatic hedging do not grant immunity when regional hostilities boil over. In a historic move, Israel deployed an active Iron Dome battery, accompanied by dozens of Israel Defence Forces operators, directly to the UAE to help defend Emirati airspace against Iran. This marked the very first time Israel deployed its premier air-defence system and its own troops to protect a foreign Arab nation. The UAE realized that when its survival was on the line, the Arab League issued statements, but Israel sent interceptors.
This traumatic realization served as the catalyst for Abu Dhabi to aggressively assert its own sovereignty, deciding that if it must endure the costs of a regional war, it will no longer subvert its economic or political interests to regional consortiums that offer no tangible protection.
So Abu Dhabi has made a choice that goes well beyond energy policy. It is purchasing American strategic goodwill, at the precise moment when its regional alliance framework is collapsing and when it needs a substitute security guarantee. With Iran having conducted direct attacks on Emirati territory and shipping, and with Saudi Arabia having shifted into open confrontation mode, Abu Dhabi’s strategic calculus has fundamentally changed. Washington is no longer a preferred partner. It has become a necessity.
Henry Srebrnik is a professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.