Lebanon’s army chief Joseph Aoun walks after being elected as the country’s president at the parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, Jan. 9, 2025. Photo: REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

Following Hamas’ barbaric invasion on October 7, 2023, events initially seemed confined to yet another localized confrontation between Israel and the Gaza Strip. However, developments across the Middle East since then have proven otherwise.

Rapid political and military shifts are propelling regional actors into a whirlwind of change. In an era shaped by foreign interventions, demographic and cultural shifts, and the influence of social media, the Middle East is transforming before our eyes, presenting challenges that lead to a range of possibilities — many of which remain unclear.

Israel’s response to the October 2023 events, culminating in the elimination of much of Hamas’ leadership, extended beyond Gaza’s borders. Lebanon, under Hezbollah’s control, was drawn into the chaos. The targeted killing of Hassan Nasrallah in Operation “New Order” created a leadership vacuum, possibly setting the stage for Lebanon to reinvent itself. The election of Joseph Khalil Aoun, a Maronite Christian, as Lebanon’s new president, represents an effort to prevent the nation’s collapse, restore stability, and reinforce Western influence.

Yet Lebanon’s internal issues, coupled with resistance from extremist factions like Hezbollah, cast doubt on whether Aoun can restore balance to a country that has been deeply fractured for more than 50 years.

Meanwhile, Syria’s crisis deepened following the flight of Bashar al-Assad, a president whose long, bloody civil war shattered his country.

Despite his name –“The Lion” — Assad ultimately revealed himself as fearful in the face of external and internal threats.

The emergence of Abu Muhammad al-Julani, former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, as Syria’s leader sparks both hope and concern, as the new regime is associated with extremist Islam. And Russia’s retreat in Syria, due to being bogged down in the Ukrainian quagmire, has significantly boosted Turkey’s influence.

Ankara is steadily becoming Syria’s new patron, following the decline of Iranian dominance, aligning with Erdogan’s ambitions to resurrect the glory of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Turkey’s control over northern Syrian territories and Israel’s incursions into southern Syria illustrate the shifting regional power map. The central question is how Syria’s new leadership will tackle these challenges, maintain internal stability, and strengthen its position in the region.

Not far away, Yemen continues to be the battleground for a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the Iran-backed Houthis launching missiles and drones at Saudi targets. Joint Israeli-American strikes, supported by Saudi Arabia, against Houthi military infrastructure have raised the question of whether Iran’s influence in Yemen will wane or persist as a threat.

In this context, while military shifts introduce new challenges, it remains unclear whether they will lead to long-term stability or exacerbate the conflict.

The situations in Egypt and Jordan are fundamentally different, yet similarly characterized by internal pressures. Egypt, under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, continues to suppress opposition, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the ongoing economic crisis threatens to undermine the country’s stability. The economic crisis is not just a domestic issue but a regional and global one, as Cairo struggles to secure Western support, particularly through large-scale development and investment projects. Jordan, considered relatively stable in the Middle East, faces mounting internal pressures while striving to maintain economic and security stability. The Hashemite monarchy’s position may come under renewed scrutiny this year, especially as tensions grow between local and global interests.

What is clear is that the Middle East is undergoing a dramatic transformation, with military and political events intertwining with social and economic developments. Social media, which has rapidly proliferated, plays a decisive role in shaping public opinion both locally and globally. The flood of information and growing criticism on these platforms directly influence governmental actions and public sentiment.

Against this backdrop, it is difficult to predict whether the region is on the brink of a stable new era, or whether more regimes will collapse or undergo significant change. A key question remains how Israel, as a central and influential power in the region, will shape the Middle East’s near future. It is evident that Israel’s governmental decisions — whether economic, judicial, or political — will continue to significantly impact the trajectories of neighboring states and the directions their leaders choose to pursue.

Itamar Tzur is an Israeli scholar and Middle East expert who holds a Bachelor’s degree with honors in Jewish History and a Master’s degree with honors in Middle Eastern Studies. As a senior member of the “Forum Kedem for Middle Eastern Studies and Public Diplomacy”. Tzur leverages his academic expertise to enhance understanding of regional dynamics and historical contexts within the Middle East.

The post The Middle East in 2025: The Beginning of a New Era — or a Year of More Chaos first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

An aerial view shows the bodies of victims of an attack following a mass infiltration by Hamas gunmen from the Gaza Strip lying on the ground in Kibbutz Kfar Aza, in southern Israel, Oct. 10, 2023. Photo: REUTERS/Ilan Rosenberg

Over the last few weeks, a pattern has emerged in the media coverage of a possible deal being ironed out to end hostilities between Israel and Hamas. Israel is being frequently condemned as the primary obstacle to a ceasefire being implemented (See here, here, here, here, and here).

But what’s never noted is that, for one thing, the October 7, 2023, Hamas invasion of Israel occurred during a ceasefire.

More broadly, Israel and Hamas have agreed to over a dozen ceasefire agreements in the past. They were all violated by Hamas.

Also missing from the reportage is the fact that Hamas has vowed to carry out similar assaults repeatedly in the future with the goal of eliminating Israel.

Such crucial background information could at least partly explain the Israeli government’s serious reservations about agreeing to yet another ceasefire with Gaza’s iron-fisted rulers.

Yet because most casual news consumers are not being made aware of Hamas’ long history of ceasefire violations, they are likely to think that the side that is pushing for a ceasefire today supports peace (Hamas), while the side that is opposed to a ceasefire is only interested in making war (Israel).

Whitewashing Hamas’ Genocidal Goals

This is a quote from a January 6, 2025, article in The Guardian, titled, “Reports of optimism about Gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal“:

Despite the latest talks, Israel has stepped up airstrikes on the Palestinian territory that killed at least 100 people over the weekend.

This piece and others depicting Israel as ceasefire obstructionists do mention the October 7 attacks, but they don’t describe Hamas’ motivations and goals. Instead, Hamas is regularly depicted as a rational, quasi-political organization that happens to include a military wing, and wants Israel to leave the Gaza Strip for no other reason than to be able to finally establish an independent Palestinian state.

As such, Israel’s perceived intransigence to a negotiated settlement is derided as counterproductive to the cause of peace.

In fact, Hamas has no interest in living side by side with Israel. From its founding, the terrorist outfit has been openly dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish State through jihad. Hamas states outright that it does not accept Israel’s right to exist, and pays lip service to the establishment of a Palestinian state as a mere temporary measure.

And while you’ll never see the words religious, or Jihadist used by top-tier media companies to describe Hamas, the organization’s entire raison d’etre is shaped by a fundamentalist, apocalyptic interpretation of Islam.

The below quote is from the Hamas Charter, or Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.

Media Memory-holes All Previous Israel-Hamas Ceasefires

It’s nothing short of amazing, considering the widespread coverage of developments related to a prospective ceasefire deal, that no mention is made of the many previous attempts at a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas. That’s because they all failed.

This is why history matters.

There is something appealing about a ceasefire in Gaza — especially in light of the hostage situation and suffering endured by Gazans who just happen to be ruled by a genocidal terrorist group.

But it would be foolhardy to ignore the fact that there is a long history of Hamas breaking ceasefire agreements.

Hamas has used Iranian support to launch several wars against Israel from its base in Gaza. So, to protect millions of Israeli citizens, the Jewish State was forced each time to respond militarily, including 2008’s Operation Cast Lead, 2012’s Operation Pillar of Defense, 2014’s Operation Protective Edge, and 2021’s Operation Guardian of the Walls.

And, of course, by committing the October 7, 2023 attacks, Hamas violated a previous ceasefire with Israel by launching thousands of rockets toward Israeli population centers, infiltrating the country, murdering Israelis, taking hostages, and using their own people as human shields.

Media Stifling Public Debate

One of journalism’s key functions is to help create forums for public debate. By not providing their readers with important background information about previous ceasefire attempts, and Hamas’ oft-stated goals that could be facilitated by another ceasefire, the world’s leading news publications are preventing a robust discourse on the issue from taking place.

Inside of Israel, that debate began on October 7. Reasonable men and women have divergent opinions as to the efficacy of a ceasefire deal. It’s the right of every Israeli citizen living in a democratic society to weigh in on this monumentally important topic.

Because they are well-informed, Israelis who support a ceasefire policy are also aware — from knowing about the previous ceasefires that went wrong — of the heavy price their country may well have to pay.

By not contributing to an honest public debate, news outlets around the world are effectively picking sides. That’s not good for journalism. And that’s not good for any democratic society that relies on an informed citizenry to survive.

Gidon Ben-Zvi, former Jerusalem Correspondent for The Algemeiner, is an accomplished writer who left Hollywood for Jerusalem in 2009. He and his wife are raising their four children to speak fluent English – with an Israeli accent. Ben-Zvi’s work has appeared in The Jerusalem Post, The Times of Israel, The Algemeiner, American Thinker, The Jewish Journal, Israel Hayom, and United with Israel. Ben-Zvi blogs at Jerusalem State of Mind (jsmstateofmind.com).  He is a contributor to HonestReporting, a Jerusalem-based media watchdog with a focus on antisemitism and anti-Israel bias — where a version of this article first appeared.

The post If Israel Ceases, Will Hamas Fire? Remember That a ‘Ceasefire’ Existed on October 6, 2023 first appeared on Algemeiner.com.

Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system intercepts rockets launched from the Gaza Strip, as seen from Sderot, Israel May 13, 2023 Photo: REUTERS/Ammar Awad

JNS.org – On Jan. 6, terrorists in northern Gaza fired three rockets toward Sderot, Ibim and Nir Am, one of which was intercepted by the Israeli Air Force, with the other two causing damage but no injuries. The attack came after days of sirens in southern Israel, only some of which were false alarms.

These incidents underline the vastly reduced yet persistent threat posed by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), whose rocket arsenals and operational capabilities have been significantly degraded since the start of the war on Oct. 7, 2023.

At the start of the war, Hamas and PIJ reportedly held 15,000 rockets and a five-brigade, division-strong invasion force capable of seizing Israeli territory and committing massacres. Today, their remnants consist of scattered guerrilla cells with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and explosives—as well as a handful of projectiles. Israeli assessments suggest that these groups collectively have no more than dozens of rockets left, perhaps as many as 100.

However, professor Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy in Jerusalem, believes it may be more than a handful.

“I think it’s more than dozens. I think we’re talking about a few hundred rockets. We have to remember that Hamas prepared in advance for launching very large barrages at Israel, and hence, many rockets were prepared ahead of time,” including in underground locations and in orchards, he told JNS.

Michael described the recent launches as the Gaza terrorist groups’ final performance, arguing that in the war’s aftermath they will not regain the ability to flood Israeli skies with rockets, retaining only the ability to sporadically launch a projectile.

Currently, the vast majority of the Hamas and PIJ arsenal has been destroyed, said Michael. He noted also that some of its precious few remaining rockets are being launched as IDF forces close in on them.

While Hamas retains small arms, TNT, and, potentially, the capacity for extremely restricted rocket production, “Compared to what they had in October, and even after Oct. 7, we’re talking about completely minimal capabilities,” he said.

IDF operations in northern Gaza since the ground operation there began on Oct. 27 have focused on clearing key areas such as Beit Hanoun and Jabalia of remaining Hamas elements. On Jan. 5, Israel’s Army Radio reported that rockets fired at the Erez Crossing had originated in Beit Hanoun, where the IDF’s Nahal Brigade had been operating.

A joint statement by the IDF and Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) on Jan. 5 detailed recent strikes on over 100 Hamas targets, resulting in the elimination of dozens of operatives and the destruction of rocket launch sites. These types of operations, combined with precision strikes and intelligence efforts, have diminished Hamas’s ability to operate freely in the northern Gaza Strip.

While the IDF has made substantial progress in northern Gaza, new challenges are emerging in Gaza City, south of that area, Michael said. “They will try to regroup and rebuild capabilities in areas where we are less present, and we must be vigilant,” he told JNS.

The IDF’s responses would include continuous intelligence monitoring and targeted operations, he added.

Despite their diminished arsenals, sporadic rocket fire continues, and remains a threat that must be taken seriously, he told JNS. “Even a single rocket that is not intercepted can cause damage and casualties, as we saw in Sderot,” he said.

“We need to be prepared for occasional rocket fire even after the war concludes,” he cautioned. He emphasized that intelligence and operational freedom would allow Israel to maintain pressure and respond swiftly to any renewed threats.

During a Jan. 2 call organized by the Washington D.C-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amikam Norkin, former commander of the Israeli Air Force, emphasized the ongoing need for military operations in Gaza, stating, “The IDF will be launching military operations against terrorists in Gaza every few weeks.”

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, former national security adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, stated on the same call, “I think that we succeeded in neutralizing Hamas as a military terrorist organization, but still Hamas is strong inside Gaza.” Amidror suggested that neutralizing Hamas entirely would take at least a year of sustained efforts, including targeting its leadership and infrastructure.

Amidror also raised the issue of governance post-conflict, asserting, “When it will not be relevant inside Gaza, we can call a third party to come into Gaza and take control of the civilian side. Until then, no one [externally] will be ready to take responsibility.”

On Jan. 4, IDF engineering units uncovered and destroyed a Hamas tunnel in central Gaza containing manufacturing facilities for munitions and explosives. The operation underscored ongoing efforts to dismantle the group’s remaining rocket production infrastructure.

The post Gaza Terrorists Likely Have ‘a Few Hundred’ Rockets Left first appeared on Algemeiner.com.